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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has become
intimately involved in trying to strengthen weak and failed states. External actors,
both multilaterally and unilaterally, have intervened in Europe, Asia, and Africa to
bring internally conflicted parties together and to change the domestic authority
structures of these countries. This dissertation explains how external actors can
successfully contribute to the development of domestic authority structures in conflicttorn or post-conflict countries.
Conventional state-building theories follow the Weberian conception of the
modern state as an entity that maintains a monopoly over the legitimate use of violent
coercion. Further, standard approaches to ending civil conflict recommend the use of
population-centric strategies to achieve stability. These prevailing assumptions are
problematic as they ignore a credible commitment problem that exists in conflict-torn
societies: elites within the government and opposition have no incentive to disarm due
to the rational fear that once they do so they will be taken advantage of by the
opposing elites. This dissertation proposes a theory of self-enforcing stability to
explain, from a rational-choice perspective, how it is possible to overcome this
credible commitment problem.
The theory contains four testable hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that an
elite-centric, rather than population-centric, strategy will lead to greater success in
establishing stability in conflict-torn states. Second, external actors contribute to the
establishment of stability more successfully when they help nations establish limited
iv

access orders created by elite pacts rather than encouraging the creation of liberal
democracies, or open access orders. Third, external actors must help internal actors
overcome their underlying credible commitment problems by guaranteeing elite pacts.
The final hypothesis is that the decentralization, or oligopolization, of violent means
and rent-seeking opportunities balances power amongst elites, ensuring that competing
elite groups can protect themselves from one another without threatening each other
with overwhelming force.
This dissertation finds support for the proposed theory’s hypotheses in its
examination of two cases: the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960, and the
stabilization effort in Iraq between 2006-2008, which includes the “Awakening
Movement” and the “Surge. Both cases demonstrate how an external actor can
contribute to developing enduring stability in conflict-torn societies by breaking from
the standard Weberian conception of the state and population-centric focus. This
dissertation concludes with a discussion of policy implications, based on the
dissertation’s findings, for current state-building efforts in Afghanistan.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Introduction
This dissertation explains how external actors can successfully contribute to
the development of domestic authority structures in conflict-torn or post-conflict
countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has become
intimately involved in trying to strengthen weak and failed states. External actors,
both multilaterally and unilaterally, have intervened in Europe, Asia, and Africa to
bring internally conflicted parties together and to change the domestic authority
structures of these countries. For instance, in 1995, the Dayton Accords ended the
civil conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and established an ad hoc international
organization, the Office of the High Representative, to oversee the state-building
efforts in Bosnia and to guarantee the agreement made between the formerly warring
factions. Since 1999, the United Nations has overseen efforts to build the state of East
Timor and keep conflict between the government and opposition from destabilizing
this nascent country. NATO has expanded its role in trying to stabilize Afghanistan
since 2003, but has still not been able to get the government and insurgents to see the
collective benefits that they could gain from a stable state.
The above examples of international intervention efforts follow the standard
conceptions of achieving peace. The standard models follow from the Weberian
conceptions of the state, where the modern state is one that maintains a monopoly over
the legitimate use of coercion by violence (Weber 1919 [2004]; 1978, 314). This
prevailing assumption is problematic, because in failed or fragile states, a credible
1

commitment problem exists between conflicting internal actors. To solve this
credibility problem, this dissertation argues that it is necessary to diversify the
legitimate use of force in order to create a balance of power in the failed or fragile
state. Further, standard approaches to ending conflict recommend population-centric
strategies, where this dissertation argues that an elite-centric approach is also
necessary to solve this credible commitment problem.
This dissertation examines two cases to show how an external actor can
contribute to stability in conflict-torn societies by breaking from the standard
Weberian conception of the state and population-centric focus: (1) the Malayan
Emergency from 1948 to 1960; and (2) the stabilization effort in Iraq between 20062008 that included the “Awakening Movement”, the tribal movement that began in
2006 to end the Sunni insurgency against Iraqi and coalition forces in order to counter
the influence of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the “Surge”, the increase in American resources
provided to Iraq in 2007.

1.2. Research Question
This dissertation focuses on the general topic of state-building. This is a broad
and emerging area within the field of political science. Despite years of interest in the
topic, only a nascent literature on state-building exists (Krasner 2009). Due to the
breadth of the topic, the narrowed research focus of the dissertation is to examine the
emergence of self-enforcing stability in conflict-torn states. This dissertation is
motivated by the following question: what is the appropriate social order external

2

actors should help nations attain in order for successful state-building to take place,
and what incentives can external actors provide to set host nations on this path?
With this focus on the establishment of enduring security, this dissertation
views counterinsurgency efforts as an element of the state-building process. Through
a game theoretic approach and case analyses, this dissertation refutes the prevailing
“hearts and minds” (HAM) theory both logically and empirically. The general HAM
argument is that counterinsurgents achieve victory by using largely non-military
means to win over the loyalty of the population, severing insurgents from their base of
support. The dissertation provides an alternative theory, and evidentiary support, that
explains how external actors should adopt an elite-centric, rather than populationcentric, approach that appeals to the rational self-interest of the opposing internal elites
to stabilize conflict. Elites are won by providing them with incentives to reduce
violence and allow governance, economic, and social development to take place that
make the elites better off in the long-run.
The starting point for the theory development in this dissertation is the
rational-choice framework established by North, Wallis, and Weingast (NWW)
(2009a) that conceptualizes the relationship between violence and social order. While
NWW focus on how order develops in societies based on the interaction of internal
actors, this dissertation adds to their framework by exploring the role of external
actors in contributing to the development of social order in fragile states.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to define several terms, which are
fundamental to the research question, and will be used repeatedly throughout the
course of the dissertation. State-building refers to the construction of self-enforcing
3

governance structures that establish stability in the state and allow for economic,
political, and social development to take place. Following Greif (2006), strategic
situations are defined as self-enforcing if each actor “finds it best to follow the
institutionalized [or expected] behavior that reproduces the institution,” or solidifies an
agreement between actors, and that the “implied behavior confirms the associated
beliefs and regenerates the associated norms” of the institution or agreement (15-16).
This dissertation defines stability as the reduction of violence to a manageable level.
Manageable is the point where violence does not inhibit the governance, economic,
and social development components of state-building to take place. Finally, this
dissertation uses social order, following NWW’s (2009a) discussion of open versus
closed access societies, to highlight the societal basis of governance structures rather
than regime type, which is the more common way to examine stability in the literature
(Lipset 1959; O'Donnell 1971; Przeworski et al. 2000). The analysis of social order
progression, as opposed to level of democracy, keeps this dissertation focused on
stability rather than a specific form of government.

1.3. Methodology
This dissertation adopts a rational-choice perspective, and follows an analytical
narratives approach to develop a theory of self-enforcing stability and to test the
theory empirically. This approach combines game theoretic analytical tools with
narratives that explore historical events and the context of the events. The approach
focuses on the choices and decisions between strategic actors in order to delineate
specific mechanisms that contribute to observed outcomes (Bates et al. 1998, 10-13).
4

By adopting this problem driven approach to understanding the conditions under
which self-enforcing stability emerges as a result of the involvement of external actors
in conflict-torn states, this dissertation begins to develop a more general theory of selfenforcing stability.

1.4. Hypotheses
The theory of self-enforcing stability developed in this dissertation contains
four main hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that an elite-centric, rather than
population-centric, strategy will lead to greater success in establishing stability in
conflict-torn states. The causal logic for this argument is that the government and
external actor have limited resources with which to counter the civil conflict, so rather
than spreading those resources thinly and directly to the population, distribution
through elites allows the elites to maintain power and have a stake in the future of the
nation. This logic is supported by Christia’s (2008, Forthcoming) findings that mesolevel elites control the behavior of the population under their influence through the
provision of security and rents. When the meso-level elites fail to provide either, then
the population is more prone to support national-level conflicts. Recent empirical
work supports this view that citizens follow the lead of elites. Berinsky (2007) found
that patterns of elite conflict, rather than individual citizen cost-benefit calculations,
shape the opinion of the American public in their support for military conflict.
Blaydes and Linzer (2010) similarly found that anti-Americanism amongst the “Arab
Street” is driven by elite-competition between Islamist and Arab-secular elites.

5

The second hypothesis is that external actors contribute to the establishment of
stability more successfully when they help nations establish limited access orders
(LAOs) rather than open access orders (OAOs). Everything in limited access orders is
personal and driven by elites through patron-client relationships. These relationships
tie elites into dominant coalitions that spread the benefits they receive across the
coalition, while limiting access to the privileges only to the members. The creation
and manipulation of interests in LAOs ensures social order (North et al. 2009a, 38).
Over time, some countries develop into open access orders, which are essentially
highly developed and consolidated, liberal and market-based democracies.
The lack of effective governance institutions in conflict-torn states creates the
conditions for extensive rent-seeking—or what some may view as endemic
corruption—and actors resort automatically to violence to solve conflicts. Moving too
quickly to open political and economic competition in such a society may cause elites
to return to what they know, corruption and violence, to achieve and maintain power.
Helping establish a limited access order—while not democratization per, the formation
of an LAO may contain some democratic mechanisms—allows stability to form and
the gradual extension of rule of law to more members of society and the development
of institutions that can enforce the extension of rule of law.
This dissertation’s third hypothesis is that the external actor must help internal
actors overcome their underlying credible commitment problems in order to put them
on the path towards self-enforcing stability. The external actor solves this problem by
guaranteeing a pact between a dominant coalition of elites. The external actor uses
credibility mechanisms—personnel, money, equipment, time, elections, institutional
6

development, and public statements of intent—that enable the external actor to punish
the transgressor of the pact. Preliminary support for this hypothesis comes from
Walter’s (2002) argument that combatants pursue and credibly commit to peace
settlements when third parties safeguard each combatant’s role in the post-war
government and minimize the risk of post-treaty exploitation. Further, Fortna (2008)
found that peacekeeping only works when peacekeepers shape the choices of the
combatants to choose peace over war. The mechanisms available to the external actor
that this dissertation describes highlight how the external actor can shape the
incentives, and, hence, the behavior of the combatants.
The final hypothesis counters the Weberian assumption that states must
maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in order to maintain order
(Weber 1919 [2004]). Drawing from the insights of NWW (2009a) about the role of
elite pacts in creating social order in limited access orders, this dissertation
hypothesizes that the decentralization, or oligopolization, of violent means amongst
competing elites allows stability to develop in conflict-torn societies. This
oligopolization of force creates a balance of power amongst elites, ensuring that
competing elite groups can protect themselves from one another without threatening
one another with overwhelming force. The logic of this hypothesis finds support from
De Figueiredo and Weingast’s (1999) rationality of fear argument, as well as from
recent empirical research on Columbia by Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos (2010)
who argue that non-state armed groups can help governments implement policies the
government would otherwise be unable to do.

7

1.5. Existing Literature
The dissertation’s focus on the establishment of security during the statebuilding process leads to the exploration of several areas of literature within political
science: civil war, state-building, counterinsurgency, and international peacekeeping.
Insight into the topic at hand can be drawn from the existing literature. The civil war
literature gives an understanding about the reasons behind the outbreak of civil
conflict, while the other three areas provide insight into how to resolve civil conflict.
However, an examination of the extant literature also illuminates some gaps in this
literature; it is these gaps that this dissertation indents to fill through the development
of a theory of self-enforcing stability.

1.5.1. Conflict Outbreak
1.5.1.1. Civil War Literature
One literature that this dissertation builds upon is the civil war literature. Civil
war and counterinsurgency are closely related, but the civil war literature is more
developed theoretically. Yet, political scientists still have difficulty distinguishing the
difference between civil war and insurgency empirically. Fearon and Laitin (2003)
obscure this difference by saying that insurgency is a tactic of war, but they and others
(Gompert and Gordon 2008) use the terms interchangeably and use the same
conventional measurement of battle deaths to empirically define both civil war and
insurgency (Small and Singer 1982). In explaining the incidence of civil war, the
literature has three primary causal arguments that one can transfer to explain the
outbreak of insurgency. First is the grievance approach. According to Gurr (1970),
8

without a responsive government, “relative deprivation” will solve a societal collective
action problem and lead the population to support a rebellion. Without those
grievances, the insurgents will fail to gain support from the population. Micro-level
research by Kalyvas (2006) demonstrates that local grievances about inequality can
lead to marco-level civil conflicts.
A second explanation of civil conflict is based on greed. According to this
argument by Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) and Weinstein (2006), nations with an
abundance of lootable natural resources or large illegal or informal sector-based
economies provide the incentives for rebels to seek control of the state. The resources
reduce the rebel’s dependence on the population for support.
The final approach to understanding civil conflict is based on the premise that
civil conflict occurs when there is sufficient opportunity. Fearon and Latin (2003)
argue that rough terrain and state strength, proxied by GDP per capita, predict civil
war onset, because they determine the ability of the government to defeat
insurgencies. A weakness of their finding though is that GDP per capita may capture
poverty, which is a grievance rather than proxy for state strength. Collier, Hoeffler,
and Rohner (2009) also argue that the financial and military feasibility of rebellion is
an important factor in determining the outbreak of civil conflict.

1.5.2. Conflict Resolution
1.5.2.1. State-building Literature
In the area of state-building, several approaches attempt to explain how the
process occurs, yet no overarching theory exists to explain how external actors can
9

contribute to the development of stability in conflict-ridden states. Modernization
theory argues that economic development needs to occur for governance improvement
to take place (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000). This theory does not account for
the role of security in setting the conditions for development to occur. The political
institutionalization approach argues that to achieve stability, states must first build the
institutional capacity necessary for effective governance (Huntington 1965, 1968;
Fukuyama 2004). The implication is that the state must centralize control and prevent
political mobilization from exceeding state capacity. Finally, the rational-choice
institutionalism approach argues that the incentives of the key actors must be aligned
for state-building to take place (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; North et al. 2009a).
The key gap in the state-building literature is that all of the approaches treat
external actors as exogenous shocks to the process. As an exogenous shock, the
external actor may impact a process, but the process is assumed to have no influence
on the external actor. So, in this case, the external actor does not incorporate strategic
considerations (a decision based on the expectations of another’s actions) into its
behavior or role in the state-building process. This dissertation argues that when
external actors take part in a state-building process, they are endogenous to the
development of the host state. In other words, while the external actor’s preferences
and behavior directly affect the development of stability and the success or failure of
state-building, the actions of the host-nation participants to the state-building process
influence the external actor, so the external actor may behave strategically. As the
external actor is endogenous to state-building, the external actor has at its disposal
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various mechanisms that it can exploit to shape the outcome of the state-building
process depending on the strategies of other actors in the strategic situation.

1.5.2.2. Counterinsurgency Literature
Within the counterinsurgency literature, the prevailing paradigm argues that
counterinsurgents—the government and the supporting external actors—must adopt a
population-centric strategy to win the “hearts and minds” (HAM) of the populace.
Counterinsurgents undermine the insurgents and win the “hearts and minds” of the
population through the provision of public goods and services, demonstrating the
legitimacy of the government. Further, according to this theory, counterinsurgents
must use minimal force against the population, and have adaptive leaders and
organizations to develop and implement HAM policies (Galula 1964 [2006];
Thompson 1966; Kitson 1971; Nagl 2005 [2002]; Department of the Army 2006;
Kilcullen 2009). This population-centric theory, or “hearts and minds” approach,
however, ignores the role of elites and their incentives. This dissertation develops an
elite-centric theory to better understand the role of elites in the development of
stability and their impact on state-building success or failure.

1.5.2.3. International Peacekeeping Literature
Finally, this dissertation uses the knowledge developed in the international
peacekeeping literature to fill some of the gaps in the literatures discussed above.
Walter (2002) argues that the implementation stage is the most important stage of the
civil conflict resolution process. She found that combatants pursue and credibly
11

commit to peace settlements when third parties verify and enforce demobilization and
safeguard each combatant’s role in the post-war government. The third-party
guarantees are vital to the combatants’ credible commitment due to the enormous risks
of post-treaty exploitation.
Fortna (2008) examined both the role of the peacekeepers and the peacekept
(the combatants). She found that peacekeeping only works when peacekeepers shape
the choices of the combatants to choose peace over war. She argued that four
pathways contributed to the continuation of violence: “aggression, fear and mistrust,
accident …, and political exclusion” (175). Fortna then explains that peacekeepers
can block these pathways by changing incentives to favor peace over war, reduce the
security dilemma between the parties, prevent or control the impact of accidents, and
dissuade the parties from excluding the other from the political process. This
dissertation applies Walter’s and Fortna’s findings about the importance of external
actors in solving credible commitments between combatants in civil conflict to how
external actors can help achieve a level of stability that allows state-building to occur.

1.6. The Dissertation’s Contribution
Building on the rational-choice framework, this dissertation fills the gap in the
nascent state-building literature by incorporating external actors as components of the
process. The dissertation also reevaluates conventional approaches in the
counterinsurgency literature by focusing on elites rather than the population as the unit
of analysis, and focusing on aligning incentives of these actors instead of trying to
directly win “hearts and minds.” Further, it contributes to the literature by formalizing
12

the population-centric “hearts and minds” theory in an extended-form game model,
and developing an alternative theory to explain how external actors can contribute to
the establishment of stability in conflict-torn states.
It is important to analyze quintessential counterinsurgency cases to see if there
exists empirical support for the theoretical argument. The lessons learned from these
cases have policy implications for the role of external actors in modern state-building
during civil conflict. Conventional HAM proponents argue that host governments
need outside “experts” to help solve the legitimacy problems that led to the outbreak
of insurgency. HAM and its state-building emphasis have the potential to develop into
the 21st century version of the “White Man’s Burden” (Kipling 1899). Yet, data on the
ability of external actors to help governments defeat insurgents warns that this is a
burden that must be taken on very cautiously.
Table 1.1 shows that external actors have supported governments in 34% of all
completed insurgencies since 1945. Yet, the success rate for governments defeating
insurgencies is lower with the help of external actors. The government won when they
had direct external actor support and indirect support in only 23.5% and 25% of the
cases, respectively. This is compared to the government losing when external actors
provided direct and indirect support to governments 29.4% and 50% of the time,
respectively. This may be because external actors only help in the toughest cases.
Regardless of the reason an external actor helps to defeat an insurgency, Table 1.1
shows that defeating an insurgency is a real hard problem. Further, while the data
does not differentiate HAM from other COIN efforts, the data does raise questions
about the “expertise” of external actors in fighting counterinsurgency campaigns. This
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data clarifies why would-be counterinsurgents must do a better job in learning what
mechanisms and under what conditions an external actor’s involvement has the
greatest correlation with success in defeating an insurgency.

Table 1.1. Completed Insurgencies, 1945-2009 (Gompert and Gordon 2008,
Appendix A)
This dissertation seeks to identify how external actor’s can best contribute to
ending insurgencies and developing long-lasting stability. Through the formalization
of the population-centric “hearts and minds” theory and the development of an elitecentric theory of self-enforcing stability, this dissertation reevaluates the purported
HAM success stories during the Malaya Emergency, 1948-1960, and the “Surge” in
Iraq, 2006-2008. In the case analyses of both the Malayan Emergency and the
“Surge”, this dissertation found that neither case follows the expected logic described
by the formal HAM model. The formalization of the population-centric theory also
shows that the theory, at least rhetorically, focuses more on winning the population’s
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“hearts” and ignores their “minds”. Additionally, the data on each of the cases
suggests that means other than those proposed by the HAM narratives were used to
change the behavior of the population. In both Malaya and Iraq, the counterinsurgents
relied more on coercive than persuasive means to change the behavior of the
population.
After analyzing the HAM model and narrative against the data from the
Malayan Emergency and the “Surge”, the dissertation tests the theoretical logic and
empirical arguments of the theory of self-enforcing stability. The theory held up to the
analysis of both cases, suggesting that the four main arguments of the theory may be
more generalizable. In both Malaya and Iraq, the external actor pursued elite-centric
strategies to help the host government and opposition overcome their credible
commitment problems, which were the main cause of violence in both cases.
As the competing elites were the source of the credible commitment problems
that blocked Malaya and Iraq from achieving stability, the external actors recognized,
in practice though not rhetoric, the need to focus directly on elites, rather than the
population. The external actor in both cases used different credibility mechanisms to
guarantee pacts between dominant coalitions of elites. These mechanisms included a
combination of the provision of resources—in the form of personnel, money,
equipment, and time, as well as elections, institutional development, and public
statements of intent.
In both Malaya and Iraq, the external actors diversified power between the
government and opposition, rather than centralizing power within the government.
They diversified power through the oligopolization of violent means and distribution
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of rent-seeking between government and opposition elites who agreed to join an elite
pact. In Malaya, the British established over 450,000-armed local Chinese personnel
to provide self-protection and to punish the members of their community who did not
abide by the pact. In Iraq, the coalition did the same with the Sunni population during
the “Awakening Movement”, supporting over 95,000 local self-defense forces (the
Sons of Iraq). The external actor also distributed resources through local leaders in
both cases. The reductions in violence in both Malaya and Iraq allowed the elites to
increase their prosperity, and showed the elites they are all better off in the long-run
through cooperation.
Additionally, in both Malaya and Iraq, the external actors established limited
access orders (LAOs) rather than democracies. The British supported governance
structures in Malaya that limited access to the benefits of governance to members of a
pact established between the Chinese and Malay elites. The same happened in Iraq,
where the coalition limited the provision of benefits, authorized security forces, and
rent-seeking opportunities to just certain Sunni and Shi’a elites. In both cases, the
limitation of access and use of the external actors’ credibility mechanisms enabled and
supported the ability of the elites to punish any transgressors of the agreements. In
Malaya, the pact become self-enforcing, while in Iraq, the external actor set the
conditions for the possibility of the pact to become self-enforcing.
In summation, this dissertation contributes to the literature by providing an
alternative to the conventional population-centric and Weberian approaches to ending
conflict in failed states. The standard approach seeks to have external actors solve the
problem of violence by winning over the affection of the population through the
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provision of public goods and services and by forcing the opposition to lay down its
arms and grant the government a monopoly over violence. The theory developed and
tested in this dissertation shows that the Weberian approach leads the opposition to
fear government abuse, providing no incentive to stop fighting. To end violence, the
external actor has to focus on aligning the incentives of the elites rather than winning
the affection of the population. The standard approaches fail to recognize this
incentive problem, therefore, misdiagnosing the problem and providing inadequate
solutions. This dissertation identifies the problem as the failure of the government and
opposition elites to provide credible commitments to one another, and argues the
solution is the diversification of power within a limited access order among a
dominant coalition of government and opposition elites.

1.7. Dissertation Outline
The dissertation consists of several components. Chapter 2 critically analyzes
the existing literature. The chapter emphasizes the counterinsurgency literature, as
this dissertation focuses largely on the security development aspect of state-building in
conflict-torn states. This chapter critiques the prevailing population-centric “hearts
and minds” theory logically and empirically. The chapter uses an extended form game
to explain flaws in the underlying logic of the HAM theory. The chapter shows
empirically that the actions taken by nations who have claimed to follow a HAM
approach do not match the rhetoric of HAM theory’s proponents or doctrine.
Chapter 3 develops an alternative to HAM theory—a theory of self-enforcing
stability. Again, the dissertation uses game theory to explain the logic of this
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argument. The theory incorporates and contains detailed explanations of the four
hypotheses of the theory stated in Section 1.4. Chapter 3 contains two extended form
models to explain this theory of self-enforcing stability. The first model examines the
role of an intervening external actor who enters the host nation during or following
hostilities between internal actors to help establish self-enforcing stability. The
second model explores the role that an external actor who is already stationed inside
the host nation prior to hostilities may have in helping establish self-enforcing
stability.
Chapters 4 and 5 consist of two analytical narratives that test the validity of the
competing theories presented in Chapters 2 and 3: the “hearts and minds” theory and
the theory of self-enforcing stability. Chapter 4 reexamines the Malayan Emergency
from 1948 to 1960. This case is the “most-likely” case (George and Bennett 2005,
120-123) for examining the strength of HAM, because proponents of HAM regularly
use Malaya as its example of success. By first reexaming the Malaya case with the
formal model of HAM (derived in Chapter 2), the case analysis shows that the
outcome does not follow the logic of the population-centric HAM approach. The
chapter then analyzes Malaya through the logic of the theory of self-enforcing
stability. This analysis finds that the outcome in Malaya more closely follows the
logic of the elite-centric “post-colonial model” defined in the Chapter 3.
Chapter 5 again tests the HAM logic derived in the model in Chapter 2; this
time, though, against the case of the stabilization that took place in Iraq between 2006
and 2008. Again, the outcome does not follow the HAM logic, and more closely
follows the logic of the elite-centric “Podesta model” of self-enforcing stability
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derived in Chapter 3. Finally, the dissertation concludes in Chapter 6 with a
discussion of the implications of the findings from the analytical narratives, as well as
the generalizability of the theory of self-enforcing stability, and paths for further
research and testing of the theory.
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Chapter 2: Critical Analysis of Conventional Counterinsurgency Theory
“[Rebellion] must have…a population…sympathetic to the point of not betraying
rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellion can be made by two percent active in a
striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic.” – T.E. Lawrence (1929 [2010])
2.1. Introduction
At the start of the 21st century, as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
counterinsurgency has reemerged as an en vogue military term. Students and scholars
who have argued that the United States lost in Vietnam because military leaders failed
to recognize that the United States faced an insurgency (Krepinevich 1986) and that
the military did not shift to counterinsurgency tactics in Vietnam because the Army
lacked a learning culture (Nagl 2005 [2002]) have influenced the strategic direction of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The reigning conventional wisdom, that to defeat
these ongoing insurgencies by winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi and Afghan
people, has dominated current US and British military doctrine (Department of the
Army 2006; British Army 2009) and policy decisions by Presidents Bush and Obama.
The overarching principles of the “Petraeus Doctrine”, codified in FM 3-24:
Counterinsurgency, provided the basis for the “Surge” ordered by President Bush in
Iraq (Bush 2007b), as well as the revised Afghanistan strategy approved by President
Obama (Obama 2009).
The conventional wisdom actually is fairly simple rhetorically. It starts with
the assumption that insurgencies are mass social phenomena (Mao 1961 [2000]; Taber
1965 [2002]; Department of the Army 2006, 1-1--1-19); therefore an effective
counterinsurgency strategy must be population-centric. The counterinsurgents must
compete with insurgents for control of and influence over the population. So, the
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counterinsurgents should implement a “hearts and minds” strategy that protects the
population and improves the effectiveness and legitimacy of the central government,
winning the affection and loyalty of the population. But executing this strategy is
quite complex, and why its proponents self-approvingly call it the “graduate level of
war” (Department of the Army 2006, 1-1). COIN proponents have operationalized
this strategy through the concept of “clear, hold, and build” (National Security Council
2005, 18-22; Packer 2006; Frontline 2007). This “graduate level” characterization,
however, implies that conventional warfare is the “undergraduate level of war” and is
simpler to conduct.
The propagation of the counterinsurgency conventional wisdom has occurred
with little debate about the theoretical underpinnings of “hearts and minds” or the
“lessons learned” about previous counterinsurgency1 experiences. The proponents of
this view of counterinsurgency have developed the moniker “COINdinistas” (Ricks
2009a), implying their rebelliousness against the dominance of conventional warfare
in thinking about how to conduct war. Yet, as one of the contemporary patron saints
of the conventional wisdom states, “The world community of specialists in these
issues is small and tightly knit” (Kilcullen 2009, xv). Unfortunately, this tightly knit
community has mostly promulgated an uncritical groupthink about COIN theory.
Twenty-first century COIN proponents have largely adopted the ideas of a few authors

1

The theory and lessons learned described in this chapter are about what today is commonly referred to
as counterinsurgency, but at different times have been referred to as guerrilla warfare, small wars,
imperial policing, irregular warfare, or asymmetric warfare. This dissertation treats these terms
interchangeably.
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from the 1960s (Galula 1964 [2006]; Thompson 1966; Kitson 1971)2, making modern
proponents the protectors of the COIN orthodoxy rather than the self-promoted rebels
of military thinking. This younger generation has merely displaced the older
generations’ convention that “no more Vietnams” meant fighting wars with
overwhelming force3 with the view that “no more Vietnams” means preparation for
counterinsurgency warfare should take precedence over preparation for interstate
conventional warfare (Van Creveld 1991; Boot 2005).4
“Hearts and minds”, a term attributed to General Sir Gerard Templer after his
use of the phrase in Malaya, conjures the image of benign activity and intent by the
counterinsurgents to gain the affection and loyalty of the population. HAM makes a
good bumper-sticker slogan, but there has been limited critical analysis of the logical
and empirical basis for the theory5. This chapter proceeds by examining the prevailing
counterinsurgency literature. First, the chapter explores the history of
counterinsurgency warfare, literature that influences counterinsurgency thinking, and

2

The primary theories and lessons learned come from the experience of the British in Malaya
(Thompson and Kitson) or the French in Algeria (Galula). The three main authors from which other
heavily cited works derive their ideas from are Sir Robert Thompson (1966), Sir Frank Kitson (1960,
1971), and David Galula (1964 [2006]).
3

The desire to prevent future Vietnams was codified in the “Weinberger/Powell Doctrine” (Weinberger
1984).
4

While the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (Department of Defense 2010) says that the
United States must be able to face “two capable nation-state aggressors” (vi), the QDR excludes that
from the six key missions of the Department of Defense. These are: 1) “Defend the United States and
support civil authorities at home”; 2) “Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism
operations”; 3) “Build the security capacity of partner states”; 4) “Deter and defeat aggression in antiaccess environments”; 5) “Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction”; and 6)
“Operate effectively in cyberspace” (2).
5

Some critical analysis of the theory’s logic occurred at the RAND Corporation in the 1970s by Leites
and Wolfe (1970), and there has been an emerging empirical revisionist critique of the lessons learned
in Malaya (Purcell 1954; Hack 1999, 2009; Dixon 2009; Bennett 2009).
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then the leading counterinsurgency theories. Second, the chapter explains the causal
logic of counterinsurgency’s population-centric “hearts and minds” theory and its
underlying assumptions that come from the state development literature. A game
theory model helps further clarify the theory and depicts what one should expect if the
logic of the HAM theory holds. Third, the chapter provides a logical critique of the
population-centric theory, showing how missing components in the theory’s logic
prevent HAM from satisfactorily explaining the outcome of counterinsurgency
warfare. Finally, the chapter empirically critiques the population-centric theory,
demonstrating that the policy implementation of the theory does not match the
romanticized image of HAM.

2.2. Brief History of Counterinsurgency Warfare
2.2.1. Asymmetry is Not a New Phenomenon
While insurgency is a term of the late 20th century, the underlying concepts
about internal war and the use of unconventional means are not new. Many different
words have been used to describe similar strategies and tactics, despite differences in
technology, throughout history. Asymmetric warfare has existed since nearly the first
wars. The idea behind asymmetric warfare is that the weaker side uses tactics outside
of the “norms” of warfare to attack or exploit weaknesses in a stronger force. The
Scythians of Central Asia used hit-and-run tactics between the 5th and 3rd centuries
B.C.E. against the Persian armies of Darius the Great, and later against the
Greek/Macedonian armies of Alexander the Great. The Romans broke the “norms” of
warfare at the time to use assassinations and raiding parties against Hannibal
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following several disastrous defeats. And, the Romans faced asymmetric resistance
against their forces, such as the struggle led by Judas Macabee. The Continental
Army also used such strategies and tactics to exploit the weaknesses of the stronger
British forces during the American Revolution.
The same elements of asymmetric warfare existed in the development of
guerilla warfare, or “little war”, by the Spanish in the 18th century. This period
solidified warfare of armed civilians against a nation-state using tactics outside of the
“norms” of war among nation-states at the time, such as ambushes, sabotage, snipers,
and hit-and-run tactics. By the 18th century, nation-states fought wars by standing and
facing each other in battle. The word guerilla was coined to describe a band of
fighters, separate from the Spanish Army, who fought Napoleon’s army as part of the
Peninsular War after Napoleon’s invasion of Spain in 1808. The guerrillas’ principal
function was to disrupt the supply and communication lines of the French army by
intercepting messages and by seizing convoys of supplies, arms, and money. Guerilla
warfare followed this pattern through the turn of the 20th century with the Philippine
Insurrection against US forces in the Philippines following the Spanish-American war.
Guerrilla warfare evolved into the “People’s War,” developed by Mao TseTung, at the start of the 20th century. Mao recognized the impossibility of
overthrowing the ruling Chinese regime without developing a large base of support,
and that it would be suicide to attack the Chinese nationalist forces directly in battle at
the opening stages of war. Mao (1961 [2000]) identified three stages to the “People’s
War”. The first (strategic defense) is devoted to organization, consolidation, and
preservation of regional base areas. Cadres train and indoctrinate volunteers, while
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agitators and propagandists go out and “persuade” or “convince” surrounding
populations to support the rebels. Sympathizers willing to supply food, recruits, and
information form the base of support. The rebels limit military operations during this
phase, which is conspiratorial, clandestine, methodical, and progressive, to lay the
foundation for the next two phases.
Acts of sabotage and terrorism dominate the second phase (strategic
stalemate), and the rebels liquidate collaborators and “reactionary elements”. The
“asymmetric” attacks target vulnerable military and police outposts, in order to
procure arms, ammunition, and other essential supplies (communications equipment
and medical supplies). This phase also helps solidify and strengthen support amongst
the base by showing the strength of the guerrillas and by “liberating” more territory.
During this period, the guerrillas form “militias” to protect the base areas from the
government, as well as to recruit and inspire subversives or collaborators within the
community. This phase is not focused on winning over the minds of the population; it
is more about controlling the population. The guerrillas shift to the offensive as a
conventional army to face and defeat the enemy forces during the final phase (strategic
counteroffensive).
This long history of asymmetric warfare and Mao’s articulation of “People’s
War” in On Guerrilla Warfare (1961 [2000]) became the basis for most efforts of
modern insurgency. Fidel Castro advocated very similar ideas during the Cuban
Revolution, which Che Guevara exported into Latin America and Africa under the
banner of foco theory. The central principal of this theory is that a small vanguard of
cadres should lead highly-mobile paramilitary groups that provide a focus for popular
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discontent with the ruling regime, ultimately leading the people to a general
insurrection (Guevara 1961 [1998]). Variations of these ideas also spread throughout
most of the former colonies of the European empires that dissolved after WWII during
the wars of independence. Some argue that insurgency has again evolved in the 21st
century from the rural nature that typified insurgencies throughout much of the 20th
century to an urban basis due to globalization (Gompert and Gordon 2008). Further,
colonial powers developed the current COIN practices at a time when they attempted
to retain their colonies. Today, however, foreign actors involved in COIN are actually
trying to set conditions for themselves to leave, rather than to stay (Hussain 2010).

2.2.2. Defining the Topic
The literature lacks a single, clear, agreed upon definition of insurgency or
counterinsurgency (COIN), yet there are some common components and a distinction
between theoretical and empirical definitions. It is best to start by defining an
insurgency, since COIN is a response to an insurgency. That is one of the problems
with modern COIN theory; it is reactive rather than proactive. In other words, modern
COIN responds to an insurgency after it has broken out, rather than providing a theory
about how to address the underlying conditions that enable insurgencies and/or
prevent insurgencies from starting in the first place.
For the theoretical definition of insurgency, this dissertation uses the Central
Intelligence Agency’s (Undated) definition, which states:
Protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the
resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political
organizations. Insurgent activity … is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy
while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. [Italics added for emphasis]
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The distinction between insurgency and civil war is unclear in the theoretical
literature. Jim Fearon (2007) defines a civil war as “a violent conflict within a country
fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to
change government policies” (4) [italics added for emphasis], which is very similar to
the CIA’s definition of insurgency. Ultimately, insurgency, civil war, and guerrilla
warfare all describe an opposition that raises arms against a government in order to
seize control of some or all power from the ruling regime.
The same lack of clarity, or interchangeability, exists in the empirical
literature. Political scientists commonly use the threshold of more than 1,000
battledeaths in conflict to define a civil war, though variation exists within the
literature. Some researchers use 1,000 combat-deaths per year, with at least 5% on
each side, as the criteria for defining a civil war (Small and Singer 1982; Collier and
Hoeffler 2004), while others use an average of at least 100 battledeaths per year of
conflict, and at least 100 total battledeaths on each side (Doyle and Sambanis 2000;
Fearon and Laitin 2003).
The nascent empirical literature on insurgency has borrowed from civil war
data sets to test relationships. But to maintain focus on insurgencies, the analysts have
removed a few internal war events—coups, countercoups, and spontaneous
insurrections—from the data sets (Gompert and Gordon 2008). Some scholars define
insurgency merely as a tactic or technology of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003).
This nuanced distinction allows scholars to avoid having to paraphrase Justice Potter
Stewart and say, “I know [the difference between a civil war and insurgency] when I
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see it.” While, undoubtedly, certain tactics are more common in intrastate wars than
in conventional conflicts, tactics are just one point on a continuum that leads one actor
to compel the will of another. Insurgents and counterinsurgents, just like conventional
interstate combatants, employ grand strategy and strategy, as well as tactics. Grand
strategy is the actor’s use of all elements of power6 to achieve the actor’s desired
objectives. Strategy7 in war is how an actor plans to use armed force to achieve
military or political objectives. Finally, tactics define how armed units employ
weaponry and fight battles (Arreguin-Toft 2001).
The counterinsurgency literature also largely focuses on tactics and strategy
rather than on a theory of COIN. Since counterinsurgency is generally treated as a
reaction to an insurgency, this dissertation uses the Army’s counterinsurgency
manual’s (2006) definition that states:
“The primary objective of [counterinsurgency] is to foster development of effective
governance by a legitimate government. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by the
balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means” [italics added for emphasis] (121).

The purpose of the COIN manual is to provide guidance for developing COIN
strategy and tactics. The above definition incorporates modern beliefs in liberal
governance into COIN. The manual implies in its definition of legitimate that only
governments that rule primarily through the voluntary consent of the governed are

6

The U.S. military defines the elements of national power as diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic power (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996, I-5; 2007 [2009], x). Diplomatic in this definition
subsumes political or governance power. This paper removes the word national, because non-state
actors, such as insurgents, also have the potential for these elements of power.
7

This is different than the definition of strategy used in game theory to describe the interaction between
actors. This analysis in this chapter and the rest of this dissertation uses the game theory definition of
strategy.
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legitimate. The manual builds on the tradition and lessons of previous
counterinsurgents, such as T.E. Lawrence, Dave Galula, Sir Robert Thompson, and Sir
Frank Kitson, who originally developed most of the “best practice” strategy and tactics
in the Army’s COIN manual. This chapter, though, does not examine the strategy or
tactics of internal war; rather this chapter focuses on the theory of counterinsurgency.

2.3. Influences on the Counterinsurgency Literature
Before turning to the primary arguments in the counterinsurgency (COIN)
literature, it is useful to understand where some of the ideas in the COIN literature
originated. This section briefly examines the influence of the civil war, international
peacekeeping, and state-building literatures on thoughts about counterinsurgency.

2.3.1. Civil War Literature
The civil war literature largely influences the theoretical component that
explains the outbreak of insurgencies. Three primary causal arguments explain the
incidence of civil war in this literature. One can transfer these three explanations to
explain the outbreak of insurgency. First, the grievance approach argues that without
a responsive government, “relative deprivation” will solve a societal collective action
problem and lead the population to support a rebellion (Gurr 1970). Without those
grievances, the insurgents will fail to gain support from the population. Second, the
greed hypothesis argues that nations with an abundance of lootable natural resources
or large illegal or informal sector-based economies provide the incentives for rebels to
seek control of the state. The resources reduce the rebel’s dependence on the
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population for support (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004; Weinstein 2006). The final
approach argues that civil conflict occurs based on opportunity. Fearon and Latin
(2003) argue that rough terrain and state strength, proxied by GDP per capita, predict
civil war onset, because they determine the ability of the government to defeat
insurgencies. A weakness of their finding, though, is that GDP per capita may capture
poverty, which is a grievance rather than proxy for state strength. Collier, Hoeffler,
and Rohner (Collier et al. 2009) also argue that the financial and military feasibility of
rebellion is an important factor in determining the outbreak of civil conflict.
While the civil war literature helps develop a theoretical foundation for the
outbreak of insurgencies, it also provides initial thoughts for how to counter an
insurgency. Some lessons for the government include responsively solving the
grievances of the population, limiting access of insurgents to economic resources, or
reducing the opportunity for insurgencies to start a rebellion in the first place.

2.3.2. International Peacekeeping Literature
While the civil war literature provides some insight to explain the outbreak of
internal war and the role of governments, the international peacekeeping literature
contributes to an analysis of COIN by examining the role of external actors in ending
civil conflict. This dissertation also builds upon the knowledge developed in this
literature about external actors helping solve credible commitment problems in other
states. Walter (2002) argues that the implementation stage is the most important stage
of the civil conflict resolution process. She found that combatants pursue and credibly
commit to peace settlements when third parties verify and enforce demobilization, and
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safeguard each combatant’s role in the post-war government. The third-party
guarantees are vital to the combatants’ credible commitment due to the enormous risks
of post-treaty exploitation.
Fortna (2008) examined both the role of the peacekeepers and the peacekept
(the combatants). She found that peacekeeping only works when peacekeepers shape
the choices of the combatants to choose peace over war. She argued that four
pathways contributed to the continuation of violence: “aggression, fear and mistrust,
accident …, and political exclusion” (175). Fortna then explains that peacekeepers
can block these pathways by changing incentives to favor peace over war, reduce the
security dilemma between the parties, prevent or control the impact of accidents, and
dissuade the parties from excluding the other from the political process. The
international peacekeeping literature provides insights into methods counterinsurgents
can use to solve credible commitment problems between the actors involved in
fighting and countering an insurgency. Despite these lessons, the prevailing
population-centric counterinsurgency paradigm, discussed below, ignores these
credible commitment challenges in explaining how to defeat an insurgency. Chapter 3
proposes an elite-centric theory that incorporates knowledge about peacekeeping.

2.3.3. State-building Literature
While the civil war literature provides insight into causes of insurgency and the
international peacekeeping literature explains possible roles for external actors in
ending internal conflict, the state-building literature explains ideas for how
counterinsurgents may overcome the causes that led to the outbreak of insurgency.
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This section provides a brief overview of the state-building literature, while the
dissertation discusses these state-building theories in more depth in Section 2.4.2 and
in Chapter 3.
Underlying COIN theory is the assumption that COIN contributes to statebuilding (Gompert and Gordon 2008; Nagl and Burton 2009; Fick and Lockhart
2010), since the objective of COIN is to reestablish government legitimacy. There are
three main approaches to draw upon in the state-building literature: modernization,
institutional capacity, and rational-choice institutionalism (Krasner 2009). First,
modernization theory argues that economic growth and social change, through
industrialization, urbanization, and education that develops a middle class who
demand political participation, leads to political and social transformation and
democratization (Lipset 1959). Alternatively, some argue that economic development
does not impact regime transitions, but does have a positive relationship with
democratic consolidation (Przeworski et al. 2000).
The theory of institutional capacity arose as an alternative to modernization
theory. Huntington (1968) challenged the logic that institutional development
occurred as a result of economic change. Instead, he argued that the institutional
capacity of the government determined the level of economic growth and political
order in a country. Institutionalization had to develop ahead of political mobilization
to maintain order. If mobilization outpaced institutionalization, decay and political
disorder would result. Fukuyama (2004) refocused the state-building literature back
toward institutional capacity theory in his argument that states fail when the scope of
government outpaces its strength, meaning institutional capacity. Institutional
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capacity theory ultimately argues that effective central state institutions are the key to
state-building. As states modeled themselves on other nations, they adopted the
institutional structures of the world’s major nations, what Meyer (1997) has called a
world society model, without assessing the need for those institutions or the capacity
to perform the functions. While modern COIN thinkers argue for political
institutionalization, in practice they advocate for transplanting western-style
bureaucracies into developing states plagued by insurgencies (National Security
Council 2005; Obama 2009).
The third approach in the state-building literature is rational-choice
institutionalism. This approach focuses on the alignment of incentives to overcome
commitment problems among key actors who behave strategically in pursuit of their
own economic self-interest, enabling the development of political institutions, or statebuilding. Other than in an earlier work by Leites and Wolf (1970), and a developing
research agenda (Berman et al. 2008), the counterinsurgency literature has made
limited use of rational-choice insights. The next section discusses the primary theories
within the counterinsurgency literature.

2.4. Development of Counterinsurgency Literature
The modern counterinsurgency literature, especially the dominant “hearts and
minds” (HAM) paradigm, is more an explanation of strategies and tactics intended to
guide practitioners than a theory per se. Additionally, most of the tactical (Kitson
1960, 1971; Galula 1964 [2006]) and strategic (Thompson 1966) prescriptions for how
to conduct COIN operationally (Department of the Army 2006; British Army 2009)
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are based on a few experiences, particularly Kenya, Malaya, Indochina, Algeria, and
Vietnam. Yet, it is important to test the validity of this approach as if the populationcentric HAM is a complete theory because of its prevalence in current policy
implementation to counter on-going insurgencies around the world. Before
developing a model to show the logic of the population-centric theory, it is necessary
to explain the two main approaches to COIN.

2.4.1. Coercion or Cost-Benefit Theory
2.4.1.1. Enemy-Centric Variant
Coercion, or attrition, is an enemy-centric theory that seeks to destroy the
insurgents. This approach argues for the use of population control measures to
separate the population from the insurgents, isolating the rebels in order to capture,
kill, or neutralize the insurgents through their surrender. The counterinsurgents will
use force to make the population compliant and defeat the insurgency with brute force.
The emphasis in this approach is on the primacy of military over civilian operations,
including the use of what some call counter-terror tactics. Coercion proponents argue
for the need to control the population through food rationing, ghettoizing the populace
with controlled entry and exit points to separate insurgents from a base of support,
conducting a mass census, issuing identification cards to and collecting biometric data
from the populace, conducting counter-terror operations, and using torture to gather
intelligence from insurgents (Trinquier 1961 [1964]). While the population may feel
the brunt of some of the coercion methods, the primary target is the enemy. The
French generally followed this approach during the Battle of Algiers in Algeria.
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2.4.1.2. Population-Centric Variant
Cost-benefit theory is a rational choice approach that forces the population to
maximize its utility as a rational, self-interested actor. The population must make its
own cost-benefit analysis with regards to its support of the insurgency. The
counterinsurgents use carrots and sticks—the provision or deprivation of material
benefits—to obtain cooperation and support from the population and to turn them
against the insurgents. The goal within this theory is to change the behavior of the
population. While the approach may use some of the same tactics as the coercion
approach, the difference is that under the cost-benefit approach, the center of gravity is
the population, rather than the enemy as in a coercion strategy.
To appeal to the rational self-interest of the masses and defeat the insurgents,
the counterinsurgents dispense public services conditionally. The conditionality
rewards pro-government behavior while punishing pro-insurgency behavior. The
government uses a combination of military and civilian operations to appeal to the
population’s rational self-interest to change their behavior. The logic behind changing
the behavior of the population is that cutting off support to insurgents leads to an
increase in the cost of fighting to the insurgents. The cost-benefit approach assumes
the opportunity and feasibility arguments of the civil war literature, so by increasing
the cost to fight an insurgency, it reduces the opportunity of the insurgents to sustain
the rebellion. And to further counter the insurgents’ opportunities to fight, costbenefit proponents argue for the need to increase the protection of the population
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through hardening local physical security and expanding local security forces (Leites
and Wolf 1970, 28-47).
While the cost-benefit approach requires improved institutions to provide
services and improve local security force capacity, institutional change is a means to
the end—defeating the insurgents—rather than an end in itself. The transformation
variant of the “hearts and minds” theory, though, argues it is not possible to win the
loyalty and hearts and minds of the population without political institutionalization
that gives the masses a voice in the governance of the nation. The next section of this
chapter discusses the “hearts and minds” theory.

2.4.2. “Hearts and Minds” Theory
Like the cost-benefit theory, “hearts and minds” is a population-centric theory
that views the population, rather than the enemy, as the center of gravity8 that must be
the primary target of operations, especially non-kinetic operations—the use of nonlethal force or activities. Much of HAM theory is a mirror-image of the principles that
Mao enunciated in his ideas about “People’s War”.
Mao identified the importance of maintaining control of the population by the
guerillas/insurgents. Mao famously stated that guerrillas had to swim as fish in a sea
of the peasants. Insurgents have to rely on the people to survive, just as fish have to
rely on the sea. So, as a reaction to the insurgent focus on the population,

8

Clausewitz (1943 [2000]) originally defined the concept of center of gravity analysis. The U.S.
military defines the center of gravity (COG) as “the source of power that provides moral or physical
strength, freedom of action, or will to act” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001 [2008], 142). This is the decisive
element that determines the ability of a military to accomplish its mission.
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counterinsurgents have also ostensibly directed their efforts toward the people. COIN
theorists vary, though, in their assessments of how to approach the population. Even
the enemy-centric coercion strategy that focuses on destroying the enemy accepts a
central role for the population, which is why coercive means are used to separate the
population from the insurgents. HAM, today’s most famous and prevailing
counterinsurgency theory, explicitly assumes that the population is the key to
overcoming the insurgency, as the insurgents have to rely on the population for
survival.
The supposedly quintessential case of HAM success is the British effort
against a communist insurgency in Malaya (now Malaysia) at the end of WWII. The
Malayan Emergency lasted from 1948-1960. The essence of the “hearts and minds”
theory is that by the government providing public goods and services that improve the
population’s lot in life, the people will give their loyalty to the government. The
ability to deliver goods and services increases the faith the population has in the ability
of the government to continue delivering the goods and services to the population. As
lives improve, the people have a greater stake in the stability of the government and
see the insurgents as those who will destroy their increased prosperity.
HAM relies on population-centric strategies and tactics to defeat the insurgents
by winning the support and allegiance of the masses. These strategies and tactics
include using minimal force to provide security for the population and cause the least
amount of “collateral damage” possible. Further, HAM argues for the need to
persuade the population, make political concessions to ameliorate grievances of the
population, increase social provisions, and maintain unity of effort for
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counterinsurgency operations under civilian control. A mantra of HAM proponents is
that there is no military solution for defeating insurgents; the solution is political. If
HAM works, the population does not have to make any cost-benefit calculations about
each action they take, because with their faith in the government, the population can
behave reflexively.
As counterinsurgency is a sub-component of state-building, in that COIN lays
the security foundation for political, economic, and social development to take place,
“hearts and minds” theory largely draws implicitly from state-building’s
modernization and institutional capacity theories. Modernization was the predominant
development theory following Lipset’s (1959) seminal article, “Some Social
Requisites of Democracy”. Modernization theory was very influential at the time that
COIN theory emerged during and after Malaya, Indochina, Algeria, and Vietnam, as
well as other post-colonial conflicts. The crux of modernization theory was that
economic growth would lead to democracy, although the argument is more nuanced
than that simple statement.
Lipset provided a causal chain to explain the logic of modernization theory
(see Figure 2.1). He defined economic development (modernization) as consisting of
several components (wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education). The
independent variable of the argument is economic development, the dependent
variable is democracy, and the causal logic is that modernization leads to the creation
of a middle class, which demands political representation and participation. The
process of modernization consists of the accumulation of wealth and the transition
from agrarianism to industrialization, creating greater wealth for the society. With
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industrialization, comes urbanization. As economies industrialize and urbanize, there
is a greater need for a more educated, skilled population. Greater education combined
with wealth leads to the development of a middle class. Ultimately, the middle class
demands political representation and participation, leading to democracy.

Figure 2.1: Causal Diagram of Modernization Theory
COIN literature, around the time of Lipset’s publication, co-opted
modernization theory without using the term, yet described all of the components of
Lipset’s theory (Taber 1965 [2002], 187-189). It made sense for COIN proponents to
incorporate modernization thinking, since during the Cold War many insurgencies
were ideological proxies—at least rhetorically—over the type of government that
should rule—democratic or communist regimes. Later COIN proponents, from the
1980s till today, have further combined the modernization argument with democratic
peace theory. Democratic peace theory holds that democracies should be less likely to
fight one another (Doyle 1986; O'Neal and Russett 1999), so this strengthened the
belief that modernization would help end insurgent threats against Western interests.
The original HAM theorists, influenced by modernization theory and assuming
that insurgents can only survive with the population’s support, had a clear solution to
defeating the insurgents. By modernizing societies to compete for and win the
population’s hearts and minds, the counterinsurgents would remove the population’s
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grievances by improving their life opportunities, thus taking away the insurgents’
raison d’être. HAM theory has borrowed from modernization theory’s emphasis on
development, but has seen political institutionalization as the means to achieve
development, and has ignored modernization theory’s focus on development as the
path to social change. This has contributed to HAM’s view that development is a key
prescription for winning COIN, because it improves standards of living, increases
political rights, and reduces corruption and abuse of government power.
Some COIN research, however, has actually found that development may
actually exacerbate the conditions for insurgency. Leites and Wolf (1970) argue that
development makes the pain that accompanies inequalities in the distribution of
wealth, income, education, and opportunity more acute since the masses can more
clearly see the level of societal inequality that exists, and this can lead to greater
resentment (30). Yet leading modern COIN proponents who have influenced the
Obama administration’s policy in Afghanistan continue to make the development
argument to explain how the United States can win the hearts and minds of the Afghan
population. Fick and Lockhart (2010) argue, “The [American COIN] strategy [in
Afghanistan] depends on successful efforts to foster economic development in an
impoverished and war-weary country with poor-infrastructure, low literacy rates, and
little recent economic integration with the rest of the world” (1). Such a policy,
according to Fick and Lockhart, will “demonstrate progress to U.S. voters, U.S. allies,
the enemy, and—most importantly—the Afghan people” (8). This argument implies
that such a policy will win the Afghanis’ hearts and minds.

40

Modern proponents of HAM theory have also incorporated elements of state
building’s political institutionalization theory. This variant of HAM theory,
transformation, follows the development community’s shifting focus on the need for
good governance to reduce poverty. The transformation HAM proponents argue that
governments will gain legitimacy and the support of the population through the
development of good governance and institutions that can deliver public goods and
services effectively to the people (Gompert and Gordon 2008; Department of Defense
2010, 26-30; Obama 2010a, 26-27).
Transformation deals directly with the legitimacy part of the insurgency and
counterinsurgency definitions in Section 2.2.2 above. COIN theorists argue that
governments lose legitimacy when they are not representative of the people. So,
counterinsurgents have to make governments representative of the populace through
liberal political institutionalization. The liberalism part of this argument, though,
moves beyond political institutionalization’s focus on the appropriate alignment of
state scope and state strength. Through the incorporation of representation with
improved governance that makes it possible to effectively deliver goods and services
to the population, HAM proponents argue that the government will engender the
population’s loyalty. Earlier works on COIN implicitly incorporated the political
institutionalization argument, sans the liberalism component (Galula 1964 [2006];
Thompson 1966). Contemporary iterations of HAM, however, explicitly argue for
liberal political transformation (National Security Council 2005; Department of the
Army 2006; Obama 2009).
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The transformation variant of HAM remains a population-centric argument. In
order to defeat insurgents by improving governance and social services,
counterinsurgents should adopt several ambitious strategies. There are two interacting
paths to political institutionalization: one that is internally driven by the host
government, and the second that is driven by an external actor. The role of the
external actor dominates the transformation argument since the government is already
ineffective and the outsiders are supposed to be the experts.
Contemporary population-centric proponents argue, first, that
counterinsurgents, especially external actors, need to adopt a long-term perspective
given the historical length of insurgencies and the challenges in reforming governance
institutions. Second, governance reform must develop fair and efficient rule of law
systems (e.g., police, courts, judges, and prisons). Third, states should implement
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs that include targeted
job training and placement for ex-fighters that fit into the nation’s economic
development goals. Lastly, proponents argue for the expansion of primary-level
educational capacity for the broader populace, which is also tied along with the DDR
process to the host government’s modernization process (Gompert and Gordon 2008).
To understand the transformation argument, it is necessary to turn back to the
state-building literature. As an alternative to the modernization argument, Samuel
Huntington (1965, 1968) developed an argument about the role of institutionalization
leading to order in changing societies. He argued that in order to achieve stability in
societies, the institutions of the state had to stay ahead of political mobilization. If
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mobilization outpaced institutionalization, social disorder (i.e., rebellion or
insurgencies) would occur.
Fukuyama (2004) updated Huntington’s argument, but focused on the scope
versus strength of state governance institutions. The argument has policy implications
for COIN, because of the dominant role of external actors in the transformation theory
of COIN thinking. Again, the basic transformation argument is that all the external
actor and host government have to do to defeat the insurgents is build efficient
government institutions capable of delivering public goods and services to the
population. The U.S. Department of Defense has officially adopted this institutional
capacity argument in the latest Quadrennial Defense Review (Department of Defense
2010) that has made strengthening partner institutions a key mission for the military.
Figure 2.2, adopted from Fukuyama (2004, 11), displays different outcomes
based on varying relationships between the scope and strength of government.
Quadrant I represents the economic efficiency argument where the state possesses
great strength in executing its accepted functions, which keeps the scope to a
minimum. Quadrant II represents a broad scope of government that takes on many of
the intermediate as well as activist functions of a state, but also maintains a strong
state that can continue to effectively execute these added functions. Quadrant IV is
the location where most insurgencies take place. These states often lack legitimacy,
and are the most inefficient nations. Developing nations often end up in Quadrant IV,
because they try to have the scope of the states in Quadrant II, but do not have the
strength to execute even the minimal functions of the state. In COIN, external actors
try to improve the strength of the state to match the scope of state functions.
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According to the transformation argument, external actors should help improve state
strength to provide public goods provision, enabling the host government to achieve
legitimacy. Yet, the transformation proponents try to move to Quadrant II from IV
without first going through Quadrant III. By limiting the scope of the state to minimal
functions, even with limited strength, these states will become more effective at
providing the basic public goods and services necessary to overcome the grievances of
the population and regain legitimacy. So, Quadrant III is place where the
counterinsurgents can set the conditions to defeat insurgents and eventually try to
move to Quadrant IV.
The learning organization variant of HAM furthers the externally-driven nature
of the institutionalization argument made by the transformation variant. The
organizational variant argues that to defeat insurgencies, adaptive, learning
organizations must implement strategies with “hearts and minds” principles through
doctrine and training by experts, as well as adopt unified command structures
(Krepinevich 1986; Nagl 2005 [2002]; Krepinevich 2005). This argument was
developed by examining the role of external actors as counterinsurgents and argues
that host governments need outside experts to get on the right path to defeat the
insurgents. Another variant focused on the role of outside experts argues that
command of the civilian and military chains of command must reside with a single,
focused, and enlightened individual who can lift the morale of the people and the
government (Stubbs 1989; Ramakrishna 2001; Smith 2001).
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Figure 2.2. Political Institutionalization Outcomes
The next section further illustrates the general logic of population-centric
theory. The section first reveals the elements of the causal logic that explains how
counterinsurgents defeat insurgencies. Then, Sections 2.5.2-2.5.5 develop a game
theory model to draw out the expected outcomes of HAM based on the strategic
preferences and choices that actors should have—and those they actually make—
according to this population-centric theory.
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2.5. Logic of “Hearts and Minds” Theory
2.5.1. Causal Logic
As explained above, “hearts and minds” theory implicitly draws from theories
within state-building. Section 2.4 described a number of HAM variants, and this
section intends to capture the core elements of this population-centric theory across
the variants. First, the section diagrams the causal logic of HAM. Then, the section
defines some of HAM’s propositions and assumptions. Finally, the section develops
an extended-form game to illustrate the strategic choices facing the actors in an
insurgency and the expected outcomes based on the different actors’ preferences.
The basic premise behind HAM theory is that the government has lost the
support of the population, which is now given, at least tacitly, to the insurgents. To
defeat the insurgency, the government must recapture the sympathy and support of the
population. The essential elements of this approach, regardless of variant, are that
counterinsurgents (an equal partnership between the government and external actor)
must regain legitimacy, use minimal military force, provide goods and services to the
population, and create institutions to support service provision. Figure 2.3 below
illustrates the causal logic of the hearts and minds theory that has evolved from the
1960s through today.
The conditions exist for insurgency to take place once the government loses its
legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Government legitimacy exists when the
population recognizes and reflexively responds to government authority. The people
do not have to think about their actions before they take them, because they know the
outcome in advance. When the government lacks legitimacy, the insurgents can then
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exploit the grievances of the population through material or ideological support. The
insurgents require this popular support in order to conduct successful operations
against the government (Leites and Wolf 1970, 8).
After the outbreak of the insurgency, government must separate the insurgents
from the population in order to deny support obtained by the insurgents. Additionally,
population security protects the population from exploitation by the insurgents,
displays the strength of the government, and increases the ability of the government to
gather information and intelligence about the insurgent organization. By establishing
physical security—primarily through law and order, rather than military, operations to
clear the area of insurgents—the government sets the conditions for follow-on civil
operations (Galula 1964 [2006]; National Security Council 2005; Department of the
Army 2006).

Figure 2.3. “Hearts and Minds” Causal Logic
The next part of the causal chain that leads to counterinsurgency success
according to HAM theory is development. This is the building part of the HAM
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process. In part, the government loses its legitimacy with the people because of its
inability to provide public goods and services. The insurgents take advantage of the
grievances among the population that arise from poverty and economic inequality
within the society (Leites and Wolf 1970, 16). The counterinsurgents must conduct
civil operations focused on reducing poverty and inequality, which include expanding
economic development, education, and health care.
Additionally, to ensure the long-term ability of the government to continue
delivering these public goods, external actors must help the host government establish
non-corrupt, political institutions that represent the people. The factors that contribute
to the insurgency primarily exist internally to the country (Leites and Wolf 1970, 21),
but external assistance is required to overcome the internal challenges and to restore
legitimacy. While enabling civil operations and development, the external actors
should train the host nation’s security forces. External actors can best train police and
counterinsurgency forces who will gain the confidence of the people by establishing
law and order while respecting human rights. The local security forces can then hold
the areas cleared with the help of the external actors and further allow the building
process to take place.
Expanding institutional capacity coupled with development restores the
legitimacy of the government by overcoming the population’s grievances and
restoring a host government that can maintain the population’s loyalty. Once the
government has won the population’s hearts and minds, the counterinsurgents will
defeat the insurgency, because the insurgents will have lost the population’s support,
which is required for any insurgency to exist.
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2.5.2. Extended Form Game Model of “Hearts and Minds” Theory
The extended form game developed in this section explains the underlying
logic of HAM theory and the expected outcome from the strategic interaction between
the primary actors involved in insurgencies. This model, as with all models, is a
stylization intended to crudely represent a real situation. Real world insurgencies are
too complex and contain too many variables to incorporate into a complete model, so
the stylized version provides us with insights about the broader issues of
counterinsurgency.
The extended form game in Figure 2.4 below represents a stylized model of the
prevailing “hearts and minds” theory that has evolved over the past 50 years (Galula
1964 [2006]; Thompson 1966; Kitson 1971; Krepinevich 1986; Mockaitis 1990; Nagl
2005 [2002]; Department of the Army 2006; British Army 2009). The model includes
three different actors: 1) counterinsurgent forces (C)—made up of the government and
external actor supporting the government; 2) the opposition (O)—or, the insurgents;
and 3) the population (P). Rather than single individuals, the strategic actors represent
unified groups; this assumes everyone in the group has the same preferences.
This model combines the government and external actor into one unitary actor,
the counterinsurgent force, because both have the same goal of defeating the
insurgents and restoring the legitimacy of the government. While the government and
external actor may have policy differences in the real world, the two must have the
same overarching objective; otherwise, they would not work together. HAM theory
does not discuss an exit strategy for the external actor. An implicit assumption is that
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once C defeats the insurgents, then the external actor can leave. So, up until the defeat
of the insurgents, the government (G) and external actor (EA) have aligned
preferences, allowing for the treatment of G and EA as a single unitary actor, C.
While the opposition may have varying factions who compete with each other
in reality, this stylized model treats all insurgent groups as a unified actor, O. Despite
real-world differences between insurgent groups, all insurgent groups have the
common desire to reduce the legitimacy of the government and establish control over
state resources. By treating O as a unified actor, it allows the model to focus on the
general strategic preferences and choices made by the different groups. The same
holds for the population. Despite differences between segments of the population,
HAM theory depends upon to whom the population provides its sympathy, loyalty,
and support. So, treating the population as a unitary, rational actor allows us to better
understand the strategic interaction between the different actors involved in an
insurgency.
Further, the model contains several assumptions derived from the causal logic
of HAM described in Section 2.4.1. First, the population is the determining factor that
leads to the success or failure of an insurgency. Second, an insurgency cannot sustain
itself without the support of the population. Third, grievances based on poverty and/or
inequality, ineffective distribution of public goods and services, and lack of popular
representation lead to the government’s loss of legitimacy. Fourth, it is possible to
regain the sympathy, loyalty, and support of the population after they have supported
the insurgents.
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Additionally, the probability of success for the insurgents against the
counterinsurgent forces equals p. The population changes the probability of success
by a factor of !—if they support the insurgents, the probability of insurgent success
becomes p+!. Finally, C’s policy choice impacts the insurgent’s probability of
success by a factor of ". HAM proponents argue that C has a dichotomous choice
between population-centric (e.g., HAM) and enemy-centric (e.g., a preponderance of
military force) strategies to defeat an insurgency, and that dominating military power
is counterproductive since COIN is primarily a political battle (Nagl and Burton 2009,
93). So, " represents a change in probability that increases the insurgent’s probability
of success, p+", when the government chooses overwhelming military force (violent
coercion) as its policy to defeat the insurgents. " represents the increase in population
members who shift from passive and material support to more active support of the
opposition due to the collateral damage from overwhelming military force by C. This
captures the HAM assumption that policies based primarily on violent coercion create
more insurgents than these operations kill or capture.

2.5.3. Order of the Game
In the game in Figure 2.4, the population is the first mover. The game starts
with the assumption that an insurgency has just begun. In the first move, the
population chooses either to support or not support the opposition. This choice
initiates one of two sub-games where either C or O moves next.
In the sub-game in the upper half of Figure 2.4 the counterinsurgents moves
next, choosing either to implement either a “hearts and minds” or “coercion” policy to
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defeat the opposition. The HAM policy includes population security, modernization,
and political institutionalization efforts, while coercion is ostensibly an enemy-centric
policy that inflicts heavy collateral damage. Thus, coercion is a de-facto population
centric strategy that is similar to the cost-benefit approach. The population moves in
the next stage, regardless of the policy choice, choosing either to support or not
support the opposition. If the population supports the opposition at this stage, nature
will determine whether O or C prevails. If C implemented a HAM policy, then the
insurgents have a probability of p+! of success, but if C implemented a coercion
policy, the probability of success increases to p+"+!. If the population does not
support the opposition, then O must choose to either continue or end the insurgency.
If O continues the insurgency, O’s probability of success is p if C chooses HAM, or
the probability of success is p+" if C chooses coercion.
In the sub-game in the lower half of Figure 2.4, the opposition makes the next
move following the population’s initial choice not to support the insurgency. O can
choose to either continue or end the insurgency. If O chooses to end the insurgency,
the game ends. If O chooses to continue the insurgency, then this sub-game follows
the sub-game in the upper half of Figure 2.4, where C chooses either a HAM or
coercion policy. The rest of the moves follow in sequence as described above.
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Figure 2.4. Model of Population-Centric Theory

2.5.4. Actor Preferences
The counterinsurgent forces first prefer that the insurgency come to a quick
end. For this to happen, the counterinsurgents want the population not to support the
opposition and for the opposition to choose to end the insurgency, M. Next, the
counterinsurgents prefer to maintain the support of the population. The
counterinsurgents will prefer to implement a HAM policy while maintaining
population support, leading the opposition to end the insurgency, C or I. The next best
preference for the counterinsurgents is maintaining popular support while using
physical coercion to force the opposition to end the insurgency, F or L. The
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counterinsurgents prefer to implement HAM versus coercion, because of the
possibility that non-minimal violence may cause more members of the population to
actively support the insurgents.
If nature will ultimately decide the outcome of the insurgency, the
counterinsurgents prefer to implement HAM and for the population not to support the
insurgent, B or H. This gives the counterinsurgents their greatest probability of
defeating the insurgents, 1-p. Next, the counterinsurgents prefer E or K, where the
population does not support the opposition even after the implementation of a coercion
policy. The counterinsurgents will then have a probability of 1-p-" of defeating the
opposition. If the population continues to support the insurgents after the
counterinsurgents choose a COIN policy, the counterinsurgents still prefer to
implement a HAM policy, A or G, over a coercion policy, D or J. HAM will give the
counterinsurgents the greater probability of defeating the opposition, 1-p-!, compared
to a probability of 1-p-"-! if the counterinsurgents use violent force.
The opposition maintains different preferences. Once the opposition chooses
to start an insurgency they want to further undermine the legitimacy of the
government, defeat the counterinsurgents, and take control of the national resources.
So, the opposition prefers to shape the conditions that increase the opposition’s
probability of success when nature determines the outcome of the insurgency. The
opposition’s first preference is for the counterinsurgents to try to use overwhelming
violent means, provoking the population into supporting the opposition, D or J, giving
the opposition a success probability of p+"+!. Next the opposition prefers A or G,
continued population support after the counterinsurgents implement a HAM policy,
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giving the opposition a p+! probability of success. Third, the opposition prefers E or
K, no population support but a counterinsurgent policy of coercion, because the
opposition’s probability of success would be p+". Then, the opposition prefers p, the
probability of success that comes with continuing the insurgency after losing popular
support due to the counterinsurgents implementing a HAM policy, B or H.
Of the options where the opposition will choose to end the insurgency, they
prefer to minimize the costs of the insurgency to the opposition members and
organization. So, they would next prefer to end the insurgency after initially failing to
receive popular support, M. Then, the opposition would prefer to end the insurgency
after failing to garner public support once the counterinsurgents implement a policy of
coercion, F or L. Finally, the opposition prefers C or I, where the opposition ends the
insurgency following a lack of support from the population after the government
implements a HAM policy.
The population also maintains different preferences from both the
counterinsurgents and the opposition. Ultimately, under HAM theory, the population
ranks its preferences based on who—counterinsurgents or opposition— can provide
the population with public goods and services, security, and representation. First, the
population prefers C or I, because the counterinsurgent’s implementation of a HAM
policy will solve the population’s grievances, and ending the insurgency will minimize
the costs inflicted upon the population of fighting. Next, the population prefers to
maintain the status quo by not supporting the opposition and the opposition ending the
insurgency, M, because this minimizes the losses and costs inflicted upon the
population when they are caught between the two sides. The population’s third
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preference is for the counterinsurgents to defeat the opposition with probability 1-p
after the counterinsurgents implement a HAM policy and the population does not
support the opposition, B or H. This outcome leads to the provision of some public
goods and political institutionalization while maximizing the counterinsurgents
probability of defeating the opposition. Fourth, the population prefers A or G, because
while they prefer for the insurgents to win, they also want the counterinsurgents to
implement a HAM policy to gain the benefits of development and institutionalization.

Table 2.1. Summary of Actors’ Preferences in “Hearts and Minds” Model
A policy of coercion will push the population’s preference closer to the
opposition’s due to the likelihood of collateral damage inflicted. So next, the
population prefers to support the opposition, increasing the insurgency’s probability of
success to p+"+!, after the counterinsurgents choose a coercion policy, D or J. The
population’s sixth preference is for the opposition to end the insurgency if the
population withholds support of the opposition after the counterinsurgents implement
a policy of coercion, F or L. This will minimize the cost of fighting inflicted upon the
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population. Finally, the population prefers E or K, where the counterinsurgent’s
probability of defeating the insurgents is 1-p-" following the opposition’s decision to
continue the insurgency after the population withholds support following a
counterinsurgent policy decision of coercion.

2.5.5. Solving the Game
Solving the game in Figure 2.4 through backwards induction shows how,
according to the population-centric theory, the counterinsurgent’s decision to
implement a HAM policy leads to a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE)
whose outcome, C, is the end of the insurgency. In the last stage of each branch of the
game, following a decision by the population not to support the opposition, the
opposition must decide to continue or end the insurgency. According to HAM theory,
the population is the critical factor in determining the success of an insurgency.
Knowing that, the opposition will choose to end the insurgency since the opposition
will have its lowest probabilities of success, either p or p+".
In the prior stage, the population must choose either to support the
counterinsurgents or the population. In accordance with the population’s preferences,
the population’s choice will depend upon which side has the greatest probability of
success and will distribute the most public goods and services. When the insurgency’s
probability of success becomes p+"+!, the population will support the opposition, but
if the insurgency’s probability of success remains below p+"+! the population will
support the counterinsurgents. The factor of "+! becomes a tipping point that pushes
the population into active support of the opposition.
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Before the population has to choose to support or not support the opposition
for the second time, the counterinsurgents have to choose between a policy of HAM or
coercion. Knowing that the population will decide whether or not to support the
opposition based on the likelihood of opposition success, the government will choose
to implement a HAM policy. This policy will prevent " from becoming a factor that
can tip the odds in favor of the insurgency.
If the participants end up in the lower half of the game, continuing to work
backwards, the opposition must choose to continue or end the insurgency. Knowing
that the government will implement a HAM policy and that the population will not
support the opposition, the opposition will choose to end the insurgency at this stage.
This aligns with the opposition’s preference to minimize its costs if nature will not
determine the outcome.
This leads back to the first move of the game, which the population makes.
The population has to decide to support the opposition or not after the initial outbreak
of an insurgency. Under population-centric COIN theory, an insurgency occurs when
the government of a nation has lost part or all of its legitimacy in the eyes of the
population. The population wants improved public goods and services provision, as
well as representation, to return legitimacy to the government. The population does
not want to maintain the status quo, and the opposition serves as a mechanism for the
population to force the government to recognize and rectify the population’s
grievances. The population will initially choose to support the opposition knowing
that this is the only way to get the government to implement the development and
political institutionalization programs that come with a HAM policy.
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2.6. Empirical Critique of “Hearts and Minds”
Despite the population-centric theory’s logic described in the previous section,
the theory has limited empirical support. This section first discusses the findings of
two recent empirical studies of insurgencies. Finally, the section raises doubt about
the conventional wisdom derived from two cases held up as HAM successes.

2.6.1. Recent Empirical Studies
With the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, interest has grown in the field
of political science to conduct empirical studies on insurgency. One such study
looked at micro-level data in Iraq to test whether or not hearts and minds are won or
bought. Another study examined macro-level data to explain why counterinsurgents
routinely defeated insurgents in the 19th century, but have had less success in the 20th
century.
In the first study, Berman et al. (2008) developed a model to test the
economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq. Their findings support a rational-choice
explanation for counterinsurgency successes, undermining HAM’s argument about
winning the allegiance of the population after restoring legitimacy. Berman et al.
found that public goods provision has a violence-reducing effect. But, the effect arises
with relatively high volumes of public goods provision, because the population makes
a rational choice. The government and insurgents compete with each other for
information from the population. Both sides use positive and negative inducements to
extract information. Berman et al. found that the population only provided
information to the government when the benefits outweighed the costs of sharing
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information. This echoes Leites and Wolf’s (1970) point about denunciation and
information. This most likely occurs in areas with initially the poorest endogenous
service conditions and the largest boosts in exogenously provide public goods.
Lyall and Wilson (2009) explored the puzzle of why counterinsurgents
routinely defeated insurgents in the 19th century, but routinely lost in the 20th century.
This raises a more puzzling question. If HAM dominated late 20th century COIN
policy and counterinsurgents have routinely lost during this period, why does HAM
maintain pride of place in COIN thinking? Lyall and Wilson found that the increased
mechanization of counterinsurgents after World War I inhibited the collection of
information from the population. During the 19th century, the counterinsurgents had to
forage among the population for resources, so they got to know the population. Lyall
and Wilson found that proximity to the population allowed counterinsurgents to sift
through the population for insurgents and learn what rewards and punishments to
selectively apply to gain information from the people. These findings undermine
modern HAM proponents’ argument that counterinsurgents win the loyalty and
affection of the people by living among them. Rather, living amongst the population
allows the counterinsurgents to glean information that allows the counterinsurgents to
choose the most effective carrots and sticks. The resulting counterinsurgent policies
will adjust the population’s behavior cost/benefit analysis and change the population’s
behavior.
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2.6.2. HAM Successes?
HAM proponents hold up the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, and the
“Surge” in Iraq, 2006-2007, as quintessential successes for HAM theory. Yet,
analysis of both cases shows the HAM logic described in Section 2.5 cannot explain
the outcomes in either Malaya or Iraq. The literature on Malaya paints “hearts and
minds” as the British way of conducting counterinsurgency. According to the
conventional story, the British were losing the war against Chinese communist
insurgents between 1948 and 1951. During this timeframe, the British employed a
policy of coercion, marked by counter-terror tactics. According to the HAM story,
these policies led to the alienation of the population and a stalemate between the
British and the Chinese.
Then, at the end of 1951, the British reassessed their policy and appointed
Lieutenant General Sir Gerard Templer to take over operations in Malaya, combining
the civil and military efforts under his leadership. HAM proponents argue that
Templer understood that victory lay with the support of the population. Templer
provided the leadership to change the organizational behavior of the
counterinsurgents, shifting focus to civil operations that would improve the lives of
the Chinese and win their affection away from the communists (Short 1975; Stubbs
1989; Ramakrishna 2001, 2002b).
This narrative, however, masks the continuation of many of the earlier coercive
British policies, such as the forced move of over half a million Chinese civilians from
their homes into resettlement camps. This story also ignores the selective use of
rewards and punishments by Templer to coerce desired behavior from the Chinese
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people (Hack 1999; Smith 2001; Hack 2009; Dixon 2009). Chapter 4 provides a
deeper analysis of the HAM story in Malaya and the chapter also describes an
alternative explanation for the British counterinsurgency success in Malaya.
A conventional wisdom narrative has also developed about how HAM theory
led to the success of the Iraq “Surge” in 2007. HAM proponents argue that the
increase in American troops allowed the coalition forces to implement a “clear, hold,
and build” strategy as described in Section 2.4.2. The story describes how the
coalition was able to provide physical security for the Iraqi people by clearing
population centers of insurgents. Then, American soldiers, along with newly
American-trained Iraqi Security Forces moved in to hold the areas cleared of the
insurgents. By living among the population, the population got to know and develop a
relationship with the counterinsurgents. Once the Coalition and Iraqi Government
began rebuilding the population centers and providing public goods and services the
counterinsurgents earned the affection and loyalty of the Iraqi people. This led to
decreased support for the insurgents and lower levels of violence (Packer 2006; Biddle
et al. 2008; Boot and Simon 2008).
Just like the Malaya narrative, this story masks other things happening at the
same time. As Berman et al. showed, the population in Iraq made cost-benefit choices
in providing information, rather than choices based on affection for the
counterinsurgents. Further, this HAM story of the “Surge” downplays the importance
of the “Awakening Movement” that began in the summer of 2006, well before the start
and implementation of the “Surge”. The “Awakening” began as a Sunni tribal revolt
against Al-Qaeda in Iraq, but quickly spread around the country amongst both the
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Shi’a and Sunni populations. Essentially, the Coalition co-opted local level elites by
distributing rent-seeking opportunities and decentralizing violent means to these elites,
strengthening each of the elite’s local power bases. And, at the same time, Coalition
and Iraqi Forces continued counter-terror operations that targeted the insurgents.
Chapter 5 discusses the conventional wisdom about Iraq in greater depth, and also
provides an alternative model and supporting analytical narrative that draws different
lessons from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq than the HAM story.

2.7. Conclusion
“Hearts and minds” may make sense from a public opinion perspective but it is
less useful from a theoretical or policy implementation perspective. While HAM
proponents may describe a list of the right actions for counterinsurgents to take, these
proponents explain how these tactics work for the wrong reasons. This chapter has
explained the causal logic of the “hearts and minds” theory and developed a game
theoretic model to show the expected strategic behavior of the actors in the HAM
story. Further, the chapter has highlighted some problems with HAM theory.
The COINdinistas (Ricks 2009a) have dominated the current debate about how
to fight an insurgency. This dominance has limited debate, preventing the discovery
of successful mechanisms for counterinsurgents to employ. HAM’s public relations
rhetoric about winning affection and loyalty has obscured the fact that defeating an
insurgency does not happen merely through the provision of carrots to the people.
Previous rational-choice research about cost-benefit choices and balancing the use of
carrots and sticks has largely been dismissed till now.
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The next chapter develops an alternative theory to explain what mechanisms
external actors can use to limit the impact of internal conflict on state-building. The
theory shifts from the prevailing population-centric focus in both the theoretical and
empirical literature on counterinsurgency to an elite-centric perspective. Further, the
proposed theory of self-enforcing stability in Chapter 3 fills the missing credible
commitment gap from the prevailing theory and addresses how it is possible to win
“minds”.
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Chapter 3: Towards a Theory of Self-Enforcing Stability
“The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is
the visionary supposition that the federal government may previously accumulate a
military force for the projects of ambition. … It [is] necessary now to disprove the
reality of this danger. … The United States [would not have] an army of more than
twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to
nearly half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen
from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted
by governments possessing their affections and confidence. … [This militia] forms a
barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a
simple government of any form can admit of.” – James Madison, “The Federalist No.
46” (Hamilton et al. 1788 [2000], 304-305)
3.1. Introduction
This chapter proposes a new theory to explain the conditions under which it is
possible for an external actor to successfully help post-conflict societies get on the
path towards self-enforcing stability. The previous chapter described logical and
empirical flaws of the prevailing counterinsurgency theory, “hearts and minds
(HAM),” that purportedly underlies the current United States’ and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) strategies for state-building in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The theory in this chapter provides an alternative that overcomes HAM’s flaws by
building upon the rational-choice institutionalism framework in the nascent statebuilding literature.
HAM theory has two primary logical flaws. First is the theory’s failure to
address the credible commitment problem that exists between the counterinsurgents
and the opposition. Second, HAM’s population-centric focus identifies the wrong key
actors necessary to end conflict. Hence, HAM fails to recognize the importance of
aligning incentives between the appropriate key actors. This chapter provides an
alternative theory that avoids HAM’s flaws.
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To develop an alternative theory, this dissertation started with two broad
research questions: What conditions lead to successful state-building, and what is the
role of external actors in this process? This dissertation defines state-building as the
construction of self-enforcing governance structures that establish stability in the state
and allow for economic, political, and social development to take place. An
institution is self-enforcing when all actors behave in a manner that enables, guides,
and motivates others to follow the institutionalized norms that reproduce or continue
the institutions that led to the initial behavior to begin with (Greif 2006, 15-16). This
dissertation focuses on the toughest situations for state-building—those rebuilding
after civil conflict. Thus, a narrower research question can be defined: how can
external actors help societies torn by civil conflict get on the path towards selfenforcing stability?
Using a rational-choice framework to overcome the logical flaws of the “hearts
and minds” theory, this chapter shifts from the population to the elites as the unit of
analysis, and focuses on how to align the incentives of the elites to overcome credible
commitment problems. The theory in this chapter incorporates the role of incentives
to further address the above question by identifying the attainable social order in the
host society, because of the dissertation’s focus on stability as the measure of
successful state-building. I emphasize social order, rather than regime-type, in order
to highlight the societal basis of governance structures. Therefore, this dissertation
seeks to answer an even more focused question: what is the appropriate social order
external actors should help host nations attain in order for successful state-building to
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take place, and what incentives can external actors provide to get host nations on this
path?
Four hypotheses underlie the theory of self-enforcing stability developed in
this chapter and tested in Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation. First, the theory in this
paper shifts from the prevailing population-centric focus of the counterinsurgency
literature to an elite-focus. As the competing elites are the source of the credible
commitment problem that prevents the failed or fragile state from achieving stability,
external actors should focus on solving that problem. Rather than focusing on the
initial incentive for the external actor to intervene, this dissertation focuses on the
efficacy of the external actor’s intervention, i.e., what makes the external actor’s
guarantees credible.
H1: An elite-centric, rather than population-centric, strategy will lead to
greater success in establishing stability in conflict-torn states.
Second, external actors should focus on helping failed or fragile societies
become limited access orders (LAOs), rather than on democratization. LAOs solve
the problem of violence by limiting access to benefits by identifying privileges,
creating rents, and providing credibility to personal relationships (North et al. 2009a,
38). Failed and fragile societies face credible commitment problems between
competing factions that prevent these states from establishing stability. Consequently,
it is an unrealistic objective for external actors to try building sustainable democracies
in these states.
H2: External actors contribute to the establishment of stability more
successfully when they help nations establish limited access orders rather than
open access order (liberal democracies).
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Third, external actors should work to help internal actors overcome these
underlying credible commitment problems, and put the internal actors on the path
towards self-enforcing stability. The external actor can use different credibility
mechanisms to guarantee pacts between a dominant coalition of elites, such as the
provision of resources in the form of personnel, money, equipment, and time, as well
as holding elections, developing institutions, and public statements of intent and
commitment. These mechanisms enable and support the offended party in punishing
the transgressor of the agreement, and allowing time for the pact to become selfenforcing.
H3: An external actor is usually needed for internal actors to overcome their
underlying credible commitment problems in order to put them on the path
towards self-enforcing stability.
Finally, counter to the Weberian concept of the state maintaining a monopoly
of force, the theory in this chapter argues that the diversification of power helps
internal actors overcome the credible commitment problem, has the potential to reduce
levels of violence, and helps set the conditions for self-enforcing stability.
Diversification of power is achieved in two ways: 1) enabling multiple elites to
maintain violent means, and 2) sharing rent-seeking opportunities that allow elites to
increase their wealth. These diversifications enable elites who join the pact to
maximize their wealth and influence over the long-run while retaining protection from
other elites who may seek to limit their power.
H4: The oligopolization of violent means amongst competing elites allows
stability to develop in conflict-torn societies.
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In summation, this chapter provides an alternative to the standard Weberian
approach to ending conflict in failed states that seeks to have external actors solve the
problem of violence by forcing the opposition to lay down its arms and grant the
government a monopoly over violence. The theory will show that a Weberian
approach typically leads the government to abuse the opposition, so the opposition has
no incentive to stop fighting. The standard approaches fail to recognize this incentive
problem and therefore both misdiagnose the problem and provide inadequate
solutions. This chapter identifies the problem as the failure of the government and
opposition to provide credible commitments, and argues the solution is the
diversification of power amongst a dominant coalition of government and opposition
elites. This is an elite-centric theory, as opposed to the population-centric theory
discussed in Chapter 2.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, the chapter describes elements in the
reigning literatures that the theory in this chapter draws upon, as well as discusses
some challenges in the literature that help motivate this dissertation. Second, the
chapter builds progressive models that incorporate the role of external actors in the
state-building process, and proposes a theory of self-enforcing stability. The chapter
then discusses how this proposed theory contributes to the literature. Finally, the
chapter concludes by explaining how this dissertation will test the implications of this
theory in subsequent chapters.
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3.2. Informing Literatures
The international relations and comparative politics literatures provide some,
but limited, insight into how external actors can contribute to the development of
stability in conflict-ridden states. This section briefly addresses some insights and
challenges that the civil war, international peacekeeping, state-building, and
counterinsurgency literatures provide for this dissertation.
The civil war literature has yet to reach a consensus regarding the factor
driving the outbreak of civil wars. The main debate is between those who say civil
wars are caused by grievances (Gurr 1970; Kalyvas 2006) versus those who attribute
their outbreak to greed (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004; Weinstein 2006) or
opportunity (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier et al. 2009). This literature generally
provides little exploration about the role external actors can have, if any, in ending
civil conflict. Further, the civil war literature, particularly Kalyvas’s (2006) story
focuses on a single interaction between the actors, or a one-shot game, rather than
repeated interaction.
The international peacekeeping literature discusses the role of external actors
in overcoming credible commitment problems during the implementation phase
following a peace agreement (Walter 2002), and when the peacekeepers shape the
choices of the former combatants to prevent post-treaty exploitation (Fortna 2008).
This literature provides a foundation for introducing the role of external actors in
helping prevent conflict from recurring, and discusses successful mechanisms used by
external actors to help maintain stability in post-conflict states. Yet, this literature
does not discuss how external actor presence and resources can adjust incentives and
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overcome the commitment problems during the combat phase of conflict. Nor does
the literature fully describe how the peace enforced by external actors becomes selfenforcing, ultimately allowing the external actors to leave the host-nations.
The state-building literature provides different theories to explain the statebuilding process; yet, no comprehensive explanation predicts the conditions under
which an external actor can contribute to successful state-building. The three main
approaches (Krasner 2009) to state-building are modernization theory (Lipset 1959,
1960; Przeworski et al. 2000), political institutionalization (Huntington 1965, 1968;
Fukuyama 2004), and rational-choice institutionalism (North et al. 2009a; North and
Weingast 1989; Weingast 1997; Greif 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Chapter
2 explained the causal logic of both modernization theory and political
institutionalization, and how those two theories provide an unstated foundation for
counterinsurgency theory. The rational-choice institutionalism approach focuses on
the alignment of incentives amongst key actors to enable state-building. Each of these
theories has compelling elements, but the theories ultimately focus on the domestic
processes that lead to state-building. The theories that do consider external actors treat
them as exogenous shocks to the process, or uncontrollable structural phenomena that
occur like events in nature. This leaves room to improve upon the literature by
treating external actors as controllable, or manipulable, factors that affect governance
systems of states in which they intervene. In other words, examining the endogenous
role of the external actors can make a contribution.
In the rational choice tradition, North, Wallis, and Weingast (NWW) (2009)
provide a conceptual framework for understanding violence and social orders by
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describing two societies: limited access orders (LAOs), or natural states, and open
access orders (OAOs). Natural states are defined by the creation and manipulation of
interests to ensure social order. Everything in these states is personal and driven by
elites through patron-client relationships. These personal relationships also tie elites
into dominant coalitions that spread the benefits they receive across the coalition,
creating more benefits for the members. These natural states limit access to benefits
by identifying privileges, creating rents, and providing credibility to personal
relationships (North et al. 2009a, 38).
Over time, some countries develop into open access orders, which are
essentially highly developed and consolidated, liberal and market-based democracies.
To move from limited to open access orders, states must achieve three doorstep
conditions that establish impersonal relations amongst elites—1) rule of law for elites,
2) perpetually lived public and private elite organizations (i.e., organizations that
survive beyond the existence of specific individuals or groups), and 3) the state’s
monopolization of force (North et al. 2009a, 26). Elites in these societies create pacts
to develop a dominant coalition that allows the elites to limit access to certain benefits
in society. The importance of elite pacts also serves as the basis of the dominant
theory that explains the transitions from authoritarianism to democracy in the 1970s
and 1980s (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1993).
Yet, because social order has broken down, weak or failed states, such as those
undergoing civil strife, do not fit into NWW’s framework or the transitology literature.
Additionally, NWW do not explicitly address the role of external actors as a part of
the process in helping establish these social orders. As such, a realistic goal is to help
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those societies develop into limited access orders. The transitology literature also did
not address the role of external actors in helping states establish democracies, but does
provide another point for thinking about the role of sequencing in establishing stability
in unstable states. Rustow (1970) described a model with national unity as a
background condition for a sequence of struggle, compromise, and habituation leading
to the establishment of democracy. The democratic rules that Rustow argued that
needed to come into being during the compromise phase and their habituation supports
the idea of the role of rules in limited access orders. Those rules according to NWW
may eventually expand beyond the initial elite-pact members and ultimately reach the
doorstep conditions necessary for a society to develop into an open access order.
Using NWW’s framework, it appears that is more realistic for external actors
to help build limited access orders than liberal democracies and markets, because the
initial challenge in conflict torn states is to provide incentives for the conflicting
parties to form a mutually benefiting pact. By limiting access, the elites are
guaranteed that they will maintain their power and wealth, as well as protection from
the possibility of losing those privileges, which helps stabilize the society since the
elites collectively increase their wealth and power by suppressing violence.
When external actors focus on establishing democracies and free-markets,
despite the good intention of spreading freedom across society, this may actually
further destabilize the society, because the elites fear they will lose their wealth and
power, making the costs outweigh the benefits of ending conflict. Democracy
proponents distinguish between electoral and liberal democracies (Diamond 2008).
Fearon (2006) discusses the importance of elections as a self-enforcement mechanism
73

in democracies that aggregates private information to signal to the population when to
rebel against a ruler. Building upon this insight, this dissertation views the simple
holding of elections not as the establishment of a limited form of a democracy or a
signal to the population, but as a signaling mechanism between elites about their
willingness to agree to and enforce a pact. Building upon NWW’s theoretical
framework, this chapter argues that external actors must enable the development of
pacts between elites by serving as credible guarantors. The “Third Wave” literature
also emphasizes the importance of elite pacts in transitional societies (O'Donnell and
Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1993), but also does not explicitly consider how external
actors can contribute to the development and enforcement of these stabilizing
agreements. As credible guarantors, the external actors ensure that if either the
government or opposition cheats on the pact, they are punished and that the costs from
the punishment outweigh benefits gained from reneging. By enforcing against
transgressions from either side, the external actor sets the conditions necessary for the
pact to become self-enforcing over time. Self-enforcement means that the government
and opposition abide by the pact without the need for third party enforcement. If
external actors try to skip social order progression by trying to directly build a liberal
democracy without first establishing the doorstep conditions, they are likely to fail in
helping establish self-enforcing stability, and hence, effective state-building in these
nations.
The problem with the COIN literature is that it focuses on the wrong unit of
analysis, or the entity of interest that affects the outcome under study in the research.
The HAM approach focuses on the population as a unified actor. This dissertation
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argues instead that to reduce violence and achieve stability, external actors should
focus on elites as the actors of concern. The reason elites are important is because the
population turns to meso-level, or local, elites to provide security and to distribute
rents. The people support leaders who provide these services and goods, and turn
against the leaders who cannot provide for the population’s safety and material needs
(Christia 2008, Forthcoming). Further, recent empirical work shows how elites drive
mass opinion and behavior (Zaller 1994; Berinsky 2007; Blaydes and Linzer 2010).
Thus, to understand the incentives of the population, one must first identify the
incentives of the elites who lead the population.
This dissertation does not argue against the importance of the population, since
as COIN theorists argue, securing and controlling the population allows for
information gathering from the population that is vital to marginalizing the insurgents
(Trinquier 1961 [1964]; Galula 1964 [2006]; Thompson 1966; Kitson 1971;
Department of the Army 2006). Rather, this dissertation argues that the “hearts and
minds” paradigm alone is insufficient, but not irrelevant, for explaining how to
achieve stability in conflict-torn societies, because the HAM approach ignores the
credibility problem between the conflicting parties. The theory in this chapter views
the population as another parameter, like resources contributed by the external actor,
that elites can access to have an impact on the stability in the society and on the
ultimate social order to emerge.
In moving from a failed state to a limited access order, the population initially
helps maintain the dominant coalition’s pact. It is in the interest of the elites to get the
population’s support, because maintaining the pact is how elites increase their power
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and wealth. It is in the populace’s interest to follow the elites, because when the elites
increase their wealth and power, as this paper’s model will show, the elites reduce
violence, ultimately improving the security and livelihood of the mass population.
This dissertation argues that after achieving a stable limited access order and solving
the credible commitment problem between elites, winning over the population
contributes to maintaining the stability equilibrium.

3.3. Developing a Theory of Self-Enforcing Stability
3.3.1. Basic State-building Model
Following a rational-choice approach, the model begins with the understanding
that “the rational [actor] is one who combines his or her beliefs about the external
environment and preferences about things in that environment in a consistent manner”
(Shepsle and Bonchek 1997, 19). For the theory, this chapter defines the actors as
coalitions of elites. The basic theory consists of three actors: the government, the
opposition, and the external actor. As there may be many different members within
each of these coalitions, this model assumes for now that each overcomes its own
collective action problem. The players, then, are representative members from each of
these groups. The inability of the players to achieve an agreement exists because of a
credible commitment problem. Thus, a cooperation problem remains between the
government and the opposition.
Without the external actor, a game exists where two parties are in conflict with
each other over governmental control: the government and the opposition. This
conflict prevents state-building from occurring due to instability, which I define as the
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existence of violence at a level which prevents political and economic development
from taking place. In this game, the government (G) moves first, followed by the
opposition (O), and then nature (N) or the government moves in the third stage.

3.3.1.1. Order of the Game
In the first stage, the government chooses whether or not to include the
opposition in the government (see Figure 3.1). In the second stage, the opposition
either chooses to cooperate by laying down their arms and joining the government, or
to subvert by continuing to fight. In the third stage, if the government includes the
opposition and the opposition cooperates, the government chooses to either fulfill its
part of the pact by allowing the opposition into the government, or it reneges by
breaking the agreement and leaving the opposition out. If the opposition subverts after
the government tries to include the opposition, nature determines if the opposition
succeeds with probability p and fails with probability 1-p in overthrowing the
government. But, when the opposition subverts after the government tries to exclude
the opposition, nature determines if the opposition succeeds with probability q and
fails with probability 1-q in overthrowing the government. Probability q of opposition
success is greater than probability p, because if the government includes the
opposition, negotiations take place between the government and opposition about how
to include the opposition, giving the government time to strengthen itself against the
opposition under the cover of negotiations. This follows the logic of Fearon’s (1998)
model about ethnic conflict.
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This chapter makes several assumptions in the game displayed in Figure 3.1.
First, the government and the opposition are each unified actors, overcoming their
own collective action problems. Second, the government conditions opposition
participation in the governance process on disarmament. Third, the opposition has a
large enough base of support to continue resistance for the foreseeable future. If not,
the government is typically strong enough to command the territory. Additionally, the
balance of power between the government and the opposition is equal to p or q
depending on the choice to include or exclude, respectively, meaning that in the case
of subversion the opposition is successful with probability p or q.

3.3.1.2. Actor Preferences
In the game without an external actor (Figure 3.1), both the government and
opposition have ranked preferences for the possible outcomes of their interaction. The
government’s ideal preference, D, excludes the opposition while obtaining the
opposition’s cooperation, because the government would pay no cost of conflict and
receive all of the benefits from controlling the government. The government’s second
best preference, B, initially includes the opposition and gets the opposition’s
cooperation, and then the government reneges. With outcome B, the government
again avoids the cost of conflict, since the opposition gave up its arms when the
opposition chose to cooperate, and the government receives all of the benefits from
retaining monopoly control of the government. The government includes the
opposition, receives the opposition’s cooperation, and the government fulfills the
terms of the agreement to include the opposition in government rule as its third
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preference, A, because despite the government having to share the benefits of
government control with the opposition, the government avoids all of the costs of war.
The government’s fourth preference, C, is for the opposition to subvert after including
the opposition, because the delay in fighting during the negotiation period allows the
government to increase its strength vis-à-vis the opposition and decrease the cost to
the government of fighting by a factor of q-p. The government prefers for the
opposition to subvert after the government excluded the opposition least, E, because
the government pays a higher cost for conflict, since probability that the government
will lose is q, and correspondingly, the government’s share of the benefit controlling
the government may decrease depending upon the outcome of the conflict.
The opposition ranks its preferences of the outcomes from the game in Figure
3.1 differently than the government. The opposition’s preferred outcome is A,
because when the government includes the opposition, receives the opposition’s
cooperation, and the government fulfills the terms of the agreement, the opposition
gets to share the benefits of government control with the government and avoid all of
the costs of war. The opposition then prefers for the government to exclude the
opposition and for the opposition to subvert, E, because the opposition retains its
current strength compared to the government and has probability q of succeeding. The
opposition’s third preference is to subvert after inclusion, C, because despite the
opposition’s probability of success decreasing from q to p during the negotiation
period that allows the government to strengthen itself relative to the opposition, the
opposition still has a chance of achieving some of the benefits of government control.
Cooperating with the government after exclusion, D, is the opposition’s fourth
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preference, because despite gaining no benefits from sharing government control, the
opposition avoids all costs of conflict. The opposition’s least preferred outcome, B, is
for the government to include the opposition, for the opposition to choose to
cooperate, and then for the government to renege. While avoiding the cost of conflict,
the opposition pays the cost of giving up its ability to defend the opposition’s interests,
and the opposition again receives none of the anticipated benefits of sharing
government control.

3.3.1.3. Solving the Game
Solving the game in Figure 3.1 through backwards induction, based on the
preferences described above, reveals that a commitment problem exists between the
government and the opposition. The problem is that the government is not credible in
telling the opposition that if the opposition lays down its arms that it will not take
advantage of them and renege on the agreement to incorporate the opposition into the
governance process (Fearon 1995, 1998). Working backwards through the game tree
in Figure 3.1, the government will choose to renege in stage three, since the
government gains all of the benefits of governance with no cost of conflict. Thinking
strategically, the opposition knows the government will renege, so in stage two the
opposition will subvert. And if the opposition will subvert in stage two, implying the
opposition will not lay down its arm during the negotiation process, the government
will choose to exclude the opposition. When solving this game, despite the preference
of the government for D and of the opposition for A, E is the game’s sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE). With this SPNE, the opposition fights, not because it wants
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to win rather than negotiate, but because the government cannot credibly commit to
honor any agreement with the opposition. The opposition would choose peace if the
government would not renege. In other words, peace is not only about both sides’
willingness to compromise; it is also about credibly implementing the agreement after
the fact.

Figure 3.1: State-building Game without External Actor
Addressing this problem of credibly committing to agreements after the fact,
Weingast (2005) defines four conditions for pacts to become self-enforcing, which I
apply to the development of stability. First, pacts create structure and processes that
provide rules of the game for participants in the pact. In the case of conflict-ridden
state-building, pacts form limited access elite organizations. Second, the parties to the
pact must believe they are better off with the agreement than without it. So, on
average, the government and opposition achieves greater benefits, in terms of rent-
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seeking opportunities and influence, under this pact. Third, the parties agree to change
their behavior simultaneously. This is a challenge to achieve without external
enforcement during ongoing civil conflict because of the lack of trust between the
government and opposition. Not until after both parties have moved can the pact
become self-enforcing. Fourth, the parties to the pact must defend the agreement
against transgressions. In post-conflict state-building, the government and opposition
elites have to be willing to police their own members who violate the pact.

3.3.2. Incorporating an External Actor into the State-building Game
The external actor enters the interaction here. Under certain conditions, the
external actor provides the credible commitment that neither the government nor
opposition can. This model assumes a benevolent external actor or one with benign
intent, making the external actor unlikely to renege ex-post. As the government and
opposition cannot overcome the above commitment problems on their own, the
external actor can serve as a guarantor or arbitrator to hold both the government and
opposition accountable to the terms of the pact between the parties.
The provision of resources—personnel, money, equipment, time, elections,
institutional development, and public statements of intent—are the mechanisms that
the external actor can use to realign the incentives of the elites and make their
agreements credible. Through personnel, the external actor is capable of helping both
sides police the transgressions of their own coalitions, as well as policing the opposite
side’s defectors. And, personnel can help elites secure the portions of the population
under the control of each of the elites, preventing one group from trying to reduce the
82

influence and power of another group, which would violate the pact. Money serves as
a commitment mechanism, because the external actor provides rent-seeking
opportunities for both the government and opposition, allowing both groups to extend
their influence capabilities and limiting access to elite organizations. Equipment
serves the purpose of enabling the diversification of force, which is necessary to attain
social order in limited access orders, or natural states. Time serves as a credible
commitment mechanism when the external actor’s withdrawal timeline is ambiguous.
While all parties know the external actor will eventually leave, it is important that
there is not a clear departure date. The external actor is needed until a balance of
power is achieved through the diversification of violent means and rent-seeking
opportunities, which is what the provision of the three other resources helps
accomplish. That is the point when stability becomes self-enforcing. Since the
government and opposition recognize the need for an external actor, they each solicit
the external actor’s support.
The presence of an external actor changes the game described in Figure 3.1.
The new game, displayed in Figure 3.2, relies on several new assumptions. First, the
external actor engages only when the government is willing to include the opposition
in the governance process, and when both parties see the external actor as a credible
guarantor. Second, the external actor punishes any side that violates the terms of the
pact. Third, the external actor can change the balance of power between the
government and opposition by !. Finally, the external actor has certain preferences
for the outcomes as well: it prefers B to C and D to E. The reason the external actor
prefers to punish is because that is how the external actor maintains its credible
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commitment and enables the pact over time to develop into one of self-enforcing
stability.

Figure 3.2: State-building with External Actor Support (“Podesta-type Model”9)
3.3.2.1. Order of the Game
In the game in Figure 3.2, the government chooses to either exclude or include
the opposition in the first stage. The subsequent moves are the same as those
described in Figure 3.1 if the government excludes the opposition. If the government
9

The use of the term Podesta to describe this model captures the general role of an outsider brought in
to help build the Italian city-states, such as Genoa, in the late medieval period. While not an exact
analogy of the role of outsiders today, this model assumes that modern external actors “promote
political stability, curtail political violence, and foster economic prosperity” (Greif 2006, 217) as the
Podesta did in Genoa between 1194 and 1339. The imperfect analogy exists because the Podesta
garnered resources from the host-city-state, while external actors today, such as the United States, have
their own resources and can dominate the host-nation in ways the Podesta could not.
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includes the opposition, the opposition again chooses to either cooperate or subvert in
the second stage. Now, the game changes from Figure 3.1 because of the role of the
external actor. If the opposition cooperates then the government either fulfills or
reneges on the agreement in stage three. If they fulfill, the opposition enters the
government and the game ends, but if they renege, the external actor chooses to punish
the government or not in the fourth stage. The external actor can use any combination
of its credibility mechanisms— personnel, money, equipment, time, elections,
institutional development, and public statements of intent —to punish the government,
increasing the opposition’s probability of success by !. For example, the external
actor can use its personnel to work with the opposition to fight and help overthrow the
government, they can withdrawal financial support, they can withdrawal equipment
and trainers, and they can either extend or shorten their stay in the host country. If the
opposition subverts in the second stage, the external actor chooses to either punish
them or not. If the external actor punishes the opposition it reduces the opposition’s
probability of success by the amount ß, which represents the external actor’s
application of the credibility mechanisms.

3.3.2.2. Actor Preferences
As previously discussed, the external actor has preferences about the possible
outcomes in the game. The external actor first prefers A. That is, the external actor
wants conflict not to occur and lasting stability to form in the other nation. For this
outcome to occur, the external actor must commit to the government and opposition to
defend the elite pact, enabling the government to include a cooperative opposition and
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for the government to fulfill its part of the pact. A fulfilled pact creates the conditions
for self-enforcing stability to form. The external actor’s second preference is to
punish either side that transgresses from the pact, either if the government reneges
after the opposition cooperates, B, or if the opposition subverts the government after
the government chooses to include the opposition, D. The external actor prefers to
punish the transgressor in order to maintain its credibility within the host nation,
abiding by its commitment to the government and opposition, and to maintain its
credibility within the international community in case other countries ask the external
actor to intervene in the future in other locations. The external actor next prefers for
the government to exclude the opposition and for the opposition to cooperate, F,
because this avoids conflict and achieves short-term stability. But this is not selfenforcing, because the opposition will have no role in government and the opposition
can only express future grievances through violence. Then, the external prefers for the
government to exclude the opposition and the opposition to subvert the government,
G, because this provides an opportunity for the opposition to create the conditions
where the two groups have to come to an agreement that can potentially lead to shortterm stability. The external actor least prefers for the government or opposition to
break the pact and for the external actor to not punish the transgressor, either the
government reneges, C, or the opposition subverts, E. This is the external actor’s least
preferred outcome, because it exposes the external actor’s lack of credibility, which
impedes the external actor’s ability to help build self-enforcing stability in the host
nation or in future interactions with other countries.
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The credibility of the external actor leads the government and opposition to
modify each of their preferences as shown in Figure 3.2. The government and
opposition’s primary preferences remain the same, but each of them prefer for the
external actor to punish their counterparts for any transgressions over letting nature
determine the outcome completely as in the game in Figure 3.1. Each prefers for the
external actor to punish the transgressor, because that increases the transgressed share
of the benefits and reduces its costs, and because the punishment maintains the pact,
improving the conditions for both the government and opposition in the long-run.

3.3.2.3. Solving the Game
The credibility of the external actor changes the conflictual sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) described in Figure 3.1 to a cooperative, reduced violence
SPNE, A, in Figure 3.2. Backwards induction shows how the presence of the external
actor ensures that a balance of power emerges between the government and the
opposition, and shifts the SPNE. In the last stage of the top two branches of the game,
the external actor faces the decision to punish the government or opposition’s
transgressions or not. In accordance with the preferences outlined above, the external
actor punishes either the government or the opposition. Knowing the external actor
will do this, the government chooses to fulfill rather than renege on its agreement, and
in the stage prior to that, the opposition chooses to cooperate rather than subvert. The
lower branch of the game is the same as in the first game because the external actor is
not involved, so the opposition will choose to subvert knowing that they have a
probability q of succeeding against the government. In the first stage, the government
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strategically sees that it is less costly to include the opposition and the potential
benefits are greater than to exclude the opposition, and this is consistent with the
government preferences described earlier.
So, the presence of the external actor changes the outcome of the first game.
The inability of the government and opposition to credibly commit to one another
created the problem in the first game that led to the government’s decision to exclude
the opposition and for the opposition to choose to subvert, leading to a conflict
decided by nature. With the external actor’s presence and credibility to enforce the
pact, the government and opposition determine that it is in each of their self-interests
to receive the benefits provided by the external actor’s presence and avoid the costs of
conflict. The external actor’s credible commitment mechanisms, which require a pact
between the government and opposition, help reduce violence to a manageable level
and allow stability to take hold because the government and opposition want to avoid
the external actor’s punishment.
The solution the external actor provides in the second game to the commitment
problem from the first game leads to the conditions for self-enforcing stability to
occur. The greater amount of resources provided enhances the external actor’s ability
to serve as a guarantor, and the resources also allow for the government and
opposition elites to diversify their means of violence and rent-seeking opportunities.
So, rather than the resources on their own improving stability (Dobbins et al. 2003;
Dobbins et al. 2005; Dobbins et al. 2008), “more is better” to the point where the
resources serve a credibility function. With the diversifications of violent means and
rent-seeking opportunities, the government and opposition police violators within their
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own groups, because the pact makes them better off on average over the long-run.
Over time, as the government and opposition solidify the balance of power between
them and internalize the self-interest of protecting the pact on their own, this allows
the external actor to incrementally transfer enforcement responsibilities to the
government and opposition. This implies the need for another game that describes the
achievement of self-enforcing stability, meaning that the government and opposition
no longer have a credible commitment problem between them, and an exit strategy for
the external actor exists. Section 3.3.4 develops such a game, but before that, the next
section builds a variation of the model just described by incorporating a non-benign
external actor.

3.3.3. “Post-(Neo)Colonial Model” for a Theory of Self-enforcing Stability
The model in Figure 3.2 assumes benign or noble intent by the external actor.
The framework of the broader theory in this chapter allows for changing that
assumption, making the external actor a strategic player in the game. The behavior of
a colonial power necessitates modifying the benign or benevolent assumption. Under
these circumstances, the colonial power has a stake and interest in shaping the
outcome of events between the government and opposition to favor the colonial
power’s interests. The distinction between the colonial power as an external actor and
colonial power as the government is blurred during periods of colonial rule. Yet, it is
still possible to distinguish the external actor from the portion of the population
favored by the colonial power.
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This argument maintains several fundamental assumptions. First, the external
actor wants to leave a stable state behind that supports the external actor’s economic
and national security interests. Second, favor from the external actor generally comes
in the form of privileged positions in the government and the security forces given to
the favored segment of the population; generally following colonial-style “divide and
conquer” tactics. Third, the favored party supports the colonial-type rulers in
governing the colony. Fourth, the favored segment of the population expects to
assume governance from the colonial power upon independence. Fifth, the
government and opposition both want the external actor to leave, allowing their group,
respectively, to dominate the governance structures.
Based on these assumptions, this model treats the favored group as the
government, the colonial power as the external actor, and those who challenge the
government or external actor as the opposition. The theory throughout this chapter
focuses on how external actors can help societies torn by civil conflict get on a path
towards self-enforcing stability. This section explains how the external actor can help
the government and opposition achieve lasting stability after the external actor departs
from the territory and governance structures.
Since the external actor is a strategic actor, the external actor still has to
support the four main arguments of the general theory to achieve the goal of selfenforcing stability. First, the external actor must help solve the commitment problems
between the government and opposition. Second, rather than seeking the Weberian
monopolization of force, the external actor should help decentralize violent means
between the government and the opposition. Third, as competing elites are the source
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of the credible commitment problem that creates instability, the external actor should
initially have primarily an elite-centric focus for solving the commitment problems
before shifting to population-centric strategies. Finally, the parties to the conflict
should focus on transitioning to a limited access order rather than a liberal democracy.
So, the overall argument of the general theory remains. The problem of conflict and
instability comes from the failure of the government and opposition to provide
credible commitments to one another. The solution to the problem is for the external
actor to provide the initial credible commitment that enables the diversification of
power amongst a dominant coalition of government and opposition elites.
As in the general model, described in Section 3.3.2, the external actor allows
the government and opposition to credibly commit to honor their agreement, which
they are unable to do in the absence of the external actor. Despite the non-benign
strategic actor in this model, the external actor still has mechanisms that allow the
external actor to have potential credibility—that is, to credibly threaten to punish any
transgression. While the government and opposition may distrust the external actor,
particularly following strategies of “divide and rule” to maintain power in a colony,
distrust does not negate the potential credibility achieved through several mechanisms.
As in the general model, the external actor can provide resources, such as personnel,
money, equipment, and time, and hold elections, conduct institutional development,
and make public statements of intent to prove its credibility.
As before, the personnel allow the external actor to help government and
opposition elites police transgressors of their own coalitions, respectively, as well as
the opposite side’s defectors. Personnel also help provide security for the population
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under the control of each of the elite groups. Money still allows the external actor to
provide rent-seeking opportunities to both government and opposition elites, allowing
the elites to extend their influence and limit access to elite organizations. In this
model, though, the external actor may distribute money raised within the host territory
through taxation or natural resource revenues rather than contributing money directly
from the external actor’s treasury. Equipping the government and opposition still
serves the purpose of decentralizing force, which allows for the creation of a balance
of power, self-security, and the ability to attain social order within a natural state.
The ambiguity about a timeline for withdrawal remains an important
credibility mechanism under this “Post-(Neo)Colonial Model,” along with a couple of
additional mechanisms accompany time. The external actor must take a few concrete
steps to prove to the government and opposition that the external actor will actually
leave due to the colonial legacy. The additional mechanisms that complement time
includes: 1) elections, 2) institutional development, and 3) formal public statements of
intent.
Most arguments about elections revolve around the role of elections in creating
democracy. The theory presented here, however, views the elections mechanism
differently. Elections serve the function of solidifying the pact between the
government and opposition. They also signal that the external actor will ensure that
the elites to the pact can run in and assume office after the elections. Instituting a
series of elections over time, starting locally and moving upward nationally, allows the
external actor to maintain stability during the transition and show its commitment to
eventual transition to host rule.
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Also, establishing similarly structured governance institutions at all levels of
government, with members to the elite pact given bureaucratic and leadership
positions in the institutions, further strengthens the external actor’s credibility. It
proves the external actor’s intent to leave and that the external actor will maintain a
balance of power between the government and opposition elites. Combined with time,
this mechanism allows for the training of host nation civil servants who can effectively
manage the nation’s governance structure. Additionally, as elections take place, the
winners assume positions previously held by government or external actor appointees.
The final additional mechanism that may complement time and the other
resources is formal public statements of intent. Public pronouncements by the external
actor declaring the intent to grant self-rule or independence helps solidify the external
actor’s credibility to the government and opposition elites. These public statements
create international and domestic audience costs for the external actor, so the elites to
the pact know that the external actor has to eventually follow through on its
commitment to leave (Fearon 1994). By announcing a conditions-based, rather than
set-date, timeline, the external actor can remain until the needed balance of power
between the government and opposition elites is attained through the decentralization
of violent means and rent-seeking opportunities. All of the above mechanisms work
together to create the conditions needed for self-enforcing stability to take hold.
The new game for the “Post-(Neo)Colonial Model”, displayed in Figure 3.3,
modifies the game and some of the assumptions in Figure 3.2. Before explaining the
order of this new game, it is necessary to state its assumptions. First, the external
actor starts out in control of the host nation’s governance structures, maintaining final
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decision-making authority, even with local elites in leadership positions. Second, the
government and opposition see the external actor as a credible guarantor. Third, the
external actor will punish any side that violates the terms of the pact. Fourth, the
balance of power between the government and opposition is equal to p, q, or r. If the
government includes the opposition and the opposition cooperates, the opposition’s
probability of success is p. If the government includes the opposition, but the
opposition subverts after some negotiations, the opposition’s probability of success is
q. The opposition’s greatest probability of success, r, exists when the opposition
subverts after the government excludes them. The probabilities vary based on the time
the government has to strengthen its forces vis-à-vis the opposition, so r>q>p. Fifth,
the external actor can change the balance of power between the government and
opposition by !1 or !2. Finally, the external actor desires a stable state that will
support the external actor’s economic and national security interests.

3.3.3.1. Order of the Game
In the game in Figure 3.3, the external actor is the first mover, making it
different from the general model in Figure 3.2 where the government moves first. In
the first move, the external actor chooses either to decolonize or retain the colony.
The subsequent sub-game in the upper half of Figure 3.3 is the same as described in
Figure 3.2, starting with the government decision to include or exclude the opposition,
if the external actor decolonizes. Next, the opposition chooses to cooperate or subvert.
The government then either fulfills or reneges on cooperation. Then, the external
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actor punishes or fails to punish the transgressing actor, and nature determines the
victor between the opposition and the government.
The game changes more significantly than just the external actor moving first,
if the external actor retains the colony. The lower half of Figure 3.3 then begins a subgame with the government as the next mover. The government either supports or
challenges the external actor. Support means the government wants to continue its
status quo relationship with the external actor. Challenge means that the government
wants to change the status quo and desires the departure of the external actor from the
state’s governance structures. If the government supports, then the opposition
cooperates or subverts. The rest of the sub-game follows the same pattern of moves
following government inclusion in the upper part of Figure 3.3. The external actor can
use the combination of any of the credibility mechanisms discussed earlier—
personnel, money, equipment, time, elections, institutional development, and public
statements of intent—to punish the transgressor, either the government or opposition.
If the external actor punishes the government, the opposition’s probability of success,
p or q, increases by !1, while punishing the opposition decreases the opposition’s
probability of success by !2.
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Figure 3.3: Transitional State-building: Towards Self-Rule (“Post-(Neo)Colonial
Model”)
If the government challenges the external actor in the second move, the subgame follows a new path. The opposition then chooses to cooperate or compete with
the government. Cooperate means that the opposition combines forces with the
government to challenge the external actor. Compete means that the opposition works
against the government in challenging the external actor. If the opposition and
government cooperate, their probability of successfully defeating the external actor is
s. If the opposition and government compete, their probability of success is t. The
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paper assumes that s>t, because if both the government and opposition desire the
defeat of the external actor, the probability of doing so is greater when they fight the
external actor together. The government and opposition fighting together against the
external actor is possible when the benefit of decolonization minus the cost of
decolonization (BD-CD) is greater than the benefit of maintaining colonization minus
the cost of maintaining colonization (BM-CM): (BD-CD)> (BM-CM) for the government
and the opposition.

3.3.3.2. Actor Preferences
The external actor first prefers for conflict not to occur, and lasting stability to
form at minimal cost to the external actor. So, the external actor commits to
decolonization and defense of an elite pact, enabling the government to include a
cooperative opposition and for the government to fulfill its obligations, A. As shown
in Figure 3.4 below, the fulfilled pact creates the conditions for self-enforcing
stability. The external actor’s second preference is to punish the pact’s transgressor.
This is when either the government reneges following opposition cooperation, B, or
the opposition subverting after government inclusion, D. Punishing transgression
allows the external actor to maintain its credibility to the parties of the elite pact, as
well as internationally. The third preference for the external actor is to retain the
colony while maintaining government support, opposition cooperation, and
government fulfillment of the pact, H. The external actor prefers B or D over H,
because while the short-run cost of punishing transgressors may be high for the
external actor, the long-run cost of maintaining colonial rule is greater. The external
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actor also prefers the above outcomes to the following, because all of the above can
lead to self-enforcing outcomes, meaning stability endures.
The external actor next prefers for the government to exclude the opposition
and for the opposition to cooperate, F. While this avoids conflict and achieves shortterm stability, the exclusion of the opposition in government leaves the opposition
only with the option of violence to express future grievances; hence, it is not selfenforcing. The opposition would never cooperate after exclusion, so this outcome is
off the equilibrium path—Section 3.3.3.3 discusses the outcome equilibria of this
game. Then, the external actor prefers either to not punish the government for
reneging on opposition cooperation, J, or to punish the opposition after opposition
subversion following government support for the external actor retaining the colony,
K. The external actor rewards the government for its support of continued
colonization by punishing the opposition’s, but not the government’s, transgression
because the external actor’s primary concern is maintaining its own economic and
national security interests. This may enable short-term stability by strengthening the
government, but will inhibit a self-enforcing pact and external actor credibility. The
next preference, punishing the government for reneging, I, creates the potential for a
self-enforcing pact by showing the opposition that the external actor can serve as an
honest broker. However, the costs to the external actor for following the sub-game to
I are greater than for J and K, because of the greater uncertainty about instability to
follow that will hurt the external actor’s interests.
The external actor’s seventh preference, G, costs the external actor less than J,
K, or I, but adds even greater uncertainty about possible instability with a direct
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conflict between the government and opposition in the immediate aftermath of
decolonization. The third to last preference for the external actor is to not punish the
transgressor of the pact—the government, C or L, or the opposition, E—because it
will affect the external actor’s utility gained from enforcing the agreement and will
limit the likelihood of self-enforcing stability. The penultimate preference is for the
government to challenge the external actor and the opposition to compete against the
government, N. Fighting to maintain the colony is very costly to the external actor,
but the division between the government and opposition provides an opportunity for
the external actor to exploit and employ “divide and rule” tactics. This may lead to
short-term stability, but not a self-enforcing mechanism. The external actor’s least
preferred outcome is to face a unified government and opposition that challenge the
decision of the external actor to retain the colony, M. This outcome creates the
maximum cost to the external actor with the least likelihood of a stable state that will
support the external actor’s economic and national security interests.
The role of the external actor as the first mover in this game leads to some
changes in the government and opposition preferences in the general model described
with Figure 3.2. The model in Figure 3.3 assumes that while their preferences
diverge, the government and opposition both ultimately prefer stable self-rule rather
than remaining under the yoke of an external actor. But, while wanting stability, each
side prefers to maximize its own rent-seeking opportunities and share of power.
The government’s top preferences follow the decolonization path.
Decolonization provides the government the opportunity to gain more power in the
country as the external actor departs. The first preference remains where the
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government excludes a cooperative opposition, F, reaping all of the benefits of
government control without any costs of conflict. But, this will only happen if the
opposition is very weak and unable to resist. Next, the government prefers to renege
on a cooperative opposition without punishment by the external actor, C, since the
opposition will have given up its arms, giving the opposition its lowest probability of
success, p. Next, the government prefers to fulfill its agreement with a cooperative
opposition following decolonization, A, because the government avoids the costs of
war and, even by including the opposition, increase its power and rent-seeking
because the external actor is gone. Fourth, the government prefers outcome D,
because the external actor punishes the opposition, increasing the benefits to the
government while decreasing the costs of fighting the opposition alone. This also
reduces the opposition’s probability of success by !2.
The government then prefers to support the maintenance of the colony and
renege on a cooperative opposition without punishment from the external actor, J,
because this decreases the opposition’s probability of success by !1. The government
expects greater benefits at a lower cost. The sixth preference is to avoid all costs of
conflict and share power with the opposition under colonial rule, H. Next, the
government prefers to challenge the external actor with a cooperative opposition, M.
This gives the government the greatest probability of success in defeating the external
actor, s, and allows the government to share the costs of fighting the external actor.
Eighth, the government prefers that the external actor punish the subverting opposition
after the government supports the maintenance of the colony, K. Then, the
government prefers to face an excluded, subverted opposition after decolonization, G.
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The government’s tenth preference is for the external actor to not punish the
opposition after subverting government efforts to either include after decolonization,
E, or government efforts to support the external actor’s maintenance of the colony, L.
These outcomes reduce the external actor’s credibility and increase the opposition’s
probability of success to q. The government’s penultimate preference is to fight a
two-front war, N, when the government challenges the external actor and the
opposition competes with the government. The least preferred outcome is when the
external actor punishes the government for reneging on agreements made by the
government to include a cooperative opposition following decolonization, B, or when
the opposition cooperates with the government that supports the maintenance of the
colony, I. The punishment by the external actor increases the opposition’s probability
of defeating the government by !1.
The opposition’s preferences remain largely at odds with the government’s
preferences in this game as they did in the “Podesta Model” in Figure 3.2. The
opposition’s preferred outcome remains A, because it allows the opposition to share
the benefits of power with the government while avoiding the costs of war. For the
same reasons, the next preference is H, even though the benefits of government
control are now split three ways with the external actor. The opposition then prefers
to cooperate with the government as it challenges the external actor, M. Even with
uncertainty about the long-term distribution of power, this increases the chances of
success in removing the external actor. Next, the opposition prefers that the external
actor punish the government for reneging on deals the government makes with the
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opposition. The opposition prefers B to I, because of only having to distribute power
between two rather than three actors, respectively.
Preference

Government

Opposition

External
Actor

1

F

A

A

2

C

H

B, D

3

A

M

H

4

D

B

F

5

J

I

J, K

6

H

G

I

7

M

E, L

G

8

K

N

C, E, L

9

G

D, K

N

10

E, L

F

M

11

N

C

12

B, I

J

Table 3.1: Summary of Actors’ Preferences in Transitional State-building Model
When the opposition subverts, it prefers outcome G, because if the opposition
subverts following government exclusion, the opposition retains its current strength
and has its highest probability of success, r, against the government. The opposition
then prefers that the external actor not punish the opposition for subversion after
inclusion or support from the government, E or L, because the opposition can face the
government without interference even with the probability of success decreased to q.
Next, the opposition prefers to compete with the government while it is challenging
the external actor, N, because this requires the government and external actor to split
their conflict efforts, improving the opposition’s probability of success. Then, the
opposition prefers to subvert after inclusion or support by the government knowing the
102

external actor will punish the opposition, D and K, because the opposition retains
probability q-!2 of success.
Cooperating with the government after exclusion, F, is the opposition’s next
preference because the opposition avoids all the costs of war even though it gains no
benefits from sharing government. The second to last preference for the opposition is
for the government to include, the opposition to cooperate, the government to renege,
and the external actor to not punish the government, C. The opposition’s probability
of success deceases to p because the opposition has given up its ability to defend its
own interests. But, the least preferred option, J, is worse because with the external
actor remaining as a colonizer, the external actor provides tacit and possibly direct
support by not punishing the government, further decreasing the opposition’s
probability of success to p-!1.

3.3.3.3. Solving the Game
Solving the game in Figure 3.3 through backwards induction shows how the
credibility of the external actor prevents the possibility of a conflictual sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and leads to a cooperative, reduced violence SPNE,
whose outcome is A. This builds upon the understanding gained from the game in
Figure 3.2 about the external actor ensuring the emergence of a balance of power
between the government and the opposition. In the last stages of each branch of the
game, the external actor must decide to punish the transgressor or not. In accordance
with the described preferences, the external actor punishes both the government and
opposition when the external actor decolonizes, but will only punish the opposition if
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the government chooses to maintain the colony. Therefore, the external actor solves
the credibility problem between the government and opposition during decolonization,
but contributes to the problem under colonial maintenance. Knowing what the external
actor will do, in the upper branch of the game, the government will fulfill its
agreement, and in the stage prior to that, the opposition will cooperate. Without the
external actor’s presence, the opposition will subvert since the opposition has a greater
probability of success, q; therefore, the government will include the opposition in the
prior stage.
In the lower half of the game, the external actor exacerbates the credible
commitment problem, since the opposition knows that the external actor will favor the
government at the expense of the opposition. So, in the stage prior to the external
actor’s decision to punish, the government will choose to renege on its deal with the
opposition. This will lead the opposition to choose to subvert in the stage prior,
because their probability of success in defeating the government, q-!2, is greater even
when punished by the external actor, than if the external actor does not punish and
tacitly supports the government for reneging, p-!1. When the choice is cooperating or
competing with the government, the opposition will choose to cooperate since that has
the greatest probability for defeating the external actor, s. But, in the stage prior, the
government will choose to support the external actor because of the long-term
uncertainty about the future despite the opposition’s short-term cooperation. The
government and opposition fail to credibly commit to each other. This leads to the
external actor choosing to decolonize in the first stage of the game.
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Despite changing the first mover in the above game compared to the general
game in Figure 3.2, the external actor still must provide the credible commitment that
the government and opposition cannot give to each other. This enables self-enforcing
stability to take hold during the transition from colonial rule. Yet, the possibility of a
self-enforcing agreement between the government and opposition elites that protects
the external actor’s economic and national security interests only exists in the upper
half of the game—transitioning from colonial-type rule. The external actor’s credible
commitment mechanisms in this game—personnel, money, equipment, time, elections,
institutional development, and formal public statements of intent—enable the
government and opposition elites to recognize that an elite pact is in each of theirs
self-interest. The external actor’s credible threat of punishment helps reduce violence
to a manageable level and allows stability to take hold since the government and
opposition recognize the benefits of maintaining the pact exceed the costs of breaking
it.
As the elite pact solidifies during the external actor’s transition away from
(neo)colonial rule, a stable balance of power develops between the government and
opposition. The balance of power stabilizes through the diversification of violent
means, rent-seeking, and power in governance institutions. As this balancing occurs,
initially with the assistance of the external actor’s credible commitments, the selfenforcing nature of the pact emerges. The government and the opposition begin to
develop their own ability to provide credible commitments to one another through the
period of balancing and stabilization. As the external actor transitions out of
governance control, the government and opposition take on greater shares of the
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burden of making their promises to each other credible. Ultimately, self-enforcement
may take hold once the external actor exits and gives self-rule to the government and
opposition elites.

3.3.4. Model of Post-Transition Self-Enforcement
Figure 3.4 shows a model for how the elite pacts described above lead to selfenforcing stability. The below figure looks similar to Figure 3.1 (State-building Game
without External Actor), but the transition process described above alters the
government’s preferences and the government’s and opposition’s expected behavior,
leading to a change in the SPNE. The game in Figure 3.1 described a conflictual
SPNE because neither the government nor opposition could credibly commit to
implementing an agreement after the fact. The new game describes how the
government and opposition can maintain the cooperative, reduced violence SPNE
established in the games of Figures 3.2 and 3.3.
Several assumptions exist for the game in Figure 3.4. First, the external actor
established stability and a power-sharing pact between the government and opposition
before exiting. Second, the power-sharing arrangement achieved through the
diversification of violent means and rent-seeking opportunities changed the cost and
benefit values of decisions in the game. Third, the ability of the government and
opposition to guarantee their own security and protect their material interests allows
both sides to credibly commit to one another if they choose.
The government now prefers to maintain the elite pact, following path A:
government inclusion, opposition cooperation, and government fulfillment. The
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government recognizes the long-term benefit of fulfilling the elite pact is greater than
the short-term gain from reneging. Next, the government prefers exclusion followed
by opposition cooperation, D, since the government will receive all the benefits of
power without any costs of conflict. The government prefers A over D because it
recognizes that by choosing to share with the opposition the government will have
greater overall benefits in the long-term by avoiding the cost of future conflicts with
the opposition. Then the government prefers to renege on the pact, B, over the
opposition subverting after inclusion, C, or exclusion, E. The opposition’s probability
of success increases from B to C to E, since p>q>r. The opposition’s preferences
remain the same as in the game from Figure 3.1, but now the government and
opposition both have the same first preference, A.

Figure 3.4: Self-enforcing Stability without an External Actor
The elite pact that formed before the external actor’s exit, because of the
external actor’s credible commitment mechanisms, adjusted the costs and benefits of
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each of the paths in the upper half of the game in Figure 3.4. Solving the game
through backwards induction clarifies the cost and benefit adjustments enabled by the
balance of power and stability achieved from the games in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. In the
last stage of the game in Figure 3.4, where the government chooses to fulfill or renege,
the government fulfills due to the long-term gains from the existing elite pact. This
means the benefit minus the cost of fulfillment (BF-CF) is greater than the benefit
minus the cost of reneging (BR-CR). In the preceding stage of the upper half, the
opposition chooses to cooperate knowing that the government fulfills its part of the
agreement. Here, the benefit minus the cost of cooperation (BC-CC) exceeds that of
subversion (BS-CS). In the lower half of the game, however, BS-CS > BC-CC since the
opposition fails to receive any of the benefits of cooperation, so the opposition
subverts. Understanding this, the government chooses to include the opposition in the
first stage since the benefits minus the costs of inclusion exceed those of exclusion
(BI-CI > BE-CE). This makes path A the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the
game. Backwards induction shows that the SPNE is the one in which the government
and opposition maintain the cooperative, reduced violence SPNE established in the
games from Figures 3.2 and 3.3.

3.4. Conclusion
This chapter developed a theory of self-enforcing stability to explain how
external actors can help bring about stability and social order in conflict-torn societies.
The theory’s four main arguments run counter to the conventional wisdom of the
counterinsurgency literature and build upon theories within the state-building literature
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by explaining under what conditions an external actor may help end civil conflict.
This chapter showed how a credible commitment problem lies at the heart of civil
conflict. The two different extended form models (Figures 3.2 and 3.3) in this chapter,
based on rational choice institutionalism, theorize how external actors can enable the
competing government and opposition to overcome this credible commitment
challenge.
The theory needs these two different models based on how the external actor
enters the role of enabler in the state-building process. The model in Figure 3.2
describes how an external actor enters the interaction between the government and
opposition from abroad after civil conflict has erupted. The model in Figure 3.3
describes the role an external actor has in enabling stability when the external actor is
already involved in the host nation’s internal affairs prior to the eruption of civil
conflict.
In the first model (Figure 3.2), the external actor performs a function similar to
the Podesteria of the late Middle Ages. During this time, the republics of the Italian
city-state sent outsiders, Podestas, to dependent cities, or city-states hired their own
Podesta, to administer the city and avert conflict between competing local elites.
Podestas enabled credible commitments between these parties by treating each side
equally and protecting the defenders against the defectors of the pact (Greif 1998,
2006). The external actor functions as a colonial, imperial, or trustee power in the
second model (Figure 3.3). This model assumes that the external actor intends to
transition away from external actor to host nation independent rule, enabling the actor
to facilitate a credible pact between the conflicting parties in the host nation.
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The next two chapters will test these two models and the four main hypotheses
of the theory of self-enforcing stability presented in this chapter through case study
analysis.

Again, these four hypotheses are:

H1: An elite-centric, rather than population-centric, strategy will lead to
greater success in establishing stability in conflict-torn states.
H2: External actors contribute to the establishment of stability more
successfully when they help nations establish limited access orders rather than
open access order (liberal democracies).
H3: An external actor is usually needed for internal actors to overcome their
underlying credible commitment problems in order to put them on the path
towards self-enforcing stability.
H4: The oligopolization of violent means amongst competing elites allows
stability to develop in conflict-torn societies.
The case study chapters reanalyze two quintessential cases of supposed success
according to proponents of population-centric theory. Chapter 4 focuses on the
Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 as this is the case where most of the lessons of
“hearts and minds” theory, as well as the rhetorical use of the phrase, come from. The
chapter will recount the conventional interpretation of the British success in Malaya,
and then scrutinize the story to see if the outcome in Malaya follows the logic of the
“hearts and minds” model presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 proceeds with a
reinterpretation of the Malaya story and further tests that story to see if the outcome in
Malaya more closely follows the logic of the “Post-(Neo)Colonial model” (Figure 3.3)
of the theory of self-enforcing stability.
Chapter 5 examines the story of the “Awakening Movements” in Iraq between
2006-2008 in the same manner. The chapter first provides the conventional
interpretation for the reduction of violence in Iraq that came with the shift in tribal
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support away from Al-Qaeda in Iraq towards the Iraqi government and coalition
forces. Chapter 5 then analyzes if the outcome based on that story follows the logic
the “hearts and minds” model in Chapter 2. Then, the chapter provides an alternative
narrative of the “Awakening” story and examines the outcome against the logic of the
“Podesta model” (Figure 3.2).
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Chapter 4: Reexamining the Lessons of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960
“The answer [to the terrorists] lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but
rests in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people.” – General Sir Gerard Templer
(Mills 1958, 63)
4.1. Introduction
The above quote by General Sir Gerard Templer has contributed to the nearly
sacrosanct belief that counterinsurgencies are principally won by winning over the
“hearts and minds” of a targeted population and separating the populace from the
insurgents. The general idea is, using Mao’s analogy of insurgents as fish swimming
in the sea of the peasantry (Mao 1961 [2000], 8, 92-93), to shift the currents of the
waters so that the insurgents are separated from the pools of fish that make up the
population. The Malayan Emergency has become the quintessential example of how
to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations and for how to build a state during
civil conflict. Many lessons that shape today’s views about the role of external actors
in contributing to the end of civil conflict come from this case.
This chapter argues that the general narratives about the Malayan Emergency
do not provide the best explanations for why the British succeeded in defeating the
communist insurgency. The conventional and revisionist narratives focus on changing
the behavior of the population through persuasion or coercion, respectively. The
conventional wisdom that focuses on the role of the population in an insurgency fails
to acknowledge how the government and opposition elites influence the population.
So, these narratives fail to capture how the external actor influences the interaction of
the competing elites. This chapter argues that an elite-centric strategy to adjust the
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incentives of the government and opposition elites served as the underlying
mechanism driving British success in Malaya.
This chapter re-examines the lessons learned from the Malayan Emergency
based on the formalization of “hearts and minds” (HAM) theory in Chapter 2 and the
theory of self-enforcing stability presented in Chapter 3. This chapter begins by
discussing the prevailing conventional wisdom about how the British and Malayan
government defeated the communist insurgency. Then, the chapter analyzes these
generally accepted lessons learned from the Malayan experience to determine if they
follow the expected logic of the HAM model. This is followed by an explanation of
the revisionist narrative, as well as a critique of those lessons learned. Finally, this
chapter applies the “Post-(Neo)Colonial” model of self-enforcing stability and
explains the underlying factors and dynamics that most contributed to stability in
Malaya, which the conventional lessons learned have masked. Appendix A of this
chapter describes a brief history of Malaya before and after World War II, providing
context, if needed by the reader, of the conditions that led to the Malayan Emergency.

4.2. Conventional Explanations for Ending the Malayan Emergency
“Hearts and minds” (HAM) dominates the conventional narrative about how
the British successfully defeated the communist insurgency in Malaya and established
a newly independent and stable post-colonial nation-state. The tendency to combine
the population-centric HAM theory with organizational learning and unified command
lessons, as discussed in Chapter 2, arose in recent interpretations of COIN in Malaya.
Organizational learning and unified command under dynamic leadership, in this
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interpretation, serve as the means to implementing an effective HAM policy. This
conventional story of the Malayan Emergency has led to the development of modern
counterinsurgency theory (see Chapter 2) and doctrine (Department of the Army 2006;
British Army 2009; Sepp 2005) that explains, according to the narrative’s
proselytizers, how to defeat insurgencies and build stable nation-states. The rest of
this section describes the conventional Malayan HAM narrative, which this chapter
critiques in the proceeding section (4.2.1).
Richard Stubbs explains how three factors allowed the British colonial and
Malayan governments to shift from a policy of coercion and enforcement during the
early emergency years to a policy based on winning “hearts and minds”. First, the
demand generated for rubber and tin by the Korean War created an economic boom
for the government, allowing it to achieve full employment and increase government
revenues to pay for HAM policies. Second, the newly elected Conservative
government in Britain took advantage of High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney’s
assassination by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to install General Sir Gerard
Templer as the new leader in Malaya—with unified military and civilian authority—to
change senior personnel in the colonial government and to implement a HAM
approach. Third, the MCP revised its policies in October 1951 to reduce military
activity and increase political organization, creating space for the government to
implement HAM policies (Stubbs 1989, 6).
The HAM story, following the presumption that these above factors generated
a change in British strategy, unfolds in 1951. Proponents argue the British recognized
that their policies of coercion and enforcement in place between 1948 and 1951 were
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counterproductive and the cause of a stalemate between the government and
insurgents in Malaya. The government and insurgents recognized this stalemate in
1951 and both shifted strategies from trying to directly defeat the other side to trying
to win over and gain the allegiance of the population, particularly the Chinese. The
MCP shifted focus with the October Resolutions of 1951, trying to balance military
and political strategies in order to limit violence against the population (Stubbs 1989,
133-151). This stalemate set the conditions for a battle for the Malayan population’s
“hearts and minds”.
With High Commissioner Gurney’s assassination on 6 October 1951, Oliver
Lyttelton, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, led a review of the British
strategy of coercion and enforcement in Malaya. Lyttelton concluded that the
government in Malaya needed a new strategy to improve the lives of the Malayan
population and that the government needed a single leader to unify the government’s
civilian and military efforts to put in place the new strategy. Prime Minister Churchill
followed this advice and appointed Lieutenant General Sir Gerard Templer to take this
post in February 1952. HAM proponents credit Templer as the right person to see
through the changes necessary to implement and shepherd this new strategy to win the
“hearts and minds” of the population (Stubbs 1989, 133-151).
The population-centric “hearts and minds” strategy consisted of the British
colonial government’s use of minimum force, persuasion, political concessions, and
social provisions to prove the legitimacy of the Malayan government and undermine
the Chinese population’s support for the communists. The overall HAM strategy that
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emerged in Malaya, based on the ostensible desire to gain the “enthusiastic support” of
the Chinese (Stubbs fn 1, 250), consisted of eight key components.
First, the government improved the existing resettlement centers by calling
them “New Villages” and improving the quality of services, such as clean water,
medical care, education, farmland, and community center provision. Second, the
government incrementally introduced elections in some villages and over time
incorporated state and federal elections. Third, the government retrained the Malayan
security forces to focus on helping rather than abusing the population, and the
government established locally recruited Home Guards to protect local villages and
kampongs. Fourth, very strict food control measures augmented severe population
control measures already in place to deprive the insurgents of supplies and base
support. Fifth, the government imposed severe penalties, such as collective
punishment on villages, life imprisonment, and the death penalty, for violating or
suspicion of violating the control measures to prevent aid to the communists. Sixth,
the government gave “white area” status to communities with no guerilla activity,
which meant a reduction in Emergency regulated population control measures.
Seventh, the British released offensive propaganda denouncing the communists and
praising the government. Finally, the security forces used improved intelligence
sources to take more directed offensive action against the insurgents and their
supporters (Stubbs 1989, 250-1).
Tied to this HAM argument is the role of Templer in enabling and pushing the
HAM policy that broke the stalemate that emerged in 1951 between the government
and insurgents. Templer played two decisive roles according to HAM proponents.
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First, Templer psychologically impacted the campaign through deliberate words and
deeds that instilled confidence in the government and the Malayan population that the
government would defeat the communists (Ramakrishna 2001, 79). He helped “lift …
morale throughout the Federation and imbue the Security Forces and civil
administration with a new spirit and a will to win” (Stubbs fn 120, 190)(Stubbs 1989,
190). Instilling confidence is necessary to win “hearts and minds”; the population
must believe in the government, so the government also has to believe in itself.
HAM proponents argue that before Templer’s arrival, the British maintained
an anti-Chinese bias based on perceptions that the Chinese only understood
intimidation. So, government policies had to make the Chinese “fear Government
more than they fear the Communists” (Ramakrishna fn 24, 82). This anti-Chinese bias
led to the coercion and enforcement policies of individual and mass detentions and
deportations, as well as other forms of collective punishment. Templer countered this
bias by trying to cultivate relationships with the Chinese, particularly the Malayan
Chinese Association (MCA) (Ramakrishna 2001, 80-82; Smith 2001, 65-67).
Templer’s dynamic leadership style and ability instilled confidence in the population,
including the Chinese.
Further, HAM proponents argue that Templer instilled similar confidence in
the Malayan government. He provided moral inspiration by visiting the field
regularly, and speaking to the troops in plain speech rather than through written
conveyances. Through such behavior, Templer provided an “infectious and confident
determination to win” to the government and the population (Ramakrishna fn 58, 85).
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Additionally, Templer inserted urgency into the implementation of the Briggs Plan,
which had languished in slow progress under Gurney (Smith 2001, 63-64).
Templer’s second decisive role, according to HAM proponents, was to build an
organizational structure optimized for implementing a HAM policy, including revised
elements of the Briggs Plan. Templer established a unified command, serving as both
the civilian High Commissioner and military Director of Operations; the decisive
factor in implementing the HAM strategy that defeated the insurgents in Malaya.
Using this absolute command authority in Malaya, Templer had the necessary skill to
overcome the previous inertia and energize the campaign against the communists
(Short 1975, 12-13; Hack 1999, 100). For example, before Templer arrived, the
resettlement program instituted under the previous Director of Operations, Lieutenant
General Harold Briggs, amounted to “the mere fact of herding [mostly Chinese]
squatters behind barbed wire” (Ramakrishna fn 20, 81) to contain the insurgents’ base
of support.
Templer overcame these problems in several ways, and was essential to
implementing his “hearts and minds” strategy to win over the Chinese population.
First, he revitalized the Information Services’s “project[ion] to the Chinese that the
government was provider” (Ramakrishna 2001, 86), boosting Chinese confidence to
support the government over the MCP (Smith 2001, 73-74). Second, Templer further
projected the government-as-provider idea by reframing Briggs’s “Resettlement
Areas” as “New Villages”. He created the belief that New Villages would improve the
quality of life for its residents. While Templer still used collective punishment against
the New Village residents, HAM proponents argue that Templer used those techniques
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in a calculated manner to show that the government “was prepared to do something”
(Ramakrishna fn 87, 88). Third, Templer introduced the “White Areas” plan, where
districts that no longer fell under MCP control had Emergency restrictions lifted so
they could return to “normal life”. Templer further used the “White Areas” as part of
his Information Services campaign to “amplify the psychological effect” of this return
to “normal life” to other districts to motivate the others to get the reward of normalcy
(Ramakrishna 2001, 85-89). Fourth, Templer tried to introduce a belief in local
responsibility for the security and governance of the New Villages through the
creation of Home Guards and Local Councils, respectively (Ramakrishna 2001, 91).
Fifth, Templer conducted patient diplomacy amongst the Malays to integrate Malayan
Chinese into government service that had previously been the exclusive domain of the
Malay population (Smith 2001, 67).
HAM proponents further argue that Templer optimized his unified command
to implement a HAM strategy by encouraging organizational learning. According to
the HAM narrative, this was another necessary condition for ending the stalemate
between the government and the MCP in Malaya. British colonial experiences
developed a culture of using limited war or minimum force to achieve limited goals at
minimal costs. To achieve these ends in defeating the Malayan insurgency, the British
had to develop tight civil-military cooperation and eschew tight adherence to doctrine
in favor of embracing decentralized operations and decision-making by small units
and junior leaders (Mockaitis 1990, 110-113; Nagl 2005 [2002], 42-43). This part of
the HAM argument assumes that the addition of revolutionary politics at the end of the
18th century made guerilla warfare, relatively unchanged since the Romans and
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Persians, a more potent means for achieving political change (Nagl 2005 [2002], 1517). According to HAM proponents, the ability of states faced by insurgencies to
understand the power of “People’s Wars” and adopt strategies with “hearts and minds”
principles and unified command structures determines if a state can successfully defeat
an insurgency (Nagl 2005 [2002], 28-30).
Despite Briggs’s efforts to develop a plan to address the problem of the MCP
and to improve implementation of the new policy, the organizational resistance to
pursuing this new course required the intervention of Templer to see them through.
Templer’s first organizational innovation was the establishment of unity of
command—all civilian and military authority now existed under the control of one
person. Second, Templer improved organizational processes by putting all
intelligence analysis under the control of a Director of Intelligence and keeping that
effort separate from the collection efforts of the Special Branch, with collection seen
as primarily a police rather than military function. Third, the Information Services
developed coherent propaganda and psychological warfare efforts directed at the
population to win “HAM” and at the insurgents to demoralize them, respectively.
Fourth, Templer improved innovative thinking in the military through a couple of
organizational process changes. Templer established the Combined Emergency
Planning Staff “CEPS,” a small personal staff representing the different civil-military
efforts who made unannounced field visits, as his eyes and ears from military, airman,
police, and civil servant perspectives. Additionally, Templer added to his staff an
Operational Research team as his own “think-tank” to analyze everything going on to
establish applicable lessons for future operations (Nagl 2005 [2002], 91-97). All of
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these efforts by Templer aided the British in rapidly developing, implementing, and
assessing the effectiveness of HAM strategies and tactics in Malaya.
Templer’s focus on the importance of lessons learned led to the fifth
organizational change that contributed to the British success in Malaya: the
establishment of doctrine that pooled tactical knowledge. From these lessons came the
focus on policing New Villages and expanding of “oil spots” of security. “Oil spot”
tactics call for the concentration of counterinsurgency forces in expanding secure
zones of operations to win hearts and minds (Taber 1965 [2002], 50- 61; Krepinevich
2005). The government did this in part by infiltrating the Min Yuen organization,
emplacing strict food rations, and finally masquerading as insurgents to draw the real
ones out. From these lessons learned, Templer saw the need not just for
organizational changes in the British military, but also amongst the Malayan security
forces. He worked to train an ethnically representative national military, and placed
even greater importance on the creation of effective Home Guards as local popular
militias responsible for securing themselves. Finally, Templer stressed the
organizational use of the chain of command established through the Federal Executive
Council and the subordinate Councils at the State and District level for coordinating
social, political, economic, police, and military efforts. These institutions created the
initial multiracial institutions to support a Malayan independent government (Nagl
2005 [2002], 97-102). Such institutions improved, according to the HAM narrative,
the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the people.
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4.2.1. Critique of the Conventional Explanation for Ending the Malayan Emergency
The preceding section provided an idealized HAM narrative that explains the
success of the British in defeating the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960. The
HAM narrative argues that a dynamic leader who can establish a unified command
structure and learning organization enables counterinsurgents to implement an
effective strategy based on “hearts and minds” principles to defeat insurgents. This
section critiques that argument both logically and empirically.

4.2.1.1. Logical Critique
The population-centric theory model presented in Chapter 2 provides the basis
for critically analyzing the logic of the conventional explanation of the British success
in Malaya. Section 2.5 explained the logic of the extended game tree model illustrated
in Figure 2.4. According to the model, one should expect that the population would
support the opposition at the outbreak of an insurgency. In the case of Malaya, the
population was divided ethnically in choosing to support the insurgents. Support
came almost exclusively from the Chinese and aborigines, 39% and less than 1% of
the population, respectively. As the HAM model is based on popular support for the
insurgents, this raises a logical puzzle. With the clear ethnic divisions in Malaya, did
the Chinese insurgents really think they could win over the “hearts and minds” of the
Malay and Indian portions (48% and 11%, respectively) of the population? If not,
then the British did not face a general insurgency; they merely faced a civil unrest
from an aggrieved minority of the population. As the general population did not
support the insurgency, according to the model in Figure 2.4 the insurgency should
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have come to an end. HAM theory and the model fail to provide criteria for a
minimum percentage level of popular support needed to sustain an insurgency.

Figure 2.4. Model of Population-Centric Theory
To continue with the logical critique, it is necessary to assume that any popular
support, no matter from how small of a percentage of the population, can sustain an
insurgency. Following that assumption, the next move in the model is for the
counterinsurgents to choose between a counterinsurgency policy of HAM or coercion.
According to the conventional narrative of Malaya, the British chose a HAM policy.
So, in the next move according to the model, the population should have chosen to end
their support of the insurgency. Yet, even after the supposed implementation of the
HAM policy by Templer in 1952, the Chinese continued to support the insurgents for
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several years. The population’s continued support of the insurgents implies, according
to the model, that the British must have implemented a policy of coercion, despite
Templer’s “hearts and minds” rhetoric. The revisionist narrative in Section 4.3 below
argues exactly that point.
Assuming the revisionist narrative is correct and that the British implemented a
policy to coerce the insurgents, the conventional narrative of Malaya continues to fail
to follow the logic of the HAM model. Through coercive population control measures
implemented by the British, the Chinese ultimately ended their support of the
insurgents, which counters the expected move of the population according to the HAM
model. Further, the communist insurgents did not end their fight after losing the
population’s support, as the model predicts. While the Emergency ended in 1960, the
communists continued a low-level insurgency against the Malaysian government until
1989.
What happened on the ground in Malaya actually follows a logic almost
opposite of the one depicted in the HAM model at each stage of the game. With
Chinese popular support for the communist insurgents, the British implemented a
coercive policy of population control to separate the population from and destroy the
insurgents. The harsh measures of collective punishment directed at the Chinese
people cut the insurgents off physically and materially from the population. After
breaking the population down, then the British implemented a policy to improve the
condition of the people as long as they continued to not support the insurgents. While
the British carrot and stick measures may have changed the population’s behavior,
they unlikely won the “hearts” or affection of the people.
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4.2.1.2. Empirical Critique
In addition to the logical limitations of the conventional narrative of the
Malayan Emergency when evaluated against HAM theory, the conventional story also
suffers from empirical challenges. Even as proponents discuss the eight key
components of the idealized version of the “hearts and minds” strategy in Malaya (see
Section 4.2), they concede that this approach did not win over the population. As
Richard Stubbs, one of the leading proponents of HAM, states, “Rather, the result was
more to neutralize the key sectors of the population—the rural Chinese and especially
the New Villages—and to make it impossible for the guerillas to rely on them for
recruits and supplies” (Stubbs 1989, 251). If the outcome of the above strategy was
neutralization, the wrong lessons are learned from this case due to the focus on the
rhetoric of winning “hearts and minds”. In implementing the strategy, the promised
provision of services and quality did not materialize in many of the New Villages
(Stubbs 1989, 251). The government got villages to behave by coercing them through
deprivation rather than by persuading the villagers and earning their affection and
loyalty as the HAM story argues happened in Malaya, as well as one expects from the
logic of HAM theory.
The conventional story also argues that Templer was the key individual in
enacting the winning strategy for the British, emphasizing his role as instiller of
confidence and morale. Yet, that interpretation to put Templer in a morally positive
light obfuscates Templer’s greatest contributions to the counterinsurgency effort.
Templer’s efforts to be “feared and respected” (Ramakrishna 2001, 90) and control a
strategy of carrots and sticks enabled him to coercively change the behavior of the
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population, particularly the Chinese. Templer supporters concede that Templer
initially had to energize the government by “cracking the whip” and adopting more
authoritarian methods to achieve his objectives (Ramakrishna 2001, 84). “Templer’s
violence of language was a fact” (Short 1975, 382), as were the deeds of the policies
he continued to pursue, such as resettlement operations, collective punishments, and
offensive sweep operations.
Further, the chorus of praise for Templer leadership in the conventional
narrative implies that effective counterinsurgency is largely actor dependent. The
counterfactual to this story is that if not for Templer, the Malayan Emergency would
have remained in the stalemate situation that arrived by 1951 for many years to come
(Smith 2001, 63). By arguing that an effective HAM policy is actor dependent, the
conventional narrative undermines the HAM logic explained in Chapter 2 that relies
on the population to defeat an insurgency.
Tied to the importance of leadership, the conventional narrative also argued
that organizational learning was a key enabler of the British ability to implement a
successful HAM strategy. Yet, the romanticized view of the British organizational
culture of limited goals achieved through limited force at minimal cost actually leads
to improper lessons learned. Rather than seeking to win population support, as this
apologetic narrative claims, the British applied extremely harsh measures to control
the population from which these operational and organizational lessons came (Elkins
2005). Following acquiescence by the population, Templer introduced the “White
Areas” plan, where districts that no longer fell under MCP control had Emergency
restrictions lifted so they could return to “normal life”. But, what was “normal life” in
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the “New Villages”, because the population had no roots in these locations. The
government forcibly moved the Chinese population to these resettlement locations in
which they were previously interned.
The US Army has adopted the lessons derived from this conventional story in
its most recent counterinsurgency manual, explaining that the training of a welldisciplined police force in Malaya provided a solid foundation for the defeat of the
insurgents and only took 15 months to accomplish (Department of the Army 2006, 621-6-22). But, as Karl Hack explains, the lesson that training host nation’s security
force before transferring control makes the host security forces more effective “is
unexceptional, and almost tautologous.” The Emergency did not actually turn because
of the retraining of the police. Gurney and Briggs delayed police training in 1950 in
order to expand the size of the security forces rapidly to enable the massive
resettlement of the Chinese population. Population control measures improved
security, allowing the time and space to conduct police retraining (Hack 2009, 395396). Additionally, the lessons learned incorporated into current US doctrine ignore
the role of the Home Guards in providing local security.
Another complementary element of the conventional narrative is that the
unified command structure established by Templer allowed for this organizational
learning to take place, and for the effective implementation of the HAM policies.
However, according to the conventional story proponents, the Briggs Plan laid the
foundation for Templer’s future efforts by recognizing the political nature of the war
in Malaya. Briggs also provided the framework to coordinate all aspects of the war—
civil, police, and military—through the creation of the Federal War Council and future
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District and State War Executive Committees (Nagl 2005 [2002], 71-77). These
changes in processes and strategic direction created the shift in focus from defeating
the communists to winning the support of the population. Though, this raises a
question, if Briggs had it all right, and the British had an ingrained learning culture
due to their colonial experiences, then why would you have to have Templer to turn
things around? The organization should have been able to adapt based on this
argument. The British organizational structure should not have been so personality
dependent. This actor-based component to the conventional story provides no insight
into the type of person who is needed, when during the conflict, and under what
conditions to implement a successful HAM policy against an insurgency.
The conventional narrative argued about the importance of the
counterinsurgents’ use of minimum force, persuasion, political concessions, and social
provisions to win the “hearts and minds” of the population. Yet, these terms have
different meanings in terms of the ideal or mythical usage and the usage that matches
implementation. Most people interpret HAM to mean a soft approach to deal with and
persuade the population to support the government. But, changing the mindset of the
population is not that simple, and tough measures and hard approaches continued after
1952 to achieve that change (Rigden 2008, 12). In Malaya, this included the
continuation of policies of mass deportations, mass population resettlement, martial
law, and direct military action.
While HAM proponents exclaim the British use of minimum force, implying a
soft approach, they gloss over the reality that minimal force determined tactically or
strategically just means the minimum force to achieve the objectives, not necessarily
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the lowest force option (Rigden 2008, 12). Additionally, political concessions and
social provision do not necessarily occur out of the benevolence of the government as
implied in, and often interpreted from, the phrase “hearts and minds.” In Malaya, the
provision of support and concessions followed a carrot and stick method that utilized
extensive population control and coercion.

4.3. Conventional Revisionist Narrative
Alternative narratives to explain the British success in Malaya have existed
since the time of the Emergency. This section presents the overall argument made by
proponents of a revisionist narrative of Malaya. This narrative provides an alternative
to the conventional HAM story in the previous section. Following the presentation of
the revisionist story, this section will discuss some challenges with this narrative.
Victor Purcell, one of the original critics of the conventional narrative, argued
that the “the main success against the Communists was, in fact, won before General
Templer’s arrival” (Purcell 1954, 6). Additionally, Purcell only credits Templer, in
the words of Sir Cheng-lock Tan, founder of the MCA, with enabling a police state to
form in Malaya during Templer’s tenure (Purcell 1954, 5-19; Ramakrishna 2001, 80).
After the Emergency, revisionism mostly laid dormant as the conventional narrative
took center stage. Yet, contemporary revisionist narratives have reemerged, and have
taken a more analytical approach than Purcell’s more polemical critiques of Templer.
Public relations in part explain the dormancy of revisionist narratives. Since
the end of British colonialism, the British have worked to build their image as a
gentler fighting force. The association of General Templer and the “hearts and minds”
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approach with the successful defeat of the communists in Malaya contributes to this
mythology. According to the revisionists, while the British have more generally
adopted HAM principles since the end of the Cold War, the lessons derived from
Malaya do not match reality. The British conducted highly coercive operations in
Malaya, which involved high, rather than minimal, levels of force, and was fought
above the law, rather than within existing law as HAM theorists argue. Malaya,
compared to Vietnam, is an apparently successful external actor-led counterinsurgency
during the Cold War, making HAM proponents want to clearly distinguish HAM from
conventional warfare (Dixon 2009).
Definitionally, “hearts and minds” consists of two components. The “hearts”
part focuses on “winning the emotional support of the people,” while the “minds”
element centers on the “people as pursing their own ‘rational self-interest’” (Dixon
2009, 363). The overall term itself implies that the approach seeks the active support,
consent, and trust, rather than just acquiescence, of the population (Stubbs 1989).
British COIN doctrine since at least 1970 has emphasized this (Ministry of Defence
1970, 4; Dixon 2009, 364), with the most recent British COIN manual replacing the
term “hearts and minds” with “gain and maintain popular support” (British Army
2009, 3) The current definition states, “Gaining and maintaining popular support is an
essential objective for successful counterinsurgency. It gives authority to the
campaign and helps establish legitimacy. Unless the government gains its people’s
trust and confidence, the chances of success are greatly reduced. The degree to which
it is achieved is in effect the measure of campaign success” (British Army 2009, 3-11).
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Revisionists argue that despite the clear doctrinal meaning and usage of “hearts
and minds”, some proponents of HAM reinterpret the definition and use the term
simply for public relations purposes because of its gentle connotation despite
acknowledging harsh treatment of the population. In reference to lessons from
Malaya, Hew Strachan states, “When we speak about ‘Hearts and minds’, we are not
talking about being nice to the natives, but about giving them the firm smack of
government. ‘Hearts and minds’ denoted authority, not appeasement” (Strachan 2007,
8). People who use such arguments abuse the term HAM in order disguise their belief
in the centrality of coercion to change behavior to make such an argument less
offensive.
Such statements align with the revisionist argument that identifies the use of
coercion in the form of a series of harsh population control measures led to success in
Malaya. The revisionists argue that what HAM proponents call the “coercion and
enforcement” stage before 1952 (Stubbs 1989, 66-93), actually led to the British
success in defeating the communists in Malaya and set the stage for the formation of a
stable independent state. The revisionists do not completely dismiss “hearts and
minds”. Rather, they argue the role of HAM varied during different phases of the
Malayan campaign and ultimately HAM supported a coercion strategy (Hack 1999,
124; Dixon 2009, 369).
Contemporary revisionists focus on the lessons gained from different phases of
the campaign in Malaya. They define three main periods, and argue that the
government broke the insurgency when population control, rather than “hearts and
minds” was at the fore (Bennett 2009, 416-417; Hack 2009, 384). The first period,
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from 1948-1949, primarily consisted of lethal counter-terror tactics and mass
punishment sweep operations. Part of the justifications for the use of harsh tactics by
the security forces to coerce the population came from the belief that the Chinese only
understood intimidation, so the security forces had to instill fear in order to gain
cooperation (Harper 1999, 151; Ramakrishna 2002a, 336)(Bennett 2009 fn 94).
Additionally, the British had a colonial history of using harsh treatment to punish
recalcitrant populations and nip problems in the bud (Elkins 2005). Gurney created
the conditions for a permissive environment to use lethal force (Bennett 2009, 421432). He stated, “It is paradoxical though none the less true that in order to maintain
law and order it is necessary for the Government itself to break it for a time. … At the
present time, the Police and Army are breaking the law every day” (Bennett 2009 fn
107, 432). Recognizing the limits of wanton destruction and poor intelligence
collection, the British changed course and developed a cohesive strategy.
The second phase occurred between 1950 and 1952. The focus shifted towards
population control through a clear and hold strategy based on the Briggs Plan, which
concentrated resources to improve security. The Briggs Plan was highly coercive,
with five key elements: 1) shifting massive portions of the population—resettlement
of over 500,000 rural Chinese and the regroupment of up to 600,000 estate laborers; 2)
the government asserting administrative control over the “New Villages”; 3) forming
civil-military committees to bring together the army, police, civil administration, and
Special Branch intelligence down to the district level to coordinate efforts; 4)
assigning individual military units specific areas to patrol in order to build up
intelligence and provide security, freeing up the police for other duties; and 5)
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remaining military units operating conventionally to destroy communist forces stateby-state. The MCP actively resisted these efforts in 1950, but by 1951 decided to take
a political tact to counter the British. The MCP issued their “October Resolutions,”
which ordered its members to scale back military activity and focus on regaining mass
support and conducting subversive activities (Hack 1999, 104-108; 2009, 386-390).
The third period of the campaign ran from mid-1952 to 1960. During this
time, Templer initiated an effort to optimize the turn around that had already taken
place, and ensured maximum efficiency in the government efforts. The revisionist
argument concurs with elements of the conventional narratives about Templer.
Revisionists agree that Templer improved the functioning of the government
bureaucracy, reorganized intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination, codified
lessons learned and doctrine, and tried to improve the lives of the lower classes and
win their “hearts” (Hack 2009, 402-404). However, the revisionists argue that the
conventionalists derived the wrong lessons from these actions.
For revisionists, the conventional proponent’s argument about a stalemate in
1951 that Templer ended with his arrival in 1952 is incorrect. Rather, the tide had
already turned by the end of 1951 due to the efforts of Gurney and Briggs. The
policies of coercion implemented by Gurney and Briggs had forced the MCP to
change its behavior, ultimately opening the door for Templer to optimize Gurney and
Briggs’s gains. The coercive period between 1950 and 1951 set the conditions that
allowed Templer and his successors to ease restrictions over time, continue with
elections, win the hearts and minds, and transition to Malayan independence in 1957.
The real lesson about Templer, from the revisionist perspective, is that he did things to
133

improve the efficiency of existing policies and plans. Ultimately, success during the
Emergency came from population and spatial control, with components of the
conventional narrative supporting that effort (Hack 1999, 2009; Bennett 2009).
The revisionists developed their alternative narrative by using British and
Chinese sources, rather than relying solely on British sources like most of the
conventional narratives. Incorporating the Chinese perspective allowed the
revisionists to see the important impact that the population control and security
approach had on changing Chinese behavior, allowing eventually for “hearts and
minds” tactics and dynamic leadership to improve organizational efficiency.

4.3.1. Critique of the Revisionist Narrative of the Malayan Emergency
The revisionist argument implies that population control merely coerced a
desired behavior. The revisionist’s lesson underemphasizes the role of the British in
appealing to the rational self-interest of the Chinese to obtain enduring security and
material gain. Just like the conventional proponents, the revisionists focus on the
population as the center of gravity for the counterinsurgents to be able to defeat the
insurgents. But rather than emphasize the importance of positive persuasion in
changing the population’s behavior, as do the proponents of HAM, the revisionists
argue that punitive coercion changes the population’s behavior.
A model of the revisionist argument would consist of an extended game tree
with the same decision nodes as the model of population-centric theory (see Figure
2.4), except the preferences of the actors would change, leading to different expected
outcomes at each stage of the game. Figure 4.1 displays the new expected outcomes at
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each stage based on backwards induction. According to this model, the population
should initially support the insurgents. Then, the counterinsurgents should then
implement a coercive COIN policy that places emphasis on counter-terror and
population control operations. This policy in turn should lead to the population no
longer supporting the insurgents. Ultimately, leading to the end of the insurgency.

Figure 4.1. Model of Revisionist Narrative
While the revisionist story of Malaya appears to validate this model, this model
relies on several assumptions that obscure other dynamics taking place amongst the
different actors that may account for why coercion worked in Malaya. The most
challenging assumption is the role of the population as the center of gravity. The
causal logic linking population control directly to the population misses the
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intervening variable of local elites. Second, the narrative treats the Malayan
government as mere lemmings of the British. The local and foreign counterinsurgents
do not necessarily have the same interests, nor do the population necessarily have the
same perceptions about the legitimacy of both. Finally, the revisionist narrative does
not capture why the MCA began to support the Malayan government, but the MCP
continued the insurgency campaign.

4.4. Ending the Malayan Emergency through a Self-enforcing Stability Narrative
The problem with the conventional and revisionist accounts of the Malayan
Emergency are that they both focus on adjusting the behavior of the population. Each
argues for achieving behavior adjustment through either persuasion or coercion,
respectively. Both fail to fully appreciate the importance of understanding and
aligning the interests of the government and opposition elites who will ensure that the
sub-populations under the influence of different elites see the benefit from supporting
their leaders. Adjusting the incentives of the elites and later the masses served as the
underlying mechanism that led to the government’s success over the insurgents in
Malaya. The conventional narrative misses this point, because of its focus on Templer
instituting a policy based on winning hearts and minds, his ability to instill confidence,
or his encouragement of organizational learning. The revisionist narrative misses the
mechanism of incentives, because of its focus on coercion. The population control
strategies instituted under Gurney and Briggs, and continued with important
modifications by Templer, set the conditions for the British to serve as a credible
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guarantor of a self-enforcing pact between Malay and Chinese elites, ultimately,
leading to stability in Malaya and the end of the insurgency.
Where the conventional narrative of the Malayan Emergency attributes the
successful defeat of the insurgency to a dynamic leader who adapts policy and
organizations to win the hearts and minds of the population and the revisionist
narrative explains success through the use of coercion and enforcement to provide
material carrots and sticks to the population, a theory of self-enforcing stability
explains the end of the insurgency and establishment of stability based on interests and
the alignment of incentives of elites. This section applies the “Post-(Neo)Colonial
Model” of the theory of self-enforcing stability, explained in Chapter 3, to the
Malayan Emergency, providing an alternative narrative to explain how the British (the
external actor) contributed to establishing an enduring, stable limited access order
(LAO) in Malaya.
The application shows how the external actor has to have the flexibility to shift
between the tactics described in the HAM and coercion approaches to
counterinsurgency. The use of these different tactics can persuade the population,
through the intervening variable of government and opposition elites, that it is in the
population’s long-term self-interest to stop supporting the insurgency and participate
in the government. Ultimately though, the combination of these tactics cannot win
over the hearts or affection of the population. But, they can win over the minds as the
elites and population pursue their rational self-interest—security and material benefits.
Winning over the elites, and ultimately the population, comes not simply through
coercion, which is a tactic, but by creating incentives and aligning interests between
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the government and opposition. This dissertation has theorized that credible external
actor commitments and decentralization of violent means and rent-seeking
opportunities allows for the alignment of interests and the creation of an elite pact that
can lead to self-enforcing stability.
Following the general theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3, this chapter
breaks the key actors in the Malayan Emergency into three main categories: the
government, the opposition, and the external actor. To remain parsimonious and in
keeping with the model, this application assumes that each of the groups form their
own elite coalitions, solving internal collective action problems.

4.4.1. Key Actors
The government refers to the Malays, but more specifically, the Malay
members of the civil administration of the Malayan government, the Malay sultans
who serve as nominal heads of the Federated and Unfederated States of Malaya, and
the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) political party. The Malay
population initially was the only ethnic group to serve in the government and national
security forces. The Malays supported British rule, because they gained the most
politically under colonial rule, and had the most to gain during a transition to
independence due to their monopoly on positions in government. Very few Malays
ever joined or supported the insurgency. While initially on the sidelines, due to their
limited influence and power, this paper considers the Indian population part of the
government, but due to the Indian’s limited role does not discuss them further.
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Defining the opposition is a bit more complicated than defining the
government. Two main groups existed within the Chinese community: the
communists and the nationalists. Initially, a tenuous elite pact existed between these
two groups in opposing the government and the external actor. The communists
consisted of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), led by Lai Tek before WWII—a
triple agent of the British, Japanese, and traitor of the MCP—whom Chin Peng
replaced in 1947. The MCP controlled the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions
(PMFTU) until the government disbanded it in 1948. Additionally, the MCP
consisted of its militant wing, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), and its
civilian and logistic support group, the Min Chung Yuen Tung (Min Yuen) or
“People’s Movement.” Some refer to the MNLA as the Malayan Races Liberation
Army (MRLA), which formed out of its predecessors, the Malayan People’s AntiJapanese Army (MPAJA) and the successor Malayan People’s Anti-British Army
(MPABA).
The nationalist side primarily consisted of the business-dominated Malayan
Chinese Association (MCA) led by Tan Cheng Lock. The MCA wanted to ensure the
maintenance of the privileged position held by the Chinese population in the
plantations, shipping, banks, and import and export companies in Malaya. The MCA
and MCP represented the urban and rural divide amongst the Chinese population. The
MCA and MCP put aside differences to challenge the Japanese occupation, and
initially in opposing the Malay maintenance of dominance following the British
return, developing an internal elite pact. Over time, however, internal contestation
developed between the MCA and MCP in representing the Chinese population.
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An internal contestation approach shows how internal pressures, within an elite
bloc, “that render some leaders ready to make peace can drive their opponents to
disrupt it. In addition, … [internal elites’] relative power shapes their antagonism
toward a peace process” (Pearlman 2008/09, 106). This internal balance of power
struggle contributed to the MCA desire to work as peacemakers with the government
and the external actor, while the MCP preferred to act as a spoiler. Once the MCA
and MCP tacked in these directions, the MCA and other business and nationalist
Chinese elites became the unitary opposition actor. The Chinese-manned units of the
Home Guards that began to form in 1950 fall under the opposition in this model.
Eventually, the MCA worked with the government, leaving the MCP as the sole
irreconcilables, and decreasing the support structure of the opposition.
Lastly, this section treats all foreign elites, composed mainly of members of
the British colonial government and the European mine and plantation owners, as a
unified external actor. Even when High Commissioner Gurney and Director of
Operations Briggs maintained separate chains of command, which Templer eventually
unified, the actions of the military, civil administration, and police were closely
coordinated to achieve Britain’s interests. Again, within the rational-choice
framework of this theory of self-enforcing stability, the rest of this section assumes
that each of the elites within the government, opposition, and external actor coalitions
support a dominant elite pact despite some differences, because they are each on
average better off through cooperation.
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4.4.2. Commitment Problems
After World War II, Malaya had to recover from the experience of the British
defeat and the Japanese occupation. The population now saw the weakness of what
they previously thought was a benign colonial protector. The Malayan population had
to fend for themselves under the Japanese, with part of the population fighting the
occupier and the other part collaborating. These different actions by the population
during the occupation created great resentment and further divided the ethnic groups
that previously lived in relative harmony. The resentment from the occupation
combined with unequal representation in Malaya’s government, national security, and
business sectors contributed to immense distrust between the government (the Malays)
and the opposition (the Chinese). Ultimately, it took the British (an external actor) to
provide credible commitments to both sides that enabled an elite pact to form with the
exclusion of the communists.
The government could not provide credible commitments to the opposition
because of the fresh memories of Japanese imperialism. The animosity over Malay
collaboration with the Japanese to suppress the Chinese was particularly strong. The
Malay members of the police under the Japanese treated the Chinese quite harshly,
creating persistent fear amongst the Chinese of Malay intent to do further harm to the
Chinese population. Additionally, the Malays displayed to the Chinese the desire to
keep the Chinese as second-class citizens when the Malays organized mass
demonstrations and civil disobedience to protest the formation of the Malayan Union.
The Malayan Union would have granted citizenship to the Chinese population,
allowing the Chinese greater access to political power.
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The opposition also could not credibly commit to not attempting to overthrow
the government. In the aftermath of World War II, the Chinese exacted revenge upon
the Malays for their collaboration with the Japanese. The MPAJA’s “people’s trials”
contributed to cycles of violence between the Chinese and the Malays, as well as racial
clashes between the MPAJA and the Malay police force. Further, Chinese control of
commercial interests as well as over the labor unions contributed to the sense of fear
amongst the Malays that the Chinese desired to dominate the Malay population
economically, which granted the Chinese population Malayan citizenship and
participation in government would exacerbate. Both groups’ concerns about the
actions of the other and belief in each trying to dispossess the other of power
contributed to the development of a rationality of fear between the government and the
opposition.
The MCA Chinese elites who took part in the initial opposition coalition had
the incentive to work with the government to defeat the MCP, because the MCP
threatened the MCA’s political and economic interests as much as they did the
government’s interests. The MCP wanted to dominate control of the Chinese
population, not just the government, and redistribute the wealth of the Chinese who
supported the MCA. Amongst the Chinese community, this is a story of an internal
power struggle. The opposition’s MCA elites were essentially satisfied with the status
quo pre-WWII, because of the rent-seeking opportunities and their maintenance of
traditional power structures. The MCA feared the younger Chinese more than the
Malays since the MCP sought to tear down those traditional structures and establish
modern political structures based on the Communist system (Wang 1992, 188-190).
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Despite the incentives for some opposition elites to work with the government,
the two actors could not credibly commit to one another without a credible external
actor, in keeping with Fearon’s (1995) rationalist explanation of war described in
Chapter 3. Understanding that the government had an incentive to renege, as shown
by their protests against the Malayan Union, the Chinese attacked preemptively
through labor strikes and insurgent warfare. Additionally, without a credible British
presence, the opposition could not credibly commit to the government that the Chinese
would share power economically or politically if the government helped the
nationalists defeat the communists. This led to the need for the British to establish
their role as a credible guarantor of a pact between the government and the
reconcilable part of the opposition.
The British had initial difficulties in establishing their credibility. The
revisionist narrative’s definition of three main periods of the Malayan Emergency
helps identify the shifts in British credibility, but this paper adds an additional period
before those three phases. During Phase Zero, 1945-1948, the British mishandled
their return to Malaya following WWII. The ineptitude of the British Military
Administration (BMA) from 1945-1946 allowed the resentment, exacerbated by
WWII, between the Malays and Chinese to fester. British favoritism towards the
Malays, through provision of government positions and arrests of key Chinese leaders
despite Chinese support to the Allies, contributed to general distrust of the British.
Then, the British decision to establish the Malayan Union without serious consultation
with the different groups of the Malayan population created greater distrust of the
British. But, the British decision to abandon the Malayan Union and its promise of
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Chinese citizenship in favor of the Federation of Malaya to meet Malay demands, and
again without Chinese consultation, further undermined British credibility with the
Chinese. This contributed to the Chinese decision to seek “peaceful agitation” against
the British and the Malayan government, whom the Chinese saw as one in the same at
that time.
In response to the labor strikes and the murder of three British planters, the
British entered Phase One, 1948-1949, of the Emergency. During this period, the
British used indiscriminate counter-terror tactics and mass punishment sweeps against
the entire Chinese population. Neither the British nor the government differentiated
the Chinese based on the nationalist and communist split. This lack of differentiation
further aggravated the lack of credibility of the external actor in the eyes of the
opposition. Yet, the British began to overcome that problem during Phase Two, 19501952.
Phase Two was the period of the Briggs Plan, which shifted strategy to the use
of population control to clear and hold areas, improving security and appealing to the
self-interest of the elites to have confidence in the government. Gurney and Briggs
recognized the split in the Chinese community and worked to adjust the incentives for
the Chinese elites and population. The British simultaneously reached out to the
MCA, while they implemented coercive strategies in the form of resettlement areas, or
“New Villages”, to separate the Chinese community from the communists. The MCA
appreciated these moves, and also recalled the British history of letting Chinese
business interests prosper prior to WWII, improving the ability of the British to serve
as a credible guarantor of a pact between the government and the opposition.
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The external actor solidified its ability to make credible commitments during
Phase Three, mid-1952-1960, which began with the arrival of Templer. Templer
optimized the Briggs Plan and the government’s efficiency in implementing the Plan.
Additionally, Templer made clear to the opposition that they could have a stake in the
future of an independent Malaya. He held out the carrot of citizenship and
participation in government for Chinese cooperation. Those promises along with the
decentralization of violent means—through the rapid expansion of the Home
Guards—and rent-seeking opportunities, by protecting Chinese business interests,
ultimately allowed the external actor to serve as the credible guarantor of an elite pact
between the government and the reconcilable part of the opposition. Further, Britain’s
public commitment to self-rule solidified the external actor’s credibility with the
government.

4.4.3. Mechanisms Moving Malaya Towards Self-Enforcing Stability
With the external actor now able to give credible commitments to the
government and reconcilable opposition, Malaya could follow the post-(neo)colonial
transitional model in Figure 3.3 to move towards self-enforcing stability. The external
actor used a variety of credibility mechanisms to help the internal actors get on a path
towards self-enforcing stability by guaranteeing the pact between the dominant
coalition of Malay and Chinese elites. The mechanisms at British disposal were
personnel, money, equipment, time, public statements of intent, elections, and
institutional development. In terms of personnel, the British had ten Commonwealth
battalions on the ground in 1948 for military operations and 9,000 Malayan police at
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its disposal. By 1951, the British doubled the number of battalions to 20 and
increased the police, largely composed of Malays, to nearly 50,000 (Clutterbuck 1966,
42-44). Additionally, the British reorganized the functions of the personnel to make
them more effective, as described in the organizational learning narrative earlier in this
chapter.
While the British government had limited money to provide directly, due to the
costs from World War II, the Korean War boom in tin and rubber revenues allowed
for locally generated revenue streams. The money from the largely European-owned
mines and estates paid for most of the external actor and government’s population
control measure of resettlement. The Korean War boom also helped pay for the
provision of goods and services at the local level that helped gain local elite support.
The British also used these revenues to acquire equipment for the Malayan security
forces, as well as the local security forces—the Home Guards.
The British used the time mechanism ambiguously. They said early on that
they planned to transition Malaya to self-rule, but the British did not provide a date for
independence till much later. Yet, time tied in with the credible commitment
mechanism of public statements of intent. Despite lacking a specific date for
transferring sovereignty, the British took public actions of intent starting with the
Malayan Union declaration in 1946. While the Malayan Union would have a British
governor, the intent was to grant equal treatment to all races, and develop leaders
through appointments to legislative and executive councils. Despite the political
ineptness of the British in creating the Malayan Union and transitioning to the
Federation of Malaya in 1948, the goal of the Union and the Agreement was to set the
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conditions for an independent Malaya with leaders who could take over governance
upon independence (Sarkesian 1993, 56-59).
The ambiguous timeline worked to get the Malays and MCA to work together
and solidify an elite pact, culminating in the creation of the Alliance Party, merging
the UMNO and MCA, in 1952. The Malayan Indian Congress party joined in 1954.
They formed an alliance in order to contest elections, another external actor credibility
mechanism, that the British established first at the local level. The joint party gave the
MCA a pathway to express its political views, as well as positions of power in
government as the junior partner with the UMNO. Following victories in local and
state elections, the Alliance Party dominated the 1955 national elections. The Alliance
Party victory provided the framework for establishing an independent stable state, in
the form of a limited access order. Setting up the Alliance Party to take over an
independent Malaya helped assuage British concerns about their economic and
national security interests, which enabled the British exit strategy of an independent
Malaya with the creation of the Merdeka Constitution in 1957 (Short 1975, 345;
Sarkesian 1993, 59).
Besides elections serving as a mechanism for the external actor to prove its
credible commitment to the government and opposition, elections can also help
diversify power. The series of elections started by Templer in 1952 helped solidify the
elite pact between the Malays and the nationalist Chinese by balancing political power
between the two sides. Templer’s Citizenship Bill in May 1952 allowed the Chinese
to become citizens and take part in these elections (Smith 2001, 66). Decentralization
of power helps the internal actors overcome their own credible commitment problems
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by creating a balance that prevents one side from cheating on the pact and taking
advantage of the other side.
In addition to the decentralization of political power, the British enabled the
decentralization of economic and military power. The government and external actor
established agreements with the MCA that allowed the Chinese to maintain their
business interests, while sharing some economic power with the Malay elites, to
spread the benefits of rent-seeking. The MCA supported the tight control of the
unions, which helped the members of the elite pact, while excluding those outside the
pact, particularly the MCP. The MCA saw the MCP as a bigger threat to the MCA’s
rent-seeking opportunities than the British or the Malays, because the UMNO had
aligned interests, where the MCP wanted to destroy the current system.
The British helped establish a security balance of power and overcome each
side’s rational fear of and incentives to renege by decentralizing violent means. The
British did this in part by recruiting Chinese into the Malayan police, but were more
effective in decentralizing violent means by creating the Home Guards—village
militias responsible for self-security (Smith 2001, 67-68). By 1953, there were over
350,000 Home Guards compared to 40,000 British, Commonwealth, and Malayan
military forces and 45,000 regular and special police forces (Tilman 1966, 417). The
Home Guards protected their own villages and policed transgressors of the pact (i.e.,
the Chinese Home Guards fought against the MCP). Surprisingly, the armed Chinese
rarely lost their weapons to the communists or turned their weapons against the
Malayan or British forces—only three cases of treachery were reported in 1954, the
peak year of transitioning security responsibility to the Home Guards (Coates 1992,
148

121). As the Home Guards stood up and took over greater responsibility between
1952 and 1954, the level of insurgent incidents and government and external actor
deaths declined (Coates 1992, Appendix A).
While decentralizing power between the government and opposition, the
external actor helped the elites punish and police their own transgressors of the pact so
the pact would become self-enforcing without the British. The Chinese nationalists
helped to keep their communist ethnic kin in check. By keeping the self-rule date
undefined, retaining ultimate decision-making in government despite the elections,
and maintaining superior forces to the local and Malayan security forces, the British
could use sticks in different ways against transgressors. But, the decentralization of
economic, political, and security power helped strengthen the position of the elite
members of the pact.
Despite the use of the term “hearts and minds,” with its population-centric
connotation, in Malay and its association with Templer, the real focus of Briggs’s and
Templer’s efforts was on the elites. While winning the support of the population was
important, the British had to win the support of the elites first. The British recognized
the importance of the split amongst the Chinese, and that the MCA elites were the part
of the opposition that could work with the UMNO and government elites. The British
concern was that a communist Malaya would work against British interests, so giving
special privilege to the MCA, uniting the MCA and UMNO, and providing a path to
independence took away the MCP’s argument for establishing an independent
government with Chinese participation. The Chinese community was vulnerable to
communism not because of ideology per se, but due to Chinese immigration patterns.
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The Chinese arrived as members of groups, or with close personal connections,
rather than as individuals. Most Chinese belonged to secret societies, clans, guilds, or
other associations, which provided protection and helped new arrivals assimilate. So,
the Chinese found security from highly personal relationship, relying on individual
leaders. They brought this reliance on leaders and a distrust of government with them
from China, recreating that pattern in Malaya. The local Chinese elites had great
control over the Chinese population. During the Great Depression and the Japanese
occupation, the MCP promised material support and security that the business elites
could no longer provide (Pye 1956, 52-56).
After World War II, the MCA and MCP competed for control over the
population. Fotini Christia (2008) has shown that intra-group violence depends
largely on local elites and micro-level economic incentives. She shows that when
economic incentives are high, local elites who can guarantee survival while
distributing access to these rents will gain the support of the population. Through its
elite pact with the government, guaranteed by the British, the MCA proved to the
Chinese population that the UMNO-MCA alliance would deliver material benefits,
while securing the population. The ability of the MCA to deliver this undermined
Chinese support for the MCP.
The MCA appealed to the rational self-interest of the Chinese population by
improving security and material benefits. The harsh population control measures
implemented by the British under the Briggs Plan set the conditions for this to happen.
By the British creating resettlement areas, the MCA elites assumed the leadership
positions in the New Villages, and the MCP had to survive in isolation. Chin Peng,
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the leader of the MCP, has stated that the resettlement areas greatly constrained the
MCP’s activity and access to the population (Chin and Hack 2004, 150-160). MCA
leader Tan Cheng Lock confirmed that Gurney provide strong support for the MCA
(Hack 2009, 393), which Templer continued. Templer’s granting of citizenship and
holding elections at the local level, allowed the MCA to take control of the village
councils inside the Chinese New Villages. Through the village councils, the MCA
elites delivered goods and services provided by the British and the government to the
population. Additionally, the establishment of the Home Guards gave the MCA local
leaders the tool to provide security for their population. Once the MCA provided
security and delivered material benefits to the New Villages, they won over the
population—or at least, their rational self-interest.
While the nationalist Chinese elites initially brought along the population, the
elites and population developed a mutually supporting relationship based on rational
self-interest. The opposition elites and population gained greater security and material
benefit through adherence to the pact with the government elites. Support of the
Chinese population increased the power of the MCA elites in the pact till it reached a
balance with the Malays. The Malay elites also saw the rational self-interest in
strengthening the pact because they wanted to maintain their advantaged position at
independence. The Malay population had supported the Malay elites before the
Emergency based on their ethnic and religious traditions of supporting traditional
leaders. Although the initial operational tactics during the Emergency were directed at
the Chinese population, Chinese elites, particularly the MCA, were the strategic focus
of those tactics. Winning over the elites and giving them power over the population,
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gave the opposition elites the incentive to join and maintain an elite pact with the
Malay elites in government. This led to the establishment of a limited access order
(LAO). As the LAO matured, winning over the population contributed to the
maintenance of a self-enforcing equilibrium.
The sharing of power between the government and opposition through the
UMNO-MCA alliance solidified the limited access order’s elite pact in Malaya as
exemplified by the Alliance Party’s domination of local through national elections. As
discussed in Chapter 3, the general theory of this dissertation explains that external
actors help stabilize conflict-torn societies by focusing on developing limited access
orders rather than liberal democracies, or open access orders. Limiting access
guarantees that elites maintain power and wealth, as well as protection from possibly
losing that privilege, by working collectively to increase elite pact members’ wealth
and power by suppressing violence.
In Malaya, the British worked to bring together the UMNO and MCA to form
the Alliance Party. The British used the mechanisms described above to achieve
credible commitments and diversify power in order to set the conditions for the
transition to self-rule. The Malayan elections, local through national, were not about
democracy per se. They were a signaling mechanism of British credibility to depart
Malaya, and to solidify the pact between the government and opposition elites—the
Alliance Party won 51 of 52 elected seats (Clutterbuck 1973, 101-102). These elites
used the Alliance Party as a mechanism to divide representation in the government
based on the alliance and number of seats won in the election. To ensure the outcome
of the balance of power and to protect access to government, the British established 52
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elected and 46 nominative seats in the parliament (Mills 1958, 84-87). The same logic
underlay the local and state elections that preceded the national elections.
Similarly, the purpose of establishing village and district councils before and
after the elections was to prepare and teach members of the elite pact to govern upon
independence. So, democratic mechanisms were used in Malaya for the purpose of
establishing an LAO rather than a democratic regime and solidifying the elite pact.
Britain’s continual moves towards independence, through citizenship, elections, and
institution building, served as credible commitments that the Chinese would not be
dispossessed and provided the opportunity for the UMNO and MCA to establish a
limited access elite pact that would lead to self-enforcing stability upon independence.
This narrative affirms the logic of the “Post-(Neo)Colonial Model” of selfenforcing stability described in Chapter 3. Based on the model in Figure 3.3, one
expects that the government will attempt to include the opposition after the external
actor decides to decolonize. Given the overtures for cooperation by the government
and credible commitment by the external actor the opposition will join an elite pact
that maintains their security and rent-seeking opportunities. The government will
abide by the pact knowing that the external actor has credibly committed to protecting
the pact and punishing any transgressor of the pact. This establishes a self-enforcing
limited access order amongst the elite coalition members.
The self-enforcing narrative of the Malayan Emergency follows these expected
outcomes from the model. Once the British made overtures the decision to eventually
grant self-rule to Malaya with the announcements of the Malayan Union and the
Federation of Malaya, the Malays eventually agreed to cooperate and try to bring the
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Chinese opposition into a ruling elite pact. The British proved their credibility to the
Chinese by pushing forward the extension of Malayan citizenship to the Chinese, and
including them in the civil service. The British made a credible commitment to the
Malays by beginning the process of elections to transition to self-rule and keeping the
Malays in privileged governance positions. The nationalist Chinese elites agreed to
join the pact once the Chinese were granted Malayan citizenship and allowed in the
civil service. The MCA also maintained their privileged position in the business
community as part of the pact, which allowed the MCA to regain their rent-seeking
opportunities that had diminished while the Chinese supported the insurgency against
the British and the Malays.
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Figure 3.3: Transitional State-building: Towards Self-Rule (“Post-(Neo)Colonial
Model”)
To further strengthen the pact, the British armed the nationalist Chinese, as
members of the Home Guards, to allow the nationalists to protect themselves from the
Malays. The establishment of the Home Guards also allowed the Chinese to police
their own transgressors to the pact, the communists. While the nationalist Chinese
participated in the government with the Malays, in terms of the elite pact that formed
an LAO in Malaya, the Chinese were still collectively the opposition. The nationalists
had to help marginalize the irreconcilable part of the Chinese community, the MCP.
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In marginalizing the MCP, the MCA had to fight the communists, but also act as a
peaceful opposition. Acting as a peaceful opposition within the rules of the elite pact,
allowed the MCA elites to take influence over the Chinese population away from the
MCP elites. The MCA did this by taking on local leadership roles in the Chinese
villages and using those positions to provide security for the population and
distributing rents to the people. Once the Chinese people began to follow the MCA
elites, the MCP were marginalized, which led many MCP leaders to defect and seek to
join the rent-seeking opportunities enjoyed by the MCA elites.

4.5. Conclusion
This reinterpretation of the Malayan Emergency narrative shows how an elitecentric, rather than population-centric strategy primarily enabled the British to help
defeat the communist insurgency and establish a stable independent state. The British
aligned incentives by appealing to elite rational self-interest, rather than by winning
the population’s “hearts and minds” or merely coercing behavior through population
control and material deprivation. This case analysis of Malaya supports the main
arguments of the theory of self-enforcing stability presented in this dissertation. In
Malaya, the government and opposition required credible commitments from an
external actor before they could see the long-term benefits of cooperation. The British
provided these commitments through the mechanisms of personnel, money,
equipment, time, elections, institutional development, and public statements of intent.
Additionally, the British facilitated the decentralization of violent means and rentseeking opportunities in order to establish a balance of power between the Malays and
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the Chinese. Over time, as the ruling elite pact solidified and the government and
opposition could make credible commitments to one another without the external
actor, the Malayan government recentralized violent means.
In order to provide these credible commitments and the diversification of
power, the British adopted an elite-centric approach. While the British adopted tactics
that improved the security and well-being of the population, the strategy focused on
strengthening the Malay and nationalist Chinese elites. By empowering the elites, the
government and opposition developed a collective pact that appealed to the elites’
long-term rational self-interest over their short-term gains from non-cooperation. Both
the Malay and Chinese populations in Malaya deferred to their leaders due to
structures, customs, and traditions within each society. Increasing elite power by
allowing the leaders to provide their own security and distribute rents strengthened the
elite pact between the government and opposition. The British focus on establishing
stability through the pact rather than trying to build a liberal democracy led to the
formation of a self-enforcing limited access order in Malaya.
Malaya shows how decentralizing violent means by employing significant
manpower from indigenous groups with the limited purpose of self-protection can
have a major impact on defeating an insurgency. The police reached a peak total of
45,000 personnel, while the Home Guards numbered over 350,000. The Home
Guards accepted responsibility for ensuring the security of the Chinese population in
the New Villages and protecting the village populace from the MCP. While the
trained police did help gather intelligence against the MCP, the Malayan Police had
difficulties recruiting Chinese members, which is why Templer pushed for the
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expansion of the Home Guards (Smith 2001, 67-68). So, a more nuanced balance
between manpower and trained forces appears necessary to defeat an insurgency.
Following the decentralization of violent means, Malaysia ultimately
recentralized force as the elite pact solidified and became self-enforcing. This was
possible as Malaya transitioned from a basic to mature LAO. The Alliance Party
helped solidify an enduring elite pact as Malay elites shared power with Chinese
elites. With greater voice and shared political and economic benefits, it was possible
for the Malays and Chinese to overcome the rationality of fear, since the elites saw the
short- and long-term benefits of cooperation. Once the rationality of fear dissipated,
the Home Guards went through what today would be called Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) as they were incorporated into the police,
military, or society, and the state gained greater civilian control over all security forces
around the country.
While this chapter analyzed the role of an external actor in helping establish
self-enforcing stability following conflict in a nation where the external actor was a
colonizer, the next chapter looks at the role of an outside external actor. Chapter 5
analyzes the role of the United States and Coalition Forces had in helping establish the
elite pact between the Iraqi government and the Sunni opposition during the
“Awakening Movement” in Iraq between 2006-2008. The chapter will explain and
test both the conventional narrative and an alternative narrative against their respective
theoretical models.
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Chapter 4, Appendix A: A Brief History of Malaya and its Key Actors

4.A.1. Pre-World War II
Malaya is a peninsula of just over 50,000 square miles, sharing a single land
border (Nagl 2005 [2002], 60). Thailand and Malaya share approximately 300-miles
of contiguous land along Malaya’s northern boundary. Two main mountain ranges
divide Malaya, with the majority of the land to the east, but the majority of the
population along the western coast (Sarkesian 1993, 63-5; Tilman 1966, 413).
Mountain ranges and jungles cover 80% of Malaya, while the remaining 20% consists
of rubber plantations, tin mines, towns or urban centers, and native villages
(kampongs) (Pye 1956, 12). Anybody who lives in Malaya is termed Malayan, while
Malays, Chinese, and Indians make up the three primary races of Malaya. The Malay
population, considered the native inhabitants, besides the small aborigine population,
largely immigrated to the coastal plains from Melanesia (Clutterbuck 1973, 32-33).
The Malays follow traditional customs and largely practice Islam. The Chinese and
Indian immigrants mostly came to Malaya seeking economic opportunity.
The British interest in Malaya arose from trade, with Malaya occupying a
strategically important position between several trade routes. The British leased the
island of Penang in 1786, and Sir Stamford Raffles purchased Singapore in 1819 from
Sultan Hussein Shah (Mills 1958, 3). During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain occupied
the Dutch parts of Malaya to prevent France from claiming rights to the Dutch
colonies. After the war, the British and Dutch signed the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824,
which divided the territories into British-controlled Malaya and Dutch-controlled
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Indonesia (Webster 1998, 83-105). Under the Treaty, Britain obtained the decayed
seaport of Malacca (Mills 1958, 3). Additionally, the Treaty established most-favored
nation trade status between these territories, as well as Raj India and Ceylon (Webster
1998, 102-105).
The British established their colony through a patchwork of authorities to
maintain governance and political rule over Malaya. They created a disparate
grouping of states based on three different agreements. The Straits Settlements,
consisting of Singapore, Malacca, and Penang, maintained crown colony status with
rule coming from Singapore based on the acquisitions described above. The Federated
Malay States, made up of Selangor, Perak, Pahang, and Negri Sembilan, each had
their own legal sovereign sultans as de-jure rulers, but de-facto rule remained in the
hands of British administrators based in Kuala Lumpur. The remaining five states—
Johore, Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu—formed the Unfederated Malay
States. While these states had British administrators embedded in each of their
governments, they were under much less overt British control than the Straits
Settlements and the Federated Malay States (Stubbs 1989, 22).
By the 1900s, Malaya had an essential part in 20th century globalization as the
country moved beyond its position as a trade transit point to an essential global tin and
rubber producer. During this time, the Malays maintained their traditional roles as rice
farmers and fisherman, while Chinese and Indian immigrants flooded the country to
work on plantations, in mines, and as urban laborers. The Malays chose to continue
rice farming in part due to their adherence to traditions, as well as because Malays
wanted to control their own lives rather than work as wage labor for others. The
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Chinese and Indians filled this labor vacuum. The Indian population primarily came to
work the rubber plantations and consisted mainly of Tamils from Madras. Initially,
the Chinese primarily worked the tin mines and as urban laborers, but then moved into
the rubber plantations as well (Mills 1958, 4-6, 10-12; Pye 1956, 12).

Figure 4.A.1. Map of Malaya ("Malayan Emergency Map" 2000)
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Much of Chinese immigration was from southern China to western Malaya—
the location of the bulk of tin mines and rubber plantations. Chinese laborers
established separate communities in these areas and maintained their traditional way
of life. The Chinese population increased from over forty thousand during the 1800s
to over two and a half million by 1947. The British encouraged this immigration since
the Malays would not work in the mines or on the plantations. The Chinese became
very successful in Malaya. They obtained control of almost one-third of the tin mines,
with Europeans controlling the rest, as well as providing substantial investments in
plantations, shipping, banks, and import and export companies. The Chinese came to
dominate retail trade, produce buying, and money lending in Malaya. The prosperity
of the Chinese, large-scale immigration, and indebtedness of the Malays to the
Chinese became a major source of resentment amongst the Malay population. To
tame that resentment, the British gave the Malays privileged positions in the Malayan
government, which they excluded the Chinese from, and further, the British refused to
grant citizenship to most of the Chinese population. (Mills 1958, 4-6, 12-20; Sarkesian
1993, 59)
Tin dominated Malaya’s export trade till the interwar period. At that time,
rubber supplanted tin as Malaya’s primary export, but tin still remained important to
the Malayan economy. Both were volatile exports, but became more so as world
prices plummeted before fluctuating greatly during this period. The Great Depression
caused the rubber industry to learn to operate more efficiently, reducing labor demand
and the number of plantation owners as estates consolidated. Despite the changes in
the global market, Malaya remained dependent on rubber and tin trade till the outbreak
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of World War II (Mills 1958, 20-28). Rubber and tin played a vital role later during
the Emergency period; the outbreak of the Korean War created a demand for these
commodities that funded the Malayan government’s efforts to fight the communist
insurgency (Komer 1972, 14; White 1998, 165, 174-175; Stubbs 1989, 108-114; Mills
1958, 155-158).
The communist insurgency did not overtly begin till 1948, but the communist
movement in Malaya began in the early 20th century. Communism in Malaya was
mostly a Chinese phenomenon. Mirroring the split in the Chinese nationalist
movement on Mainland China, the Kuomintang in Malaya expelled the communists in
1927. Shortly after, the Comintern helped establish a group in Malaya that would
eventually become the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1930. The MCP
struggled, going through several reorganizations throughout the thirties, but they did
have a major achievement that would become important after the war: the
establishment of ties with labor unions. In the late thirties, the MCP gained
momentum from Chinese nationalism arising in 1937 because of the war between
Japan and China, as well as from labor frustration with the British. Despite the
increased MCP activity, the MCP did not seem at the time more than a nuisance to the
British. This changed when the Japanese invaded on 8 December 1941. The British
then saw the MCP as an important ally to serve as “stay behind” forces to conduct
guerilla operations against the Japanese. The British even helped train the Chinese
guerillas (Stubbs 1989, 42-43; Pye 1956, 51-62; Short 1975, 19-21).
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4.A.2. Post-World War II
After the outbreak of World War II and Britain’s ignominious departure in
1942 that allowed the Japanese to occupy Malaya, the status of the British changed in
the eyes of the Malayan people. Malays termed the period between 1942 and 1945,
when the British returned, as “the time the white men ran” (Allen 1983, 254 in Stubbs,
10). The Malayans initially had high expectations that the British would rapidly
restore order and prosperity to pre-war, colonial rule levels, but the British quickly
dashed those hopes. It took the British four weeks after the Japanese surrender to
reach Kuala Lumpur and over six weeks to reach the East Coast despite not having to
retake Malaya in battle (Stubbs 1989, 10). These factors further deteriorated Britain’s
credibility, already hurt amongst the various Malayan populations by the British defeat
at the hands of the Japanese in 1942.
Besides the problems the British faced directed at them, the British returned to
increased antipathy and dissension between the different ethnic groups in Malaya.
The Japanese occupiers sowed animosity between the groups through divide and
conquer policies that privileged some at the expense of others. During the occupation,
the Japanese co-opted the Malay population while targeting the non-Malay minorities,
particularly the Chinese, with the support of the Malays. Demographically, the
population did not change much during the war. Out of a population of around five
million people, the Malays, including aborigines, accounted for 49% of the population,
while the Chinese and Indians made up 39% and 11%, respectively, with the
remaining “others” including Europeans (Federation of Malaya 1952, in Hack and
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Chin, 380). Additionally, few of the non-Malay minorities enjoyed Malayan
citizenship, including many born in Malaya.
During the occupation, the Japanese incorporated the Malays into the Japanese
administration of Malaya, and the Malays took part in the harsh treatment of the
Chinese. Malays served on the police force that the Japanese used to harass the
Chinese (Stubbs 1989, 35). The Chinese came to view the Malays as corrupt
collaborators whom they distrusted and sought justice from. The Chinese, on the other
hand, worked with the Allies during the war to fight the Japanese, seeing themselves
as the defenders of Malaya and victors of the war. At the time, the Chinese were
divided between communists and nationalists, but the MCP and the Kuomintang in
Malaya put aside differences to fight the Japanese. The MCP established the Malayan
People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), who the British trained in guerilla warfare, to
fight the occupation (Stubbs 1989, 42-43).
While the MPAJA was open to all races of the Malayan population, 90 percent
of the fighters were Chinese. Additionally, the MCP established a parallel political
organization, the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU) to provide support
for the MPAJA from local communities (Stubbs 1989, 44). The MPAJA served as the
pre-cursor to the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army (MPABA), which ultimately
became the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA)—also known to some as the
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA)—that became the insurgent wing of the
MCP fighting the Malayan Government during the Emergency. Furthermore, the
MPAJU evolved into the Min Yuen, the population supporters of the MNLA. The
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number of MPAJA totaled between 7,000-8,000 by 1945 with thousands of more
supporters in the MPAJU (Purcell 1965, in Stubbs, 45).
After the fall of the Japanese, the MPAJA, with popular support from the nonMalay population, sought retribution against those they saw as traitors and
collaborators during the occupation. Racial clashes broke out between the MPAJA
and the Malay police force that suppressed the Chinese for the Japanese occupiers.
The MPAJA conducted “people’s trials” to exact retribution, creating cycles of
violence between the Chinese and Malays (Cheah 1983, in Stubbs, 45). These clashes
further cemented the antipathy between the races in Malaya, broadening the lack of
trust and credibility between the parties.
Once the British reentered Malaya, seeing themselves as victors returning to
take back their position as colonial rulers, they further exacerbated the tensions
between the different Malayan population groups. From the British return in
September 1945 till April 1946, they ruled through the British Military Administration
(BMA). The BMA was a military organization with civilian advisors, but the majority
lacked government administration or Malayan experience. The BMA operated in a
manner that quickly soured the population on the British return. First, the Army
received many complaints that they acted as victors who took the spoils of war and
went unpunished for misconduct. Second, the BMA demonetized the Japanese
currency, wiping out the value of money kept by the general population, forcing
people to give away and barter goods. Third, the BMA did little to dismantle the
corruption that grew rampant under the Japanese occupation. Fourth, British
authorities circumvented its own rationing policies forced upon the population to favor
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European estate and mine owners at the expense of local entrepreneurs, mainly
Malayan Chinese. Fifth, the BMA ignored calls to mediate justice for the behavior of
different groups of the population during the occupation. Many Malays who worked
for the Japanese were allowed to stay in their positions or given other favorable
treatment, as they were seen by the BMA as indispensible to governing. Yet, at the
same time, those who fought for the Allies were mostly excluded, feeding resentment
amongst the Chinese. Sixth, the BMA tried to limit MCP activity by closing
newspapers and arresting key officials, further arousing Chinese antipathy and the
feeling of betrayal after supporting the Allies. These factors contributed to general
distrust of the British return to colonial rule when the BMA turned over power to
civilian government in April 1946 (Stubbs 1989, 11-16).
The formation of the Malayan Union without consultation of the Malayan
population under the rule of Sir Edward Gent generated even further distrust. Before
the BMA’s transition to civilian government, the British established the Malayan
Planning Unit in London to develop a unitary, modern secular state in Malaya to
replace the pre-war disparate groupings of the Settlement Straits colony minus
Singapore, the Federated Malay States, and the Unfederated Malay States. In January
1946, the British Government published its first public White Paper on the Malayan
Union (Stubbs 1989, 22-26). The Malayan Union plan called for the sultans, ethnic
Malays, to surrender their sovereignty to a new central government and to confer
citizenship and equal political rights upon all Malays and non-Malays in Malaya.
The proposal quickly received sharp criticisms from the Malays and former
British members of the Malayan civil service. The Malays had three primary
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concerns. First, removing sovereignty from the sultans threatened the social, political,
and religious authorities of Malay traditions and the Malay way of life. Related,
centralization would undermine the power of local and state elites. Second, granting
citizenship to non-Malays would undermine the pre-eminence of Malays in Malaya
and undermine their special position and privileges in society. The Malays did not
want the others to enter the civil service or government, because the Malays controlled
that source of power. Malays already resented the prominent role of the Chinese in
Malayan business and feared a redistribution of political power. Third, the Malays felt
the British bullied the sultans into agreeing to the creation of the Malayan Union,
undermining previous arrangements between the Malays and British to maintain the
Malay’s privileged status (Stubbs 1989, 22-26).
The primary group to organize against the Malayan Union was the PanMalayan Malay Congress, which was replaced by the United Malays National
Organization (UNMO) in May 1946. UNMO organized mass demonstrations against
the Malayan Union across the country. In wake of the unexpected, well-organized
Malay civil disobedience, the Colonial Office established the Constitutional Working
Committee, consisting of representatives of the Malayan government, the sultans, and
UNMO, to draft a successor to the Malayan Union. Non-Malays were excluded from
this committee, and were disappointed with the new constitutional proposals made in
December 1946. The draft combined the British desire for greater centralization with
the Malay demands to impose strict limitations on citizenship for non-Malays and
returning sovereignty to the sultans. To overcome non-Malay objections, the British
formed a Consultative Committee to solicit non-Malay views, but ultimately, they
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ignored all of those recommendations and signed the Federation Agreement, creating
the Federation of Malaya on 1 February 1948 (Stubbs 1989, 26-27).
The British vacillation between the Malayan Union and the Federation of
Malaya created distrust between the Malays and the British. Simultaneously, the
British lost any remaining credibility they had with the Chinese. The Chinese
accepted the Malayan Union plan, but were completely angered by the Federation
Agreement. The British already betrayed the allegiance the Chinese had shown
fighting for the Allies against the Japanese during BMA rule after the war, but
undoing the Malayan Union signaled to the Chinese they would remain politically
powerless.
While the Malays distrusted the British because of the initial push for the
Malayan Union, they were satisfied with the outcome of the Federation Agreement.
The Malays knew they had more to gain in the long-run by supporting the British than
possible short-term gains from opposing the British. The British rewarded Malay
patience and strengthened British credibility in the eyes of the Malays when the
British made clear their intention to grant independence to Malaya and end colonial
rule. The Colonial Secretary made a statement in late 1954 to the House of Commons
promising Malayan independence at the conclusion of the Emergency. The first
national elections to the Federal Legislative Council followed in 1955, strengthening
British credibility amongst the Malays (Short 1975, 13-14; Pye 1956, 13). Eventually,
with the promise of self-rule and elections that included Chinese participation, the
British strengthened their credibility amongst large portions of the Chinese population;
particularly those associated with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA).
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The MCP saw the opportunity to challenge the British through “peaceful
agitation” by organizing labor through unions. As described in Section 2.A.1, the
Chinese comprised a large portion of the labor force in Malaya’s important economic
sectors (rubber plantation workers, tin miners, and service sector employees),
providing a strong base for the MCP to influence. After the war, unemployment was
high and labor disorganized due to the effects of the Japanese occupation. The MCP
re-established the General Labor Union (GLU), which provided a source of revenue
for the MCP through dues of its members. The GLU could also influence members to
find employment only at unionized workplaces. With the establishment of the
Malayan Union and the separation of Singapore, the GLU split into two different
groups and registered each with the respective governments to maintain legal status:
the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU) and the Singapore Federation
of Trade Unions (SFTU) (Pye 1956, 75-82; Clutterbuck 1973, 51-57).
Upon consolidating control, to demonstrate the PMFTU’s power, the unions
turned 1947 into ‘The Year of Strikes.’ Of the 289 registered unions in Malaya, 203
were under the direct control or influence of the PMFTU (Gamba 1962, 155;
Federation of Malaya 1949, 2 in Clutterbuck, 54). There were over 300 major strikes,
resulting in 696,036 lost work-days in 1947 (Miller 1954, 74 in Clutterbuck, 54). By
1948, these strikes had turned violent. As a result of the increasing power and
associated violence with the unions, the Malayan Government in June 1948 passed
very restrictive legislation to curb the MCP control of the unions. The three main
elements of the law were: 1) union office holders had to have at least three years of the
specific industry or trade experience; 2) convicts of extortion, intimidation, or similar
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crimes could not hold office; and 3) only industry- or occupation-based unions could
exist, meaning federations of unions could not (Clutterbuck 1973, 56-57; Sarkesian
1993, 67). These restrictions threatened a large portion of the MCP’s political and
economic power bases, and forced union leaders into covert MCP roles.
Shortly after the passage of the laws, the murder of three British rubber
planters in Perak sparked the beginning of the Malayan Emergency. On June 16,
1948, High Commissioner Sir Edward Gent declared a state of emergency for the
states of Perak and Jahore, and extended the order to the rest of the Federation on June
18 (Sarkesian 1993, 67). The declaration of the Emergency and the banning of the
Malayan Communist Party signified the start of the communist insurgency against the
British and Malayan Federation. The Malayan Emergency has become the
quintessential example used by counterinsurgency theorists in explaining how external
actors can help nations succeed in defeating insurgents, ending civil conflict, and
establishing stable states and governments.
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Chapter 5: Reexamining the Lessons of Stabilization in Iraq, 2006-2008
“[Operation Iraqi Freedom] is a war that’s going to be won by not just combat
effectiveness, but by winning hearts and minds and getting people to cooperate with
us.” – Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, May 4, 2004 (Department of
Defense 2004)
5.1. Introduction
The lessons drawn from the conventional “hearts and minds” narrative of the
Malayan Emergency described in Chapter 4 have had a major impact on the thinking
of how to end the current civil conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. By mid-2006, the
media, punditry, and think-tank analysts reached a near-consensus that Iraq was in the
midst of a sectarian civil war between the Shi’a and Sunni communities. The public
debate at the time revolved around the options of withdrawing American troops and
letting the Iraqis fight it out or increasing American involvement to stabilize the
country. On January 10, 2007, President Bush announced that the United States
would increase its troop strength in Iraq by over 21,000 soldiers—known as the
“Surge”—and essentially adopt a classic population-centric counterinsurgency
strategy (i.e., a “hearts and minds” approach).
This chapter argues that the conventional wisdom about how Iraq achieved
stabilization between 2006 and 2008 does not capture the underlying dynamics in Iraq
that led to the major reduction in sectarian violence and diminishment of the
insurgency. The conventional narrative argues the “hearts and minds” approach
adopted with the “Surge” increased the legitimacy of the Iraqi government in the eyes
of the Iraqi people. Like the Malaya case, this narrative focuses on how
improvements in development and institutional capacity won over the “hearts and
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minds” of the population. This conventional narrative fails to capture how the
external actor influenced competing elites to stabilize the conflict. This chapter shows
how the United States helped adjust the incentives of the government and opposition
elites in Iraq to bring about stability.
This chapter uses the formalization of population-centric theory (Chapter 2)
and the elite-centric theory of self-enforcing stability (Chapter 3) to re-examine the
lessons learned from Iraq’s stabilization between 2006 and 2008. First, the chapter
describes the prevailing conventional narrative about how the “Awakening
Movement” and “Surge” helped stabilize Iraq. Then, the chapter analyzes the lessons
learned from each of these components of the conventional narrative through the
population-centric model from Chapter 2 to assess if the narrative follows the model’s
logic. Next, the chapter applies the “Podesta Model” of self-enforcing stability from
Chapter 3. This demonstrates how an elite-focused strategy in which an external actor
helped internal actors overcome commitment problems by enabling a limited access
order through the oligopolization of violent means and distribution of rents brought
about stability in Iraq.

5.2. Conventional Explanation of Stabilization in Iraq
The conventional explanation for how stability arose in Iraq by 2008,
following a spiral of sectarian violence that began with the February 2006 bombing of
the Askariya Mosque in Samarra, revolves around two main components. The first is
the “Awakening Movement”; the second is the “Surge”, which enjoys greater credit of
the two components in the popular lore of how the United States snatched victory
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from the jaws of defeat in Iraq. The rest of this section provides a quick description of
the main actors in the conventional narrative before discussing the “Awakening” and
the “Surge”.
Shortly after the coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003, an insurgency began to
form. Several players, or actors, exist in this story. Initially, the insurgents were
members of a religious-based alliance, although the different participants had different
objectives. One group to the insurgent alliance, the Iraqi Sunni tribes, consisted of
Iraqi tribes who felt dispossessed of their power upon the removal of the Saddam
regime and who wanted a return to the pre-invasion status quo. The other main
opposition group, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), consisted mostly of foreign fighters and
terrorists trying to force the U.S. to leave as ignominiously from Iraq as the U.S. did
from Somalia, and to establish an Islamist government in Iraq.
The insurgents directed their actions against several groups. First, they
targeted the coalition forces that invaded Iraq and whom the United Nations Security
Council later authorized to operate as the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).
Second, the insurgents targeted the progression of Iraqi governments following the
invasion—the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) appointed by coalition forces after the
invasion, the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) elected mostly by the Shi’a and
Kurdish populations due to a Sunni boycott on January 30, 2005, and finally, the
permanent Government of Iraqi (GoI) elected by the Iraqi people on December 15,
2005. Third, the insurgents also targeted the Shi’a political parties, their
corresponding armed militias, and the Shi’a civilian population due to the rise of Shi’a
power in Iraq at the expense of the formerly ruling, although minority, Sunnis. The
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first part of the story that explains the reduction of violence is the “Awakening”
narrative.

5.2.1. Conventional Explanation of the Iraqi “Awakening Movement”
While the “Surge” maintains pride of place in the conventional narrative about
how stability emerged in Iraq by 2008, some “Surge” proponents acknowledge the
importance of the “Awakening Movement” in setting the conditions for the “Surge” to
succeed, while others argue that the “Awakening” alone brought about stability.
Sunni tribes began the “Awakening Movement” in the summer of 2006 in Anbar
Province. This “Movement” is also known as the “Sons of Iraq” or “Concerned Local
Citizens” efforts. The “Awakening” arose when Sunni tribal leaders chose to stop
fighting and began cooperating with American and Iraqi forces in Anbar Province.
These tribes cooperated by not targeting American or Iraqi forces and by turning
against Al-Qaeda in Iraq, their previous allies. With American financial support, the
“Movement” spread across the country with Sunnis protecting themselves locally, and
it eventually grew to include some Shi’a members as well (New York Times 2010).
The “Awakening” narrative argues that the Sunnis started the “Awakening” in
response to internal disputes and indiscriminate violence employed by Al-Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI). AQI is a foreign-led, radically religious organization intent upon
establishing a caliphate beyond Iraq. The local tribes felt that AQI threatened their
way of life, and that the violence against fellow Sunnis pushed them out of the Sunni
tribes’ original alliance with AQI. The conventional story is that AQI lost the hearts
and minds of the Sunni population who had provided support to AQI, and the Sunni
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tribal insurgents felt that in the short-term they would be better off cooperating with,
rather than fighting, the coalition forces and the Iraqi government to preserve the
power of the tribes and to get help in removing AQI from their tribal areas (Bruno
2009).
“Awakening”-alone proponents further argue that the Iraqi government and
coalition were slowly defeating the insurgents, which caused the Sunnis to flip sides
away from AQI. The Sunnis made a cost-benefit choice between the coalition and
AQI at this point, seeing greater possible long-term benefits from allying with the U.S.
Those who see it from this perspective argue that by bringing the Sunnis back into the
fold, during the “Awakening”, coalition forces stoked Sunni revanchist hopes and
have ultimately undermined the central government of Iraq. By siding with the
coalition, the Sunnis could get the coalition to protect them from the Shi’a militias and
Iraqi government, provide them with money, and give them weapons (or at least not
disarm the Sunnis) and training to help them prepare for a future civil or ethnic
conflict when the coalition departs. This strategy will provide short-term stability at
the expense of long-term “tribalism, warlordism, and sectarianism” (Simon 2008).
The story continues that by giving credibility to tribal leaders, the coalition
actually undermined the democratic institutions they touted by enabling alternative
power structures to grow (Kukis 2006). So, according to the “Awakening”-alone
narrative, the coalition has not necessarily gained the hearts and minds of the
population, it is just that AQI lost them, and the coalition are the best alternative to
help the Sunnis rid themselves of the AQI threat while preparing for an eventual
conflict with the other parties that they see as long-term threats. Additionally, as the
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more cynical critics describe it, “The Americans think they have purchased Sunni
loyalty, but in fact it is the Sunnis who have bought the Americans” (Rosen 2008).
Therefore, the conventional “Awakening”-alone proponents hold that the agreement,
or what they call temporary cease-fires, of the “Movement” and the transitioning of
the Sunnis into the Iraqi government are not sustainable (Biddle et al. 2008) and that
as soon as the “U.S. paymasters” are of no more use to the Sunnis, the coalition and
Iraqi government “will once again be their targets” (Simon 2008).
The conventional “Awakening”-alone wisdom concludes that the “Awakening
Movement” is a series of temporary agreements that has helped bring short-term
security, but that it will not last in the long-run—hence it is not self-enforcing.
Additionally, the coalition’s support of this effort will actually weaken the Iraqi state,
leading to an eventual return to instability and bloodshed.

5.2.1.1. Critique of Conventional Explanation of the “Awakening Movement”
The problem with the conventional “Awakening” argument is that it attributes
short-term stability to the wrong actors—the populace—for the wrong reasons—
winning hearts and minds. The reason this is wrong in Anbar is because the
population followed the leadership of the most powerful elites. Traditionally, the
tribal leaders have controlled power in Anbar. For a short-time period, AQI leaders
displaced the tribal leaders as the dominant elite by controlling greater means of
violence and appropriating rent-seeking and distribution avenues. During that time,
the populace acquiesced to the AQI elite demands. Once the tribal leaders restored
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their elite position through the control of coercion and rent distribution, the population
returned to following the commands of the tribal elites.
Therefore, the conventional wisdom establishes the wrong causal logic for the
achievement of stability in the short-term, missing the actual dynamics taking place
between the proper actors. Even if the long-term predictions of the conventional
“Awakening” argument come true, the lessons drawn will be invalid because the
argument’s faulty causal logic will lead to incorrect explanations and policy
prescriptions. Section 5.3 provides an alternative narrative based on the same events
that took place during the “Awakening”, but grounded in the theory explained in
Chapter 3. Section 5.3 will show how the “Awakening” may have led to selfenforcing stability by decentralizing force and expanding the dominant elite coalition
to give more actors a stake in the future of Iraq and incentives to sustain the
agreement. Before examining this alternative theory, the next section describes and
critiques the conventional explanation of the “Surge” story.

5.2.2. Conventional Explanation of the “Surge”
Most “Surge” proponents accept the view that the “Awakening” brought about
short-term security. Yet, the conventional “Surge” narrative views the impact of the
“Awakening” somewhat differently. Proponents of the conventional “Surge” narrative
argue that the “Awakening” set the conditions for the “Surge” to spread stability
across Iraq and make it sustainable. “Surge” proponents argue that earlier efforts by
U.S. forces to gain Sunni tribal support, such as outreach to the Abu Mahal tribe in
2005 (Semple 2005; West 2008, 101-102), helped to eventually bring the Sunnis
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over—implying that some Sunni “hearts and minds” were won—to the Coalition
(Robinson et al. 2008). The “Surge” enabled the implementation of a full-scale
“hearts and minds” strategy to consolidate and spread the gains from the
“Awakening”.
While the “Awakening” began in the summer of 2006, the “Surge” did not
begin till January 2007 and was not completed until the summer of 2007. At the heart
of the “Surge” was a belief by the strategy’s proponents for the need to shift to a
classic counterinsurgency strategy—a euphemism for the population-centric “hearts
and minds” approach. President Bush announced the “Surge” in an address to the
nation about “The New Way Forward in Iraq” (Bush 2007b). This announcement
shifted the U.S. from an enemy-centric to a population-centric strategy to improve the
legitimacy of the Iraqi government.
The six fundamental elements of “The New Way Forward in Iraq” strategy
were: “1) let Iraqis lead; 2) help Iraqis protect the population; 3) isolate extremists; 4)
create space for political progress; 5) diversify political and economic efforts; and 6)
situate the strategy in a regional approach” (Bush 2007a). To achieve these objectives,
the President committed over 20,000 additional U.S. combat troops (Bush 2007b) plus
supporting units, eventually increasing total U.S. forces from 132,000 in January 2007
to 171,000 by October 2007 (O'Hanlon and Livingston 2010, 19). The six
fundamental elements of the strategy follow closely to the HAM principles, outlined in
Chapter 2, of population control, use of minimal military force, improved public goods
and service provision through development efforts, and building and strengthening
institutional capacity.
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Operationally, the increase in American force levels in Iraq helped protect the
population from insurgents by working with Iraq Security Forces (ISF) to clear and
secure neighborhoods. Coalition and Iraq forces used minimal force to gain the
confidence of the people and to prove that the forces would protect the population. To
support the goal of setting the conditions for the ISF to take over security
responsibility, the U.S. continued efforts to increase the size and effectiveness of the
ISF through training, equipping, mentoring, and embedding programs. The ISF
support efforts, as well as a focus on rule of law institutions and service providing
ministries, made up the institutional capacity component of the “Surge” strategy. The
development component articulated in the “Surge”, following HAM theory, consisted
of delivering essential services to all communities and creating jobs (Bush 2007a,
2007b).
The goal for the main elements of the “Surge” was to gain legitimacy for the
Iraqi government in the eyes of the people—in other words, win their “hearts and
minds”. In order to implement this new strategy, General David Petraeus took
command of Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) two weeks after President Bush’s
address. General Petraeus had just officially released the Army’s new
counterinsurgency manual in December 2006. He led the authorship of this “radical
field manual” that brought together stakeholders from the military, government,
academic, and NGO communities to set a new strategic direction for the military
(Sewall 2007). The “Surge” was the culmination of a doctrine that General Petraeus
spearheaded.

180

“Hearts and minds” proponents of the “Surge” narrative have created a
hagiography about General David Petraeus that is similar to the one created about
General Sir Gerard Templer during and after the Malayan Emergency. These
advocates of the “Surge” success, defined tactically or strategically, argue that General
Petraeus turned things around because he understood and implemented a classic
population-centric counterinsurgency strategy (O'Hanlon and Pollack 2007; Robinson
2008; Ricks 2009b).
Petraeus implemented a series of directives across MNF-I that were not solely
concerned with tactical operations, but focused more on the strategic effects generated
by the tactics. These measures included securing the population by walling off
neighborhoods, creating entry and exit checkpoints, and having coalition and Iraqi
forces live among the population. Further, the strategy according to HAM proponents
included political institutionalization by empowering provincial and local councils.
The conventional narrative also argues that stability arose through the centralization of
force as the Government of Iraq (GoI) incorporated former insurgents into the military
and police. Finally, the strategy focused on development efforts by pushing large
amounts of reconstruction and Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
funds out to the provinces (Robinson et al. 2008).
According to the conventional narrative, the “Surge” of personnel and
resources enabled the combination of population security measures, improvements in
political institutional capacity, development efforts that spread the provision of public
goods and services, and the centralization of violent means that brought Iraq back
from the brink of civil war. The joint efforts of the coalition and Iraqi forces during
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the “Surge” to engage in community-specific operations enabled the provision of basic
services to the people and created new local level political and economic arrangements
that stabilized Iraq (O'Hanlon and Pollack 2007). Political institutionalization at the
local level and the strengthening of the GoI ministries centrally displayed to the Sunni
and Shi’a that they each had a stake in the future of Iraq and could resolve conflict
peacefully through the government. The coalition and GoI no longer treated the Sunni
population as the enemy (Robinson et al. 2008).
Proponents of this narrative cite the massive reduction in violence in Iraq as
evidence of the “Surge’s” effectiveness in winning the “hearts and minds” of the
population and improving the legitimacy of the coalition and Iraqi government (Biddle
2008; Exum 2010). Through the implementation of a cohesive COIN strategy,
civilian deaths declined 48% across Iraq and 74% in Baghdad from December 2006 to
September 2007 (Boot 2007). “Surge” supporters further cite that the Sunni uprising
against AQI and in support of the coalition and GoI had affected over 40% of the
country by September 2007 (Boot 2007), in effect giving credit for the “Awakening’s”
success to the “Surge”. Economically, the improved provision of public goods and
services to the Sunni areas took away popular support for Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Previously, the population had turned to AQI for goods and services, since the GoI
had not been providing them.

5.2.2.1. Logical Critique of Conventional Explanation of the “Surge”
Chapter 2 provides the basis for critically analyzing the logic of the
conventional explanation for the success of the “Surge” in Iraq. The extended game
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tree model in Figure 2.4 illustrates the logic of the population-centric theory. The
“Surge” is held up as the implementation of classic COIN strategy, meaning that it
should follow the logic of the HAM model. According to the model, the population
should support the insurgency due to the lack of government legitimacy. In Iraq, the
population was divided ethno-religiously, which determined who among the
population supported the insurgency. Support for the insurgency was a Sunni Arab
phenomenon. Shi’a Arabs account for approximately 60% of the Iraqi population,
Sunni Arabs make up approximately 18-20% of the population, the Kurds
approximately 15-20% of the population, and other ethno-religious groups make up
approximately 5% of the population (Central Intelligence Agency 2010). Just as in
Malaya, the Sunni dominance of the insurgency raises a logical puzzle about the
population-centric model. If the insurgents require popular support, did the Sunnis
really think they could win the “hearts and minds” of the Shi’a and Kurdish
populations? Did the Sunnis ever try to win “hearts and minds”, or did they just try to
regain power through coercion? Since HAM is about a competition for legitimacy in
the eyes of the population, would wanton killing of the other groups by the Sunnis
gain the legitimacy that would allow the Sunnis to recapture control of the country? If
not, Iraq faced a civil war rather than an insurgency since neither group would
capitulate to the other. If it was an insurgency without general popular support, the
insurgency should have ended according to the model in Figure 2.4.
This analysis shows, again as with the Malaya case, the inability of the
population-centric model to provide criteria for a minimal level of popular support to
sustain an insurgency. To continue with the logical critique, this section assumes that
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as little as 20% of the population (assuming unanimous Sunni support) can sustain an
insurgency. This leads to the next move in the population-centric model, which is the
choice of the counterinsurgents to pursue a HAM or coercion policy. The “Surge”
narrative argues that the counterinsurgents, the coalition and Iraqi forces, chose a
HAM policy. The HAM policy should have led the population to end their support of
the insurgency. While the Sunnis did end support for the insurgency, it is not clear
that the “Surge’s” implementation of HAM led to the end of that support. The Sunnis
had previously ended support for the insurgency with the “Awakening”. Depending
on how one views the “Awakening”, as discussed in Section 5.2.1, either the previous
coercion of the counterinsurgents led to the end of popular support before the “Surge”,
or AQI lost the population’s “hearts and minds”. In either case, the counterinsurgents
never won the population’s “hearts and minds” due to a deliberate HAM policy
choice. The empirical critique of the “Surge” explanation in Section 5.2.2.2 will
support the point that the Sunnis stopped supporting the insurgency before the
counterinsurgents implemented a comprehensive HAM strategy.
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Figure 2.4. Population-Centric Theory Model
The model also treats the counterinsurgents as a unified actor, assuming that
the government and external actor have the same ultimate goal—defeating the
insurgents. This assumption fails to capture differences in policy choices, however.
Even if the coalition forces implemented a HAM strategy, the government pursued a
policy of coercion to change the behavior of the Sunni population. Following the
outbreak of the insurgency, the GoI and Shi’a population showed restraint in terms of
violence towards the Sunnis in hope of establishing national reconciliation. That
restraint, however, ended with the Samarra bombing in February 2006 (Morales and
Alexander 2006). At that point, the government pursued a policy of coercion by
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unleashing the Shi’a militia linked to the governing political parties to target the Sunni
population directly (Worth 2006). The coalition forces at this time already relied
heavily on coercion, with the use of “cordon and search” operations and mass arrests
of younger male Sunnis (Filkins 2005). This use of coercion showed the Sunnis that
the counterinsurgents, particularly the government, were more powerful than the
Sunnis believed. The government made little effort at this time to improve public
goods provision to the Sunnis; the government relied on sticks rather than carrots to
change the Sunni population’s behavior.
Following the Sunni change in behavior, through these coercive measures, it
became possible for the counterinsurgents to shift to the provision of carrots to the
Sunnis. The split in the opposition between the tribes and AQI occurred before the
implementation of the HAM strategy. The HAM strategy may have consolidated
gains made through the coercion strategy, but HAM was not the cause of the
population ending support for the insurgency as predicted by the HAM model. With
the population control measures of the “Surge” to further separate the population from
the insurgents, it became possible to improve public goods provision, development,
and political institutionalization. As in Malaya, the counterinsurgent’s use of these
policies may have appealed to the rational self-interest of the population, but they
unlikely won the affection of the people.

5.2.2.2. Empirical Critique of Conventional Explanation of the “Surge”
Empirically, proponents of the “Surge” rely primarily on two pieces of
evidence that the “Surge” worked. The first is that the HAM strategies of the “Surge”
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proved the coalition’s and Iraqi government’s legitimacy to the Sunnis, which enabled
the Sunni uprising against AQI. The problem with the framing of the Sunni uprising
by “Surge” proponents is that they smuggle in the “Awakening” as a component of the
“Surge” even though the “Awakening” pre-dated the surge and was initiated by the
Sunnis, not the coalition or GoI. Some proponents acknowledge that the
“Awakening” started first, but they still argue that the “Surge” is what made it succeed
(Boot 2007; Biddle 2008; Exum 2010). The “Awakening” began six months before
the announcement of the “Surge” and over a year before the completion of the
“Surge”. This conventional HAM argument however suffers from an endogeneity
problem. Did the “Surge” enable the “Awakening” as argued, or did the “Awakening”
set the conditions for the “Surge” to work? Would the flood of resources—personnel,
money, and material—have made a difference without the “Awakening”? Combining
the logical and empirical critiques of the conventional narrative show that the
“Awakening” likely set the conditions for the resources of the “Surge” to serve as
effective mechanisms for the external actor to help the government and opposition
elites overcome credible commitment problems.
Second, the conventional narrative relies heavily on the data showing a
reduction of violence in Iraq as evidence that the “Surge” worked. The problem is that
supporters of the “Surge” either misread or misuse the data. “Surge” supporters
choose the near peak of violence in Iraq when describing the drop in violence. The
48% decline in civilian deaths across Iraq by September 2007 value in Section 5.2.2 is
compared to December 2006 (Boot 2007). This data value obscures the fact that
President Bush did not announce the surge until January 2007, however, and that the
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full complement of surge forces did not arrive till the summer of 2007. Further, U.S.
and coalition troop strength did not peak till October 2007 (O'Hanlon and Livingston
2010).
Figure 5.1 displays the number of Iraqi civilian deaths and the number of
coalition forces in Iraq between March 2005 and June 2010. The left-side vertical axis
provides the value for the number of Iraqi civilian deaths. The blue line (initially the
lower line) plots the deaths by month. The right-side vertical axis provides the value
for the number (in thousands) of coalition forces in Iraq. The red line (initially the
upper line) plots the number of troops by month. The horizontal axis represents time
(in months).

Figure 5.1. Iraqi Civilian Deaths and Coalition Troop Strength, March 2005June 2010 (O'Hanlon and Livingston 2010; icasualties.org 2010)
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The graph shows that the number of Iraqi civilian deaths peaked just after the
start of the “Awakening Movement”, but then declined sharply. Deaths then increased
just after the announcement of the “Surge” strategy, but then continued the major
downward trend that started after the “Awakening” began. During this time, the
“Awakening” spread beyond Anbar and included Shi’a as well as Sunni populations.
The chart also shows that the declining death trend preceded the increase in troop
levels. While increased troops may have enabled the trend to continue by supporting
the “Awakening,” the data presented on the chart raise questions about the “Surge”
argument that increases in troops led causally to the decline in civilian deaths.
Further, a likely lag exists between the time of troop arrival and their impact, because
it takes time for troops to reach and become familiar with their areas of responsibility
(AORs). Since HAM theory relies on gaining the confidence of the population, it is
hard to accept that COIN forces could have instantaneously changed the conditions on
the ground immediately upon their arrival.

5.3. Applying a New Theory of Self-Enforcing Stability to the “Awakening
Movement”
The problem with the conventional explanations of the stabilization of Iraq
between 2006 and 2008, both the “Awakening” and “Surge” arguments, is that they
focus on the change in the behavior of the population. The “Awakening” argument
describes how the opposition lost the “hearts and minds” of the population, while the
“Surge” explains how the counterinsurgents won the population’s “hearts and minds”.
Both fail to recognize the importance of the role of elites as an intervening variable
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that impacts the behavior of the population. Neither of these narratives explains the
role of incentives, positive or negative, in aligning the interests of elites. The
conventional narratives miss how aligned interests led to the development of an elite
pact between the Sunnis and the Shi’a in Iraq. The interests of these two groups
became aligned when AQI threatened the security and rent-seeking opportunities of
elites from both the opposition and the government.
This section will now link the theory of self-enforcing stability presented in
Chapter 3 to provide an alternative narrative of the stabilization that took place in Iraq
between 2006 and 2008, showing that the theory is plausible and potentially
generalizeable. The “Awakening” set the conditions for the mechanisms employed
during the “Surge” to solidify an elite pact between the government and opposition.
This section applies the “Podesta Model” from Chapter 3 to Iraq. This application
shows how a de-facto elite-centric strategy that supported the oligopolization of
violent means and rent-seeking helped the coalition resolve commitment problems
between the Sunni and Shi’a, contributing to the establishment of a potentially selfenforcing limited access order (LAO) in Iraq by 2008. Once the elites were able to
provide security and rent provision locally, they won the support and allegiance, but
not necessarily the affection, of the population.

5.3.1. Key Actors
The three actors in this self-enforcing narrative are the government (made up
of the Government of Iraqi (GoI) and the Shi’a parties and militias), the opposition
(the Sunni tribes), and the external actor (the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I)).
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This narrative assumes that each of these groups has worked out their own internal
collective action problems, forming their own elite coalitions. The Government of
Iraqi (GoI) and the Shi’a groups are treated as a unified actor, the government,
because each of the primary militia groups is an armed element of the major political
parties. For example, “ISCI [the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq] and Fadhila …
meld[ed] nearly all of their own independent militia units into the Iraqi security
forces… Their approach has … largely removed the … problem that these militias
employed systematic violence to advance their political agendas beyond, and at the
expense of, government control” (Biddle et al. 2008, 39). Additionally, the GoI and
Shi’a elites who headed the Shi’a political parties and militias aligned closely and
generally acted in concert with one another, except for the spoiler group—the Sadr
militia. However, the GoI and the Shi’a groups ultimately worked together to check
the power of the Sadr militia when the Sadrists threatened the pact, discussed below,
between the government, the external actor, and the opposition.
For the opposition, this narrative treats all of the Iraqi-led Sunni tribes as a
unitary actor. The Sunni tribes are elite organizations that permeate Iraqi society, as
Sheik Abdul Sittar, the original leader of the “Awakening,” states, “Tribes aren’t what
you’re imagining, these people who make up tribes are doctors, engineers,
intellectuals, farmers, and mechanics” (Kukis 2006). These tribal leaders actually
maintain parallel extra-state governance structures to the formal state ones as well as
political allegiances (Kilcullen 2007). AQI is excluded from the opposition, because
they are an irreconcilable, foreign-led, spoiler group with different goals from those of
Iraq’s Sunni population.
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Lastly, the narrative treats all the elites within MNF-I and their corresponding
diplomatic missions as a unitary external actor as there is a single chain of command
among all military forces, and because of the close coordination between the military
and civilian policymakers. Each of the elites within the government, opposition, and
external actor coalitions may have their own interests, but this rational-choice
framework assumes that the elites support the dominant coalition despite some
differences since they all become better off on average by working together.

5.3.2. Commitment Problems
As the tribal revolt began in the summer of 2006 in Anbar province, and
because informal tribal structures pervade Iraqi society, the “Awakening” turned out
to be “a major social movement that could significantly influence most Iraqis”
(Kilcullen 2007). And, although not mentioned much in the conventional story that
credits the “Surge” with the “Awakening,” “…the Iraqi government was in on it from
the start … with tribal leaders turning toward the government and away from the
extremists” (Kilcullen 2007). The reason that the government and opposition had to
turn to an external actor to finalize the deal was that both sides needed an external
actor to provide a credible commitment mechanism.
The government could not provide a credible commitment to the Sunnis
because of the sectarian violence since the collapse of the Saddam regime. With much
of the Iraqi Security Forces consisting of former Shi’a militia members, the opposition
could not believe that the government would not renege on any agreement; especially
one in which the opposition would lay down their arms to join the government. Once
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the Sunnis laid down their weapons, it would be relatively costless for the government
to renege and crush the opposition or continue excluding them from the government,
as explained in the game in Figure 3.1. Fearon (1998) helps us understand this
commitment problem in terms of ethnic conflict, and when he (1995) describes that
war is rational when there are incentives to misrepresent private information and when
commitment problems provide incentives to renege. In Anbar, the government and
opposition both had incentives to misrepresent their strength, because they each
wanted the other side to think fighting was futile. The government had an additional
incentive to renege; they wanted to guarantee that the Sunnis who had tyrannized the
Shi’a for decades would never take over the government again.

Figure 3.1. State-building Game without an External Actor
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On the opposition side, the members of the coalition had the incentive to work
together and with the government to defeat AQI because the foreign-born leaders of
AQI were attempting to overthrow the supremacy of the Sunni tribal leaders,
threatening their political interests. Additionally, AQI threatened the Sunni sheiks’
economic interests as “the tribes run smuggling, import/export, and construction
businesses which AQI shut down, took over, or disrupted through violent disturbances
that ‘were bad for business’” (Kilcullen 2007). Without the external actor, however,
the opposition could not credibly commit to the government either as explained by
Fearon’s rationalist explanation of war described above. The game in Figure 3.1
described this problem. Understanding that the government had an incentive to
renege, the Sunnis rationally attacked the government preemptively. This follows the
backwards induction of the game described in Chapter 3; if the opposition waited to
fight after the government consolidated and strengthened its power, the costs to the
opposition would have been much greater. Additionally, without MNF-I, the
opposition could not credibly commit to the government. The Sunnis had to overcome
the government’s rational fear that the Sunnis would try to restore what they saw as
their rightful position as the leaders of Iraq after the Iraqi Security Forces helped the
Sunnis defeat AQI. This problem again follows from the game in Figure 3.1, because
the government would also understand that the opposition would subvert when the
opposition had its greatest strength vis-à-vis the government.
The inability of either the government or the opposition to credibly commit to
one another led both sides to turn to the external actor to serve as the guarantor of the
agreement (see Figure 3.2). With the “Awakening,” MNF-I became responsible for
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preventing the disarmament of and providing payment to the “Sons of Iraq” (SOI) or
“Concerned Local Citizens” who volunteered to police their own neighborhoods. By
the end of 2008, there were more than 100,000 SOI members operating across most of
the country (Weinstein 2008), contributing to the reduction in violence. “The role of
American forces has shifted from crushing sectarian groups intent on causing violence
to essentially policing cease-fires among the groups and reassuring ordinary Iraqis that
the violence will not be allowed to resume” (Biddle et al. 2008, 31). This description
follows the role of the Podesteria in Italian city-states during the late Middle Ages,
discussed in Chapter 3. The republics sent an outsider, a Podesta, to dependent cities
or city-states, such as Genoa, or hired its own Podesta to administer the city and
prevent strife between competing local elites. The Podesta treated each side equally
and sided with the defenders against the defectors of the pact (Greif 1998, 2006).
During the “Awakening Movement” and “Surge”, the external actor provided the
necessary credible commitment for the agreement to hold, similar to the actions of the
Podesta.
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Figure 3.2. State-building with External Actor Support (“Podesta Model”)

5.3.3. Moving Towards Self-Enforcement
Coalition forces used the mechanisms of personnel, equipment, money, and
time to make their commitment credible. The “Surge” enabled the coalition to utilize
these mechanisms. The diversification of violence potential between government and
opposition forces formed a balance of interests between the government and
opposition, which is indicated by the sharp decline in violence (see Figure 5.1) since
the “Awakening” (Berman et al. 2008). The coalition helped diversify violent means
by partially training the SOI, as they had done with the ISF, and by indirectly
equipping the SOI through money transfers—or at least not disarming them—
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establishing a defined balance of power between the government and the opposition.
The increase in personnel during the “Surge” also solidified this balancing, because
coalition forces operated with both opposition and government forces, helping to
maintain the pact by identifying and punishing violations by either side, similar to a
Podesta. The personnel also helped to protect the populace, which strengthened the
influence and power of the elites over their supporters.
With the decrease in violence, both the opposition and government have been
able to increase economic activity, providing the elites on both sides with the rentseeking opportunities they desire, showing the mutually supporting relationship that
exists between balanced violence potential and prosperity. Greater rents help create an
incentive to establish peace. The coalition also enabled diversified rent-seeking
opportunities through the use of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program
(CERP), which allowed local elites to deliver local public goods (Berman et al. 2008),
while providing other reconstruction funding to government elites. Along with the
personnel, equipment, and money, MNF-I’s ambiguous withdrawal timetable extended
the shadow of their future involvement, adding to the credibility of their commitment
in the eyes of the government and the opposition and strengthening the pact. As the
government and opposition reaped benefits from the agreement, this created a focal
point for both sides to defend.
Each side determined that they were better off policing their own members
who violated the agreement in order to maintain the long-run benefits. The
government, led by Prime Minister Maliki, confronted the Sadr militia, the Jaysh-alMedhi (JAM), in Basra and Sadr City in late March 2008 (Ghosh 2008; Hider 2008).
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Following this action, “Sunni groups in Anbar began to speak positively about Maliki
(Biddle et al. 2008, 40),” whom they had distrusted before. Similarly, the Sunni
tribes’ actions against AQI, reduced attacks against the Shi’a, and participation in the
political process has shown the government that the opposition is serious about
maintaining the agreement with the government (Kilcullen 2007). The actions of both
the government and the opposition helped to build the credibility of each party in the
eyes of the other. Those signals mattered, particularly since responsibility for 76% of
the SOI program was turned over to the Iraqi government on 1 January 2009
(Weinstein 2008).
As coalition forces disengage, the Iraqi government and the Sunni tribes will
have to make credible commitments to one another to achieve a self-enforcing
stability mechanism. A credible commitment problem arises, in part, because of what
Di Figueredo and Weingast (1999) call the “rationality of fear.” This problem arises
because of economic and political puzzles about accepting the high costs of conflict
rather than higher benefits from gains through cooperation, and understanding the link
between leader’s intentions and citizens’ fears. The coalition helped overcome this
“rationality of fear” by lowering the stakes between the government and opposition
through the diversification of violent means and rent-seeking opportunities.
The preliminarily shift away from MNF-I as the guarantor shows that under
certain conditions, such as during civil conflict, an external actor can contribute to the
development of a self-enforcing stability mechanism that reduces violence. This
mechanism requires that coalitions of elites within the government and opposition
come to an agreement initially enforced by an external actor to overcome credible
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commitment problems. As discussed above, MNF-I’s several resource-based
mechanisms allowed it, as an external actor, to credibly commit to the government and
the opposition that MNF-I supported their pact. These mechanisms were: 1)
personnel—“Surge” to monitor and punish transgression; 2) equipment—materiel and
training used to diversify violent means; 3) money—decentralizing the distribution of
rents amongst elites; and 4) time—strategic ambiguity about external actor mission
length enables extension of time horizon. During the course of the agreement, both
the government and opposition have to prove to one another that they are willing to
defend their pact against any party, including members of their own coalition, who
threatens the endurance of the agreement. The agreements create focal points that all
parties know to defend, because they are better off with the whole thing even if they
lose with some parts of the pact.
The 2006 to 2008 Iraq narrative supports the theory that an important part of
the elite agreement that makes the pact self-enforcing is the diversification of means of
violence and rent-generation, creating an internal balance of interests between
government and the opposition elites, so both sides know that it costs more to fight the
other side than to cooperate with them. This recognizes, counter to the conventional
wisdom, that monopolization of force and rent-seeking opportunities by the state to
distribute through a population-centric strategy can actually further destabilize a failed
or fragile state.
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5.4. Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the conventional narrative about how stabilization
in Iraq between 2006 and 2008 occurred due to winning the “hearts and minds” of the
population is faulty both logically and empirically. The alternative presentation of the
evidence in this chapter supports the main arguments of the theory of self-enforcing
stability developed in this dissertation.
The data suggests that the coalition pursued an elite-centric strategy, rather
than a population-centric strategy, to reduce violence between the Sunni insurgents
and the Shi’a-dominated government in Iraq. The pursuit of an elite-centric strategy
allowed the external actor to overcome the credible commitment problem that existed
between the government and opposition. This strategy included Sunni engagement
during the “Awakening Movement,” and the provision of credibility-establishing
mechanisms—personnel, money, equipment, and time—with the “Surge”. The
coalition’s ability to provide credible commitments to both sides allowed time for the
Sunnis and Shi’a to see the potential long-term benefits of cooperation.
The provision of resources during the “Surge” enabled the external actor to
facilitate the oligopolization of violent means and rent-seeking opportunities that
began during the “Awakening”. This diversification of power gave both Sunni and
Shi’a elites the ability to protect themselves while increasing the elites’ prosperity.
Through the establishment of self-protection means, levels of violence declined across
Iraq, increasing the rent-seeking opportunities for the elites and showing each side that
they had a stake in the future of a stable Iraq.
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Further, the pact established between the government and opposition, which
the external actor helped guarantee to overcome the initial credible commitment
problem, focused on establishing a limited access order. The coalition limited the
provision of resources during the “Surge” to cooperative elites from the government
and the opposition. Those outside of the pact, such as the Sadr Militia and Al-Qaeda in
Iraq, were isolated and policed by all members of the pact. While different
contemporary factors may derail the progress made between 2006 and 2008, the
coalition had helped place the government and opposition in Iraq on a path towards
self-enforcing stability. As the Iraq case analysis has shown, getting on the path is one
challenge, but staying on the path is also another. Moving towards self-enforcing
stability in conflict-torn states likely requires a major commitment of time and
resources from an external actor hoping for the possibility of success: this is when
“more is better”.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
“[The new constitution] would give Iraq the political framework to build a peaceful,
democratic country… From the outset, the Coalition … judged that we had a special
obligation to help Iraqis design a political and legal structure to guide Iraq’s journey
from tyranny to democracy.” – L. Paul Bremer (2005)
6.1. Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has taken on a
more prominent role in state-building efforts. The goal of these efforts has been to
end internal conflict in other countries and to change their domestic authority
structures to reduce the threat that failed states pose to intervening nations, as well as
the international system. Such unilateral and multilateral state-building interventions
have taken place across the globe, and even pre-date the end of the Cold War. Since
the Cold War, however, state-building in weak and failed states has largely consisted
of counterinsurgency efforts combined with the promotion of democratic and liberal
economic institutions. L. Paul Bremer’s quote above captures the belief by many
external interveners that outsiders possess the expertise to transform and impose
democracy upon other societies.
This dissertation has explored the prevailing literature and theories about how
external actors can help establish stability in conflict-torn states. As state-building is
such a broad topic, this dissertation focused on external actors helping establish the
minimal level of stability necessary for other state-building processes—political,
economic, and social development—to take place. The driving research question was:
what is the appropriate social order external actors should help nations attain in order
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for successful state-building to take place, and what incentives can external actors
provide to set host nations on this path?
To explore this question, the dissertation adopted a rational-choice perspective
and used game theory to explain the logic of the prevailing population-centric theory
about how external actors help establish enduring security amidst internal conflict.
Next, the dissertation provided an alternative elite-centric theory—again using a
simple game to show the logic of the argument. The dissertation then tested the
population-centric and elite-centric theories through case analysis of the Malayan
Emergency from 1948 to1960 and the stabilization of Iraq from 2006 to 2008.
Evidence from both cases provided support for the elite-centric theory proposed in this
dissertation and exposed logical and empirical flaws in the population-centric theory.
The rest of this concluding chapter discusses the contributions made by this
dissertation to the academic literature, explores the implications of the case study
findings for policy makers, and recommends some paths for further research.

6.2. Contribution to the Literature
This dissertation’s theory of self-enforcing stability counters the prevailing
Weberian-based ideas in the state-building and COIN literatures that the state
government must monopolize the legitimate control and use of force (Weber 1978,
314). Rather, the theory of self-enforcing stability presented in this dissertation argues
that diversifying violence helps achieve security and stability. Diversification of
violence balances power amongst elites by distributing violent means, ensuring that
competing elite groups can protect themselves from one another without threatening
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each other with overwhelming force. Additionally, the conceptual framework laid out
by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a) implies that the diversification of force is
more likely to lead to a reduction of violence in failed or fragile states than is the
consolidation of force. Failing to balance power suggests the state will abuse the
opposition if the state maintains a monopoly of force, so the opposition will never stop
fighting.
Also, amongst the reigning views about state-building is the underlying belief
that external actors can or should help develop institutions based on those in modern,
liberal democracies (Carothers 1999; McFaul 2004). In addition to theorists who
make the case for the importance of democracy promotion in state-building, some
policymakers also strongly believe in it. President Bush stated during his second
inaugural address, “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth
of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the
ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” (Bush 2005). While staying away from
democracy promotion rhetoric at the start of his administration, President Obama has
since affirmed his support for promoting democracy abroad. But, President Obama
wants to promote democracy through multilateral institutions rather than having the
U.S. lead the effort. He reflected that sentiment while addressing the U.N. General
Assembly in arguing that “It’s time to reinvigorate U.N. peacekeeping, so that
missions have the resources necessary to succeed, … because neither dignity nor
democracy can thrive without basic security” (Obama 2010b).
Yet, the stability-through-democracy approach focuses on the wrong type of
social order. Again following North, Wallis, and Weingast’s framework, the theory
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developed in this dissertation focuses on the two social orders, rather than multiple
regime types, that exist today: limited access orders (LAOs) and open access orders
(OAOs). In LAOs, or natural states, “Personal relationships among the elite form the
basis for political organization and constitute the grounds for individual interaction…
People outside the [ruling dominant] coalition have only limited access to
organizations, privileges, and valuable resources and activities” (North et al. 2009b,
56). OAOs develop “impersonal categories of individuals…[that] allow people to
interact… where no one needs to know the individual identities of their partners. The
ability to form organizations that the larger society supports is open to everyone who
meets a set of minimal and impersonal criteria” (North et al. 2009b, 56).
The theory in this dissertation departs from NWW’s explanation of the social
orders in two primary respects. First, while NWW start with the existence of social
order, the theory in this dissertation starts where no social order exists, which is the
case in failed or collapsed states. Second, NWW’s framework implicitly describes the
process of social order development as something that occurs internally amongst
actors within the state, but this dissertation’s theory incorporates an explicit role for an
external actor to facilitate the development of social order in failed, collapsed, or weak
states. Using NWW’s distinction of social orders clarifies how this theory of selfenforcing stability challenges the prevailing Weberian monopoly of force and
population-centric focuses in the reigning literature.
Open access orders did not emerge until the 19th century. People in only about
25 countries today, accounting for 15 percent of the world’s population, live in open
access societies. The remaining 85 percent of the world’s population live under
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natural states or no social order at all (North et al. 2009a, xii). So, an implication of
NWW’s framework is that external actors need to approach security development in
war-torn countries, where social order has broken down, with the objective of helping
the government and opposition achieve a limited access order rather than an open
access order.
The theory in this dissertation, developed in part from the NWW framework,
contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the theory removes the focus on
democratic institutional development in favor of focusing on establishing institutions
that support self-enforcing, stable societies that may develop over time into open
access orders rather than having democratic institutions imposed by outsiders. It is
necessary to recognize the appropriate social order to encourage in conflict-ridden
states. Failed states first need to become a fragile natural state in which incentives are
embedded in organizations that “produce a double balance: a correspondence between
the distribution and organization of violence potential and political power on one
hand, and the distribution and organization of economic power on the other hand”
(North et al. 2009a, 20). A dominant coalition based on personal relationships
determines the distribution of these factors.
While some theorists (Zakaria 1997; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond
2008) may describe these regimes as pseudo-, proto-, or illiberal democracies or even
electoral democracies if the elites use the mechanism of elections to solidify the pact,
such a designation does little to explain how stability will form in the society. That is
one reason why this dissertation focuses on social order rather than regime-type. Over
time, the state will hopefully develop expanded opportunities and broaden the
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coalition, as well as centralize violent potential, through impersonal relationships,
achieving an open access order. However, that is not an immediately achievable goal
in conflict-ridden societies since the coalition members cannot credibly commit to not
trying to dominate one another. If a state ultimately becomes an OAO, then it will
achieve the status of liberal democracy, but again that designation primarily focuses
on the regime-type rather than the stability of the society.
Second, the theory of self-enforcing stability presented in this dissertation
recognizes that the diversification of force has the potential to reduce violence, rather
than expand violence, when the diversification conditions make the benefits for those
controlling force exceed the costs from conflict. The prevailing focus on Weberian
centralization of force fails to recognize the disincentives that exist for elites in the
society to give up violent means and the complexity of the institutions required to
maintain the monopoly of force.
Third, this theory of self-enforcing stability shows how an external actor can
help put failed, collapsed, or weak states on the path toward the development of a
stable social order. As NWW explain, elites must form a dominant coalition and
respect each other’s privileges to build a limited access order. They do not, however,
show how to enable the necessary credible commitments among elites. The theory in
this dissertation demonstrates that the external actor initially provides the credible
commitment mechanism that is absent amongst the elites in these societies, allowing
for each society’s elites to develop their own credible commitment mechanisms.
Finally, the theory in this dissertation contributes to the literature, particularly
the COIN literature, by shifting from a population-centric focus to an elite-centric
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focus. As NWW (2009) describe, as well as the “Third Wave” democracy literature
(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1993), the elites in the society need to
form the pact that guarantees and protects the privileges granted to each member of
the dominant coalition. This theory argues that elites have their own followers—
members of the populace—that will follow the elites’ lead or directions (North et al.
2009a; Berinsky 2007; Christia 2008, Forthcoming; Blaydes and Linzer 2010). The
populace will follow the elites for various sociological, cultural, economic, or political
reasons, but explaining those is beyond the scope of this dissertation. While the
populace’s behavior does matter, the dissertation assumes that the elites drive the
populace’s behavior. So, for an external actor to maximize its use of limited resources
while state-building, the theory of self-enforcing stability presented in this dissertation
argues that the external actor should focus on distributing its resources, or credible
commitment mechanisms, towards the elites rather than the populace. Again, this
theory argues that distributing resources through local elites appeals to the rational
self-interest of the elite and enables, strengthens, and supports the elite pact, rather
than winning the affection and mass support of the population for the regime in power.
For example, the external actor may supply personnel to protect the populace, but the
primary purpose of resource provision is to strengthen the elites in the dominant
coalition at the expense of those outside of the coalition.

6.3. Implications for Policy Making
The case studies presented in this dissertation test the logic of the populationcentric “hearts and minds” theory in Chapter 2 against the alternative logic of elite208

centric theory of self-enforcing stability in Chapter 3. The findings from the analysis
of the Malayan Emergency in Chapter 4 and Iraq stabilization in Chapter 5 show that
the theory of self-enforcing stability better explains how external actors contributed to
the stabilization of these two countries during the examined time frames. However,
the analysis in those chapters did not address the question of how the actions of the
external actors in both states facilitated long-term stability. This section begins to
explore the endurance of the stability achieved by the external actors in Malaya and
Iraq, and explains why the stability is self-enforcing in Malaysia, but that it is unlikely
to become self-enforcing in Iraq. These implications provide new lessons for policy
makers to consider while making decisions about future state-building ventures.

6.3.1. Implications of Self-Enforcing Stability Established in Malaya following the
Emergency
The elite pact between the Malayan government and opposition formed in
1952 endured after independence in 1957. The Alliance Party, which became the
Barisan Nasional (“National Front”) in 1973, has dominated Malayan (now
Malaysian) politics. They held at least two-thirds majorities in Parliament until the
2008 election. This shows that the external actor’s exit strategy of establishing a
stable state through an elite pact led to self-enforcing stability even in the absence of
the external actor, as was hypothesized and shown in Figure 3.4. The opposition and
government elites recognized that they were each better off in the long run through
cooperation.
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Figure 3.4: Self-enforcing Stability without an External Actor
While decentralization of violent means helped establish credible
commitments between the government and opposition and form a basic limited access
order, the state consolidated control over these forces over time. Not long after, the
Emergency the Home Guards disbanded. Yet, the Malaysian government maintained
diversified violent means amongst the population, but under greater state control.
Malaysia created RELA, “People’s Volunteer Corp,” in 1972, an over half-a-million
strong armed force that is used by the elites to protect their pact. It does so today by
helping maintain “public order” through crackdowns on illegal immigration that
undermine the Malaysian work force (Human Rights Watch 2007; Mydans 2007); in
other words, RELA protects elite control of rent-seeking opportunities.
The enduring elite pact, which the British helped form, and its self-enforcing
equilibrium allowed Malaya to transition quickly from a fragile to basic limited access
order after the Emergency. Malaysia then transformed to a mature limited access
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order10 and even came close to establishing the “doorstep conditions” for moving to an
open access order (OAO) before slipping away from the doorstep in recent years.
Malaysia became a mature LAO, because the state supports many organizations
outside the government while the state sanctions each organization. This sanctioning
allows the government, run through a hegemonic party in Malaysia, to limit
competition and create rents that perpetuate the ruling elite coalition. The Alliance
Party and its successor, the National Front, continued to expand access to elites in
Malaysia, which increased the size of rent-seeking opportunities.
Despite the recent crisis within the National Front, which contributed to it
losing its two-thirds majority in government in 2008, Malaysia’s public institutions
have survived changes within the ruling coalition. Until the late 1990s, Malaysia
appeared to have reached the “doorstep conditions” where Malaysia could have moved
from an LAO to an OAO. Malaysia’s self-enforcing equilibrium that emerged after
the Emergency evolved as an LAO capable of impersonal exchange among elites,
which maintained: 1) rule of law for elites; 2) support for perpetually lived elite
organizations; and 3) centralized and consolidated control of violence (North et al.
2009a). Yet, Malaysia has moved away from the “doorstep conditions” as rule of law
for elites has slipped away, most clearly evidenced by the treatment of Anwar Ibrahim,
and as the state has again diversified violent means to local elites through RELA.
Anwar Ibrahim, the deputy prime minister and finance minister of Malaysia
from 1993 to 1998, was one of Prime Minister Mahathir’s protégés. During Ibrahim’s

10

See North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a, 2009b) for a deeper explanation of the distinction between
fragile, basic, and mature limited access orders.
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rise, he was part of the elite pact that guaranteed self-enforcing stability in Malaysia.
Following the Asian Financial Crisis, Ibrahim became an internal critic of the regime
and developed popular support for his opposition. As he moved himself outside of the
elite pact, the mechanisms of the mature LAO in Malaysia organized against Ibrahim.
“Malaysia’s potent party-state organizations were … deployed to ensure that the
opposition would have no chance of removing Mahathir from office through
Malaysia’s [LAO] institutions” (Slater 2003, 95-96). Lee Kuan Yew, who carefully
maintained a mature LAO in Singapore, insightfully commented on the maintenance
of Malaysia’s elite pact when he stated, “I am not saying Anwar Ibrahim has not got a
following. What I am saying is that there are institutional checks and balances and
systems that will not allow civil order to be upset” (Ranawana and Oorjitham 1998).
Checks and balances do not exist only in democracies; mature LAOs contain strong
institutional mechanisms to maintain self-enforcing elite pacts.
Despite moving away from the OAO doorstep, Malaysia remains a mature
LAO because of its self-enforcing institutions that maintain the country’s elite pact.
The actions of the British as an external actor to provide credible commitments to the
government and opposition during the Malayan Emergency enabled the development
of an elite pact that set Malaysia on this self-enforcing path. The British did not try to
create a democracy, but rather a stable society that would support Britain’s economic
and national security interests. This stable society developed into a mature LAO.
Additionally, the diversification of violent means and rent-seeking opportunities set
the conditions for the government and opposition to develop their own credible
commitments that endured after Britain’s departure and Malayan independence. As
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the elite pact solidified through reduced violence and power sharing, it was possible
for the Malayan government to recentralize violent means. The recentralization of the
security apparatus helped maintain the elite pact in Malaysia’s mature LAO in the late
1990s. “The Malaysian police’s institutionalized loyalty … helped ensure its
coherence and effectiveness in suppressing both the elite defection and popular dissent
that … arose when [Ibrahim] was … dismissed” (Slater 2003, 95). The
recentralization of power, along with expanding the base of elites in the dominant
coalition through public and private institutions, contributed to Malaya moving from a
basic to mature LAO.
The lessons from Malaya have been misinterpreted, and, as a result, their
impact on current policy formation has been somewhat misguided. The conventional
Malaya narrative lacks an understanding of the underlying causal logic of overcoming
elite credible commitment problems that led to the defeat of the communists and
establishment of stability. Current COIN doctrine has adopted the conventional
lessons from Malaya, potentially misdirecting policy development and implementation
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army’s COIN manual discusses the retraining of the
Malayan police force, stating, “Manpower is not enough [in combating insurgency];
well-trained and well-disciplined [host-nation] forces are required. The Malayan
example also illustrates the central role that police play in counterinsurgency
operations” (Department of the Army 2006, 6-21-6-22). The lesson from this
statement implies that trained host-nation forces must stand up before the external
actor’s COIN forces can stand down. Yet, the COIN manual ignores the role of the
Home Guards, the manual teaches centralization of force, when the real lesson is that
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initially decentralizing violent means may set the conditions for stability and future
centralization of force.

6.3.2. Implications of Self-Enforcing Stability Established in Iraq between 2006-2008
While the British helped establish enduring, self-enforcing stability in Malaya,
the endurance of the U.S.-led effort to stabilize Iraq is tenuous. The goal of rapid
centralization in Iraq is likely to fail because the institutional structures being built do
not match the social order. The transition of the SOI to the Iraqi government and the
disengagement of the external actor have just begun, so it is too soon to say if the
agreement is self-enforcing without the external actor. But, it is possible to
extrapolate possible outcomes. If the Iraqi government quickly emplaces a
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program for the SOI members
(Kilcullen 2007) or if the coalition keeps pushing the GoI to transition 20% of the SOI
into the Iraqi Army and Police and move the other 80% into public or private jobs
(Weinstein 2008), the potential for destabilization is high. While the Weberian-based
conventional wisdom argues for centralizing force and disarming different factions,
the “Awakening” has shown that the oligopolization of force between elites actually
reduces violence under the current conditions.
It will take time before Iraq moves from a fragile natural state to a mature
natural state in which centralization can occur. An examination of the earlier efforts
by the Iraqi government and MNF-I to disarm the Sunni tribes showed that violence
increased during that time, and that the Sunnis rationally resisted the government’s
efforts. The model in Figure 3.2 showed that to get to a self-enforcing agreement, it
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will now be up to the Sunnis and Iraqi government to recognize the benefits that each
side has gained from the elite pact that developed out of the “Awakening” and the
“Surge”. As both sides have begun building trust and showing that they all currently
have incentives to defend the pact, the government and opposition should work to
maintain the pact in its current form.
If the pact is changed, this will change the internal balance of interests, which
would likely lead to a collapse of the stability mechanism. For example, the Iraqi
government recently arrested Anbar tribal leaders for insurgent activity they had
committed prior to the “Awakening,” despite the fact that amnesty for past activity is
part of the pact between the government and opposition (Rasheed and Sly 2009). If
violations such as this continue, the stability gained from the pact will not be selfenforcing. Further, the inability to form a government within eight months of the
March 2010 Iraqi elections poses a threat to self-enforcing stability in Iraq. If the
Iraqis fail to form a new government based on the existing elite pact, this will
undermine the progress made in developing credibility mechanisms between the Shi’a
and Sunnis. The failure to form a new government can partially be attributed to the
loss of U.S. credibility following the signing of the Strategic Agreed Framework and
Status of Forces Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq in 2007 and 2008, respectively,
which set specific restriction on and withdraw deadlines for U.S. involvement in Iraq.
This dissertation’s main research question—“what is the appropriate social
order external actors should help host nations attain in order for successful statebuilding to take place, and what incentives can external actors provide to get host
nations on this path?”—is important because policy choice answers have been
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wanting. Within the international community, a prevailing belief exists that it is
possible for external actors to build other states. Some argue that state-building and
democratization in Iraq have failed because of U.S. unilateralism. However, this
criticism does not address how external actors need to have appropriate expectations
for the type of social order that failed states can actually attain. The critics also
generally focus on winning the “hearts and minds” of the population, which is a
strategy that focuses on the wrong actors.
By focusing primarily on the populace instead of elites, policy makers provide
inappropriate incentives to solve conflict. Again, the population is not irrelevant to the
effort to create stability, but the initial focus must be on solving the credible
commitment problem between elites. The direct importance of the population
increases after solving this credible commitment problem, because expansion of the
limited access order towards an open access order requires addressing the concerns of
the broader population. So, focusing on the population before solving the credible
commitment problem leads to pacts with the wrong focal points between incorrect
actors, preventing these stability agreements from becoming self-enforcing with the
help of the external actor. The supporters of multilateral and “hearts and minds”
strategies have difficulty explaining or predicting the conditions needed for successful
external actor involvement, and do not provide answers to the above question. With
the likelihood of the continued challenge of weak and failed states leading to more
external actor interventions, it is important to understand the circumstances under
which external actor involvement can help, hurt, or have no effect in other countries’
state-building processes.
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6.4. Paths for Future Research
The insights gained from the alternative narratives of the Malayan Emergency
and Iraq stabilization in this dissertation provided initial answers to this dissertation’s
main research question and validation of the theory of self-enforcing stability. Yet,
more research will provide further testing of the theory and greater insight into the role
of external actors during state-building in other countries. This section describes
several different paths for future research that will further develop and test the logic of
the elite-centric theory presented in this dissertation. These recommended paths
include examining the impact of the external actor’s nature on state-building,
developing a typology of state-building outcomes based on multiple equilibria that
may form between elites, and exploring how external actors identify internal elites.

6.4.1. Exploring How the Nature of the External Actor Matters
The models in this dissertation are necessarily simplified representations of
theories that describe state-building processes. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the
use of simplified, extended-form games allows for the exploration and testing of the
primary logic underlying the conventional population-centric theory and the proposed
elite-centric theory. While numerous variables exist in the real-world that impact
state-building processes, trying to incorporate all, or many, of those variables would
render the model useless for explaining or testing the logic of the theories. For this
dissertation, the scope conditions limited the exploration of the nature of the external
actor to simply having benign or strategic intent. This section presents potential
extensions of the theory presented in Chapter 3.
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Two important factors to consider when determining the nature of the external
actor are the capacity and the preferences of the external actor. Capacity is important,
because as described in Chapter 3, “more is better” when it helps the external actor
prove its ability to credibly commit to the government and the opposition that the
external actor will enforce the elite pact. But, different types of actors inherently have
different capacities to provide the resources or take actions to prove their credibility
(e.g., money, personnel, equipment, time, conducting elections, developing
institutions, and making formal statements of intent).
Further, varying types of external actors may value preferences differently that
will impact the credibility of the external actor. Variances in preferences are related to
the external actor’s commitment level. Is the external actor really committed to
helping the government and opposition achieve stability for the long haul? Does the
external actor actually prefer one side to the other? If so, will the external actor really
punish transgressions by its preferred group? The initial intentions of external actors
may be the same, such as stability in the host-nation, but their state-building efforts
may end up with different outcomes based on resources available and the commitment
level of different types of external actors.
One extension of the model, then, is to consider comparative statics relating to
external actor capacity and preferences. Doing so will allow the models to provide
more insights into the strategic role of external actors in state-building and the
potential outcomes of the state-building process based on the external actor type.
Some possible comparative statics to incorporate to vary the external actor’s capacity
and preferences are: type of intervention (unilateral or multilateral), deployable force
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strength, national GDP, GDP-to-debt ratios, regime-type, size of defense industry,
rules of engagement, and intervention history.
A second extension is to allow the type of intervention to vary. The type of
intervention will impact the decision-making and implementation ability of the
external actor. Unilateral actors should have greater credibility than multilateral
external actors, especially IGOs, since there are less veto points and reduced collective
action problems for the external actor. The number and readiness of deployable
security forces and civilian bureaucratic personnel is an indication of the state-building
capacity of the external actor. The national GDP and GDP-to-debt ratio are indicators
of the financial resources available to the external actor to pay for the deployment of
personnel and to provide foreign assistance to the host nation. The regime-type
identifies possible time limitations that may exist for the external actor as democracies
face more acute audience costs than non-democracies for decisions to intervene
internationally (Fearon 1994; Tomz 2007). The size of the defense industry of the
external actor impacts the ability of the external actor to equip security forces in the
host nation. Rules of engagement serve as indicators of the credibility of the external
actor. Highly restrictive rules of engagement indicate that the external actor is less
likely to police transgressions and enforce the pact made by the host nation elites.
Finally, the external actor’s history of interventions in other states establishes a
reputation about the credibility of the external actor’s commitment to the statebuilding process, as well as the external actor’s capacity for such activities. Refining
and formalizing these and other possible comparative statics is one path for future
research.
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One possible avenue for future research is to, based on variations in these
comparative statics, develop a typology of external actors that will strengthen the
leverage of the models presented in this dissertation to improve policy analysis before
external actors undertake state-building interventions. Based on the possible
comparative statics described above, five possible external actor types emerge (see
Table 6.1). Future research can explore this proposed typology more systematically,
and potentially reclassify these or identify other external actor types. The first major
category to separate the capacity and preferences of external actors in this proposed
typology is state-led or international governmental organization (IGO)-led statebuilding efforts. The proposed typology then further distinguishes the external actors
based on the resources available to the external actor and the flexibility the external
actor has in utilizing those resources.
Type
Great Power (State)
Regional Power (State)
Weak Power (State)
Global IGO
Regional IGO

Capacity
High
Mixed
Low
Mixed
Mixed

Preferences/Credibility
Credible
Mixed
Not Credible
Partially Credible
Mixed

Table 6.1. Nature of External Actor Typology
The typology categorizes the different external actors based on their capacity
and the credibility. An external actor will have high, mixed, or low capacity. And, the
external actor will be credible, partially credible, or not credible. Mixed indicates that
the capacity or credibility varies depending on specific actors within the group. For
example, the European Union and the African Union have different capacities and
credibility levels as Regional IGOs. Future research will test these hypothesized
categorizations, and identify outlier cases.
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6.4.2. Developing a Typology of State-building Outcomes
As with the development of a typology of the nature of external actors
involved in state-building, further formalization of the theory of self-enforcing
stability can lead to the development of a typology of state-building outcomes. This
typology will help identify why and when some state-building efforts will probably
succeed, while others will probably fail. Deriving comparative statics will allow for
deeper analysis of the theory of self-enforcing stability by focusing on the interests
and preferences of the different actors involved in the process (government,
opposition, and external actor) rather than just the external actor’s committed
resources.
This future research may explain why multiple equilibria arise under different
conditions. This dissertation has followed a rational-choice perspective, and one of its
findings is that, for an external actor to contribute to successful state-building, the
conditions have to exist for the external actor to serve as the guarantor of a pact
between the government and opposition. The external actor must be able to make a
credible commitment to both sides that neither side can make on its own regardless of
either’s intention. If this condition does not exist, external actors will fail to contribute
to successful state-building processes. The development of a state-building typology
based on variations in comparative statics about the intent and preferences of the
different actors will help identify when the conditions exist for an external actor to
probably succeed, as well as the commitment level necessary to achieve success.
The strength of the theoretical framework provided in this dissertation is its
versatility. The derivation of comparative statics will provide a means for building
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greater leverage into the theory and its models. This dissertation identified two types
of state-building process that involve external actors: the “Podesta-Model” and the
“Post-(Neo)Colonial Model”. Chapters 4 and 5 provide single case studies to test each
of these models, respectively. Further research should include more cases to test the
underlying theory and potential outcomes. Other potential cases to research that may
illuminate the theory and help clarify the “Podesta-Model” include BosniaHerzegovina, East Timor, Kosovo, and the NATO-led Afghanistan mission. Each of
these cases includes a different type of external actor as described in Section 6.4.1.
above, so the research may find that different outcomes occur in this model based on
the nature of the external actor. Additionally, through further formalization and
examination of these cases, it may be possible to adjust the model to better understand
how the external actor can disengage and further the development of self-enforcing
stability between the internal actors.
The “Post-(Neo)Colonial Model” captured the effort of one-type of strategic
external actor trying to disengage while leaving in place self-enforcing stability in the
host-nation. The rules and assumptions of this model treated the external actor and
government as having the same interests as the colonizer tries to transition authority to
internal actors before independence. The population became the third actor in this
model. Examining other colonial transitions will help further develop this model by
exploring successes and failures in leaving behind self-enforcing stability after
colonial rule. Possible cases include the British Raj, Kenya, and Algeria. The model
may also apply to modern state-building efforts that possibly resemble neocolonialism.
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While examining additional “Podesta-Model” cases, future research should
also test those cases against the “Post-(Neo)Colonial Model”. The model in Chapter 3
discussed an external actor’s choice to maintain a colony or decolonize, but the
lessons from the Malayan application of the model in Chapter 5 may apply under other
circumstances. To avoid becoming a neo-colonizer, the Podesta-type external actor
must keep transitioning authority to the internal actors as the ultimate goal. In the
post-Cold War era, neo-trusteeship (Fearon and Laitin 2004) and shared sovereignty
(Krasner 2004) have become potential forms of neo-colonialism, so it is necessary to
examine how external actors remain credible in these circumstances and can facilitate
self-enforcing elite pacts in the host-nation.
The apparent early successes of external actor interventions to help establish
self-enforcing stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor have soured in recent
years. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia, established to oversee
the Dayton Peace Accords, remains the supreme authority in Bosnia despite the goal
of closing the OHR and transitioning sovereignty in 2008 (OHR 2010). The external
actor, as neo-trustee, has helped keep the peace in Bosnia, but has yet to achieve a
self-enforcing equilibrium between the government and opposition that is likely to
endure after the external actor departs. The international community focused on
establishing a liberal democracy with mass participation and centralizing violence
upon assumption of the OHR ("The Dayton Peace Accords" 1995; Clinton 1995;
Carpenter 2000) rather than trying to build a limited access order and controlling the
diversification of violent means and rent-seeking to establish an elite pact. The
international community also pushed for quick elections and the establishment of
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democracy and centralized force in East Timor ("Agreement Between the Republic of
Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor" 1999; United
Nations 2002; United Naitons 2005). Yet, East Timor faced a coup in 2006 (O'Brien
2006; BBC News 2010b), as well as another in 2008 with simultaneous assassination
attempts on the president and prime minister (Ansley 2008; MacKinnon 2008).
Applying both elite-centric models in this dissertation to these cases may help explain
why despite enormous external actor involvement, Bosnia and East Timor have failed
to achieve self-enforcing stability.
Adjusting the rules and assumptions of the theoretical framework in this
dissertation will make it possible to understand different types of cases within the
context of a unified theory. One additional type occurs by shifting the external actor
from a Podesta-type who defends all sides of the pact against the transgressor to a
non-Podesta-type who fails to defend the pact. This set of rules and assumptions may
fall in line with the belief that U.N. forces “run when others shoot”. Possible cases for
examining this “U.N.- Model” include Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica. Comparing
this “U.N.-Model” with the other model-types may provide additional insight into the
appropriate resources—credible commitment mechanisms—that external actors can
provide under varying conditions, and if the external actor’s credible commitment
really does matter for establishing stability in failed or fragile states.
While the “Podesta” and “U.N.” types assume benign or noble intent by the
external actor, the theoretical framework also allows for changing that assumption and
making the external actor another strategic player in the game, as in the “Post(Neo)Colonial Model”. Under this paradigm, another type of state-building process
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may take place. During the Cold War, the two superpowers intervened in the internal
affairs of many states, but did not necessarily care about establishing stable peace in
failed or fragile states. Under a “Cold War Model,” the external actor may provide its
resources to get one side to win or to foment violence and actually create instability in
the society. Some cases to explore include Nicaragua where the U.S. supported the
opposition, El Salvador where the U.S. supported the government, and Afghanistan
where the Soviets supported the government while the U.S. supported the opposition.
The above possible paths for future research display the richness of the framework
provided in this dissertation. More broadly though, this framework provides a
possible methodology for studying policy problems that involve the rules governing
how external actors should act with respect to other states.

6.4.3. Identifying Who Are the Internal “Elites”
Another path for future research is exploring how to identify who the elites are
within the host nation. To the external actor’s agents on the ground, it is often
challenging to identify the elites in a foreign land. Most soldiers and civilians
operating in Iraq and Afghanistan have interacted with sheiks, tribal elders, imams,
councilmen, and governors. So, how is it possible for aliens to another society or
culture to differentiate the few elites from the thousands of people with important
sounding titles who are seeking to exploit the naïveté of the external actor’s agents for
personal gain? The cliché of “take me to your leader” often becomes reality for elite
identification.
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Adding more actors to the models in this dissertation would weaken the
parsimony of the theory, reducing its leverage. To overcome this, it is possible to
explore different types of actors within each category and their impact on the statebuilding outcome—as described with the nature of external actors in Section 6.4.1. It
may be useful to develop typologies of different government and opposition elites that
exist. Besides these typologies, it is important for external actors to understand how
elites are identified in foreign cultures.
One method to understand this identification problem is by surveying on-theground participants in recent state-building efforts. A starting point would be to
survey Army commanders and State Department personnel who have had direct
interaction with Iraqis at the local, provincial, and national level to determine how
they identified the elites with whom to work. The survey would help provide insight
into how identification actually takes place and how personnel correct
misidentification. Some questions the survey would seek to answer are: How did
these personnel define elites? Were the personnel told which Iraqis to work with, or
did they have to identify the elites themselves? What procedures did they use to
identify an elite? What procedures did the personnel use to validate that a person was
an elite after identifying the person as such? What did these personnel do once they
determined an individual turned out not to be an elite?
Surveying company and battalion commanders, as well as State Department
personnel operating in local field offices will help explain how external actors
identified elites at the local level. Surveying brigade and division commanders, as
well as Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) leaders will provide insight into
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identifying elites at the provincial or regional level. And, surveying corps and force
commanders, as well as country team members will generate an understanding of how
to identify national elites. Surveying commanders and personnel at these three levels
will identify if the process of identifying elites is similar or different based on the level
of analysis. Further, surveying military commanders and State officials who operated
in Iraq at different times will show if elites become “sticky”. After the initial
identification of elites, do personnel reexamine the identification of an elite by the
previous personnel or do they just continue following previously established
relationships? Is the initial identification of elites the most important time period? If
so, is there a systematic way for external actors to identify the true elites at the start of
state-building efforts?
While this section has recommended initially surveying military commanders
and State Department officials who served in Iraq, the survey could be conducted with
military commanders and foreign affairs officials who have taken part in other statebuilding efforts. Some of these other efforts include: Somalia, Haiti, BosniaHerzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and
Afghanistan. And, surveying personnel from multiple efforts may provide greater
insight into the development of the typology of state-building outcomes described in
Section 6.4.2.

6.5. Conclusion
The theory of self-enforcing stability presented in this dissertation contributes
to our understanding of the role of external actors in helping to stabilize or destabilize
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failed or fragile states. The results of the case analysis in this dissertation and the
proposed future research should have an impact on future policy deliberations and
decisions related to state-building efforts. Particularly useful are the findings that
external actors can promote self-enforcing stability by focusing on 1) helping the
development of limited access orders rather than democracies in host nations, 2)
promoting the ologopolization of force rather than following the Weberian belief in
monopolization of force, 3) the external actors helping solve commitment problems,
and 4) shifting from a population- to an elite-centric focus until after solving the
credible commitment problems.
Policymakers have followed the prescriptions of the population-centric lessons
learned from the conventional wisdom about the Malayan Emergency and the Iraq
“Surge” in Afghanistan. Yet, this dissertation has shown that the incorrect lessons
were learned from Malaya and Iraq, which may explain why NATO is unlikely to set
the conditions for self-enforcing stability in Afghanistan despite the latest “Surge” in
that country. Putting the population-centric rhetoric about the strategy in Afghanistan
aside, NATO forces have increased conventional operations (Gall 2010) and have
made major efforts to cut a deal with the Taliban (Cooper and Shanker 2010). NATO
has even secured passage for and secretly flown Taliban leaders in from the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border to Kabul for peace negotiations (Filkins 2010b; Shanker
et al. 2010).
The talks with the Taliban leadership indicate that NATO leadership
understands the importance of developing elite pacts. But, the question remains,
whom is NATO helping form an elite pact between? Is the pact between NATO and
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the Taliban, or is the NATO helping establish one between the government in Kabul
and the Taliban? While the assumption is that the U.S. is helping broker a peace deal
between the government (Kabul) and the opposition (the Taliban), it is not clear that
the two parties are interested in an elite pact, and that NATO may be just negotiating
with the Taliban for NATO’s own exit from Afghanistan. In addition to NATO
negotiations between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), Iran has
maintained ties with both the Taliban and the GoA.
Although Iran may have supported the Taliban with military equipment and
expertise early on (Bruno and Beehner 2009; Setrakian 2009), Iran likely supported
the Taliban as a counter to the U.S. more than as a counter to the Afghan government.
Iran never recognized the Taliban regime when they controlled power in Kabul
(Kaplan 2009) and the two states actually had tense relations at the time (Burke 1998;
Rashid 1999; 2000 [2010], 74-75), so it would not be surprising if Iran continued to
support Karzai over the Taliban after NATO’s departure. Recently, the Iranian regime
has become a major behind the scenes backer of the Karzai government (Filkins
2010a). Further, with tensions increasing between the Afghanistan and U.S.
governments (Filkins and Rubin 2010; Ajami 2010), as well as the withdrawal
deadlines made public by NATO members (Obama 2009; Murphy 2010; Traynor
2010), it is not even clear that the primary external actor can provide the credible
commitment mechanisms necessary for the government and opposition to agree to an
elite pact. With this view of elite relations in Afghanistan, the ability of the external
actor to help establish a limited access order between the government and opposition
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and to solve the credible commitment problems between the government and
opposition is limited.
So, of the four conditions necessary to achieve self-enforcing stability
presented in this dissertation, the external actor has marginally met one of the criteria.
While following a de-jure population-centric strategy, NATO has implemented a defacto elite-centric policy in Afghanistan. The other three criteria for possibly
achieving self-enforcing stability have not been met in Afghanistan. First, despite the
outreach to elites, NATO has failed, to date, to provide credible commitments to both
the government and opposition that would allow the two internal actors to form an
elite pact. Second, the absence of an elite pact, along with NATO’s focus on
democratic institutional development and anti-corruption efforts, has prevented the
external actor from facilitating the formation of a limited access order. Finally, NATO
has emphasized creating a Weberian monopolization of force under the control of the
central government. NATO sees developing the Afghan Security Forces, especially
the Afghan National Army, as a key element of its exit strategy (Simpson 2010). Yet,
it is unlikely that the Afghan Army will be combat ready to take over from NATO
forces upon their withdrawal (Chivers 2010; Motlagh 2010), and the loyalty of the
Afghan Security Forces to the central government is equally questionable (BBC News
2010a; International Crisis Group 2010). While the British supported the
decentralization of violent means through the Home Guard in Malaya and the U.S.
encouraged the “Awakening Movements” in Iraq, NATO has yet to do the same in
Afghanistan. This approach is counter to this dissertation’s finding that initially
oligopolizing violent means helps establish stability by creating balance of power.
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Amongst recent policy recommendations being made for what the U.S. should
do in Afghanistan, decentralization has started to come to the fore. The latest issue of
Foreign Affairs has an article that argues for the need to decentralize democracy in
Afghanistan. Biddle et al. (2010) contend that this will facilitate power sharing
between competing factions in Afghanistan and help restore confidence amongst the
Afghan people who distrust central rule emanating from Kabul. While Biddle et al.
cling to the use of the word democracy in describing their effort to broker an elite pact
through decentralization that would balance power between competing elites, their
recommendation is similar to the federalism proposal made by then-Senator Biden and
Leslie Gelb (2007) for Iraq.
These recommendations start to overcome the problems of conventional COIN
theory discussed in Chapter 2 and NATO’s current Afghan policy focus on
centralization and institutionalization. Particularly important is the recognition of the
need to decentralize rent-seeking opportunities. Yet, while the recommendation
mentions the importance of local elites, the advice still fails to recognize the
underlying credible commitment problems between internal elites and how the
external actor’s assistance in oligipolizing force can help overcome that challenge.
The recommenders still argue for the need to centralize the control of violent means,
missing an important way to overcome the commitment problem. The theory of selfenforcing stability presented in this dissertation identified four components that may
provide the greatest chance for developing enduring stability in Afghanistan, as well
as during other state-building efforts in states torn by internal conflict: 1) follow an
elite-centric strategy; 2) external actors must provide mechanisms to overcome
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credible commitment problems between internal elites; 3) oligopolize violent means
and rent-seeking; and 4) focus on establishing limited access orders rather than
democracies.
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